Irregular Warfare in Latin America: The American Policy and Strategy of Irregular Warfare in Guatemala

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    The United States developed a policy and strategy of irregular warfare to be deployed in Guatemala in 1954. The changing political climate post World War II created a need for the United States to utilize a measured, proportional possibly covert method of dealing with a communist incursion without escalating into a massive fullblown war. This strategy was deployed under Operation PBSUCCESS in 1954. This study concludes that while the strategy of irregular warfare was a successful failure during Operation PBSUCCESS, it would not have succeeded if reproduced. Additionally the operation would provide a blueprint for future irregular operations worldwide. The first chapter outlines the global political and economic climate that culminates in the development of Operation PBSUCCESS. Chapter two focuses on the operation development. Finally chapter three focuses on the launching of PBSUCCESS in Guatemala and the immediate aftermath.
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    Duggan, Christopher (author),(Martin Wilson, Ph.D.) (Thesis advisor),(Michael Gray. Ph.D.) (Committee member),East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania History (Degree grantor)
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