IRREGULAR WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY OF IRREGULAR WARFARE
IN GUATEMALA

Christopher Duggan, BA
East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History
To the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies of East Stroudsburg University of
Pennsylvania

January, 10 2020

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ABSTRACT
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in
History to the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies of East Stroudsburg University of
Pennsylvania.
Student’s Name: Christopher Duggan
Title: Irregular Warfare in Latin America: The American Policy and Strategy of Irregular
Warfare in Guatemala.
Date of Graduation: January 10, 2020
Thesis Chair: Martin Wilson, Ph.D.
Thesis Member: Michael Gray. Ph.D.
Abstract
The United States developed a policy and strategy of irregular warfare to
be deployed in Guatemala in 1954. The changing political climate post World War II
created a need for the United States to utilize a measured, proportional possibly covert
method of dealing with a communist incursion without escalating into a massive fullblown war. This strategy was deployed under Operation PBSUCCESS in 1954. This
study concludes that while the strategy of irregular warfare was a successful failure
during Operation PBSUCCESS, it would not have succeeded if reproduced. Additionally
the operation would provide a blueprint for future irregular operations worldwide. The
first chapter outlines the global political and economic climate that culminates in the
development of Operation PBSUCCESS. Chapter two focuses on the operation
development. Finally chapter three focuses on the launching of PBSUCCESS in
Guatemala and the immediate aftermath.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES: ……………………………………………………………….…..v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT……………………………………………………………...vi
INRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………… vii

CHAPTER
I.

A Prelude to Irregular Warfare……………………………………….…… 1

II.

The United States in Guatemala and the Development of PBSUCCESS
and PBFORTUNE………………………………………………………

III.

37

The Successful Failure: Operation PBSUCCESS………………………… 65

EPILOGUE ….………………………………………………………………………

101

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………

109

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Chapter I
1.1

Mohammed Mossadeq on Cover of Time Magazine …………………… 5

1.2

Map of Iranian Oil Fields……………………………………………....

1.3

Map of Guatemala……………………………………………………… 20

1.4

Jacobo Arbenz Guzman on Cover of Time Magazine………………….. 26

1.5

Map of United Fruit Company, 1952…………………………………... 33

7

Chapter II
2.1

Castillo Armas in Full Military Dress ……………………………………43

Chapter III
3.1

Image of Castillo Armas Forces being trained………………………......71

3.2

Map of Invasion, 1952………………………………………………..… 73

3.3

Map of Invasion, 1954…………………………………………………. 85

3.4

Bombing of Gasoline Depot…………………………………………... 92

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to all of family and friends who
have helped and supported me through the entire thesis process. Thank you for not letting
me give up on it. Thank you to Dr. Michael Gray for his insight and guidance on my
topic when it was in its early stages and his help with reviewing my many drafts. For Dr.
Martin Wilson who constantly stayed with me through everything. Taking the time to
mentor me, helping with my writing style and taking the time out of an already full
schedule to help me finish my thesis was greatly appreciated. I would never have been
able to finish this without his support and encouragement. Lastly, I would like thank Dr.
John Borek (LTC, US-Army Retired) for all his help, encouragement, advice and
guidance throughout. Thank you for staying with me and constantly being there for me to
discuss ideas or bounce concepts off you.

vi

INTRODUCTION

In the years following World War II, the global geopolitical landscape changed
dramatically. In Europe, the fascist in Germany and Italy had surrendered to Allied
forces. In the Pacific theater of operations, the Japanese Imperial Army had
unconditionally surrendered to Allied forces only after the United States dropped two
atomic bombs on the Japanese home island.1 Great Britain, the United States and the
Soviet Union were left with the arduous task of rebuilding a devastated Europe.
However, building tension between the United States and the Soviet Union that started
during the war derailed any idea of a combined rebuilding effort. The Soviet Union
captured much of Eastern Europe including half of Germany, while the United States and
her allies restored the liberated countries of Western Europe to their respective
democracies.
Europe was in need of desperate rebuilding. The bombing missions carried out by
both the Allies and the Nazis destroyed many of the major cities. Instead of having a

1 The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the first and only time in
history that such a weapon of mass destruction had been used.

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clear picture and joint cooperation to rebuild, Europe again found itself divided by
politics. Western European countries returned to their democratic status. Germany was
divided into four occupied zones, Great Britain in the northwest portion, France in the
southeast, and the United States in the South while the Soviet Union occupied the eastern
half of Germany, dividing it into East and West Germany. Even the German capital of
Berlin, which was situated in the Soviet zone, was divided in half with Great Britain, the
United States and France controlling one half and the Soviet Union controlling the other.
In Asia, the United States led the Allied forces in occupation and rehabilitation of
the Japanese state. The occupation was divided into three phases: the initial effort to
punish and reform Japan, the work to revive the Japanese economy, and the conclusion of
a formal peace treaty and alliance. 2 Allied forces, under the command of U.S. General
Douglas MacArthur, began the arduous task of rebuilding Japan. War crimes trials and
removal of Japanese Imperial army personnel from key positions was part of the all
important first phase. This also included removing most of the Imperial Japanese
emperor’s power thus making his position all but ceremonial. 3 In addition, Allied leaders
dismantled much of the Japanese military and turn it into a strictly defensive force
charged with protecting Japan.4

2 “Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan, 1945-1952”. U.S. Department of State,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction (Accessed 10-March 2019)
3 Emperor Hirohito was the head of state of Japan during World War II. Credited with managing
Japan through financial crisis as well a massive military overhaul of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy,
Hirohito surrendered to Allied forces in August 1945. After the surrender, he was not prosecuted for war
crimes.
4 Until the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan struggled to rebuild and worried about their future
protection from the growth of Communist China. When the Korean War broke out, Japan solidified itself as
a major center for Allied operations. The United States opened several military bases in Japanese territory

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Throughout American history, the United States did not possess a national
strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends.
Military force was only used during war as a means to achieve victory. The United States
was not involved in international politics continuously enough to permit the development
of a coherent national strategy for the consistent pursuit of political goals with a
combination of diplomacy and armed force. During the Cold War, the United States
departed from historical habits of isolationism and sought to form a national strategy for
the employment of America power in defense and promotion of the country’s values and
interests. The new national strategy would be not merely a military strategy but an allinclusive plan for the use of the nation’s total resources encompassing military strategy
and diplomatic and political means to defend and advance the national interests. 5
In addition to a new military strategy to combat the growth of communism, the
United States entered into its first peace-time alliance outside the western hemisphere.
Europe required an enormous influx of aid to help war torn landscapes, re-establish
industries, produce food, and to provide assurance against a resurgence of Germany or
incursion from the Soviet Union. Western Europe was increasingly concerned about their
physical and political security against the backdrop of Soviet expansion. In 1949, the
Truman administration agreed with Western European leaders to form a EuropeanAmerican alliance to bolster security of Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty

to support the war effort in Asia. As a result, the United States basically ensure that Japan would never
have to worry about being attacked again. The United States and Japan signed a mutual defense pact that
also cover Japan under the “nuclear umbrella.”
5 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 191), XV.

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Organization (NATO) would be comprised of twelve member nations all agreeing to
mutual support and to consider an attack against one of them as an attack against all of
the member nations.6 This collective defense also put most of Western Europe under the
“nuclear umbrella” of the United States, giving a further deterrence against the Soviets
and its satellite countries. 7
When the Eisenhower Administration took over from Truman, they embraced
deterrence enthusiastically. Dwight D Eisenhower was less inclined to look towards plans
of mobilization on the pattern of the World Wars. Eisenhower’s administration was keen
to extricate the United States from the Korean Police Action and to ensure against future
involvements in prolonged wars. The strategy of deterrence was inherited from the
Truman administration, as was the Korean mobilization. Eisenhower’s administration
was also the heir to unquestioned American military superiority, particularly in nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them. 8
However, there were those within the Eisenhower administration who feared that
a danger to American security existed within the very plans of the Truman
Administration’s enhancement of military superiority. These officials believed that the

6 NATO was comprised of twelve founding countries, in North America the United States and
Canada. In Europe, the countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom all signed the mutual defense pact. As of 2019,
NATO has expanded to include twenty nine countries. When the Soviet Union collapsed several countries
previously aligned with the Soviet Bloc signed the treaty to formally become part of NATO. Montenegro
become the most recent signing came in 2017
7 “North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949.” U.S. Department of State,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/northatlantictreatyorganization,1949 (Accessed 10-March
2019

8

Weigley, 399-400.

x

American contest with the Soviet Union was as much an economic engagement as a
military or diplomatic one. They believed that as part of the communist design, if
America could not be conquered in war, then the communists would strive to strain the
United States economy into eventual collapse by baiting them into excessive military
spending over an indefinite period of time. Eisenhower felt that having achieved total
military superiority, the United States must limit its further military buildup and reduce
military expenditures for the sake of the economy. Rather working against any specific
immediate military danger, the American military should maintain a constant state of
readiness over a prolonged period of time. 9 This heightened state of perpetual readiness
created less economic strain. To gain military security at the cost of fiscal and economic
peril would be contraindicated and play directly into the Soviet’s plan.
Massive nuclear retaliation could not deter all types of Communist aggression.
The United States needed to return to a strategy of deterrence not centered around nuclear
weapons alone but a balancing of all military aspects. The strategy should deter
aggression on any scale by means of readiness to make proportioned responses according
to any type of enemy assault. 10 Such a measured response would provide several different
options to be on the table in the event of Communist aggression within any part of the
world.
This paper looks to explore the American strategic thought and the employment
of an irregular warfare strategy in Guatemala beginning in 1950 building up to and

9

Weigley, 400-401.

10

Weigley, 411.

xi

through 1954. With the shift in American military strategy going away from direct
prolonged conflict, irregular warfare presented a different method to achieve a military
goal with minimal cost of U.S. resources and personnel, and allowed for maximum
effectiveness in achieving the goal. For the United States, this would be the first time that
an irregular warfare operation was developed and implemented outside the purview of a
declared war. The rhetoric and motivation of the United States changed following World
War II; Operation PBSUCCESS reflects the change in the approach towards conflict
without pulling the world into another global war. By combining economic, diplomatic,
military and psychological warfare, the umbrella term of irregular warfare offered the
United States the chance to utilize a measured, proportional possibly covert method of
dealing with a communist incursion without escalating into a massive full-blown war.
The changing tense political climate only heightened the need for a measured response
that allowed the United States to combat Communism beyond the scope of nuclear
deterrence but not break the economic bank. The irregular warfare strategy employed by
the United States offered a unique approach to engage in direct and indirect combat
against a foreign country without drawing down the attention of the entire world or bring
down the Communist military hammer.
While other authors have examined the reasons why the United States went into
Guatemala, no one has examined these events from a more strategic and military
standpoint. Historians have broken down the Guatemala events primarily into political or
economic ones. They have looked at it from many different points of view, but with the
advancement of the internet and documents being declassified and digitalized, more

xii

information is available for researchers to look at. 11 Nicholas Cullather, CIA staff
historian, wrote a history of the CIA’s role in PBSUCCESS in 1994 for the CIA itself.
He came to the conclusion that the CIA operation “barely succeeded.” This is an entirely
accurate and logical conclusion; the operation succeeded in spite of operational and
security set backs. The operation was a “successful failure” that would later be launched
against Fidel Castro and the communists in Cuba. 12 But there it was a complete disaster.
Cullather’s look at the history of the CIA’s involvement is essential in order to examine
the complexities between national policy and irregular operations.
Outside the intelligence community, the historical dialog concerning Operation
PBSUCCESS is intricate and is complicated, but it can primarily be narrowed to two
main arguments, political and economic. Historians and authors have varying arguments
as to why the United States intervened in Guatemala. Journalists Stephen Kinzer and
Stephen Schlesinger corroborated on a work on why the United States intervened in
Guatemala. According to Kinzer and Schlesinger, through the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the U.S. organized, trained, financed and equipped the invasion force that
overthrew President Arbenz. While heavily biased against the coup d’état in Guatemala,
Kinzer and Schlesinger come to the conclusion that the United States in theory was

11 Documents including assassination guidelines and information about Operation PBSUCCESS
were among several hundred documents released by the CIA on 23 May 1997. Many of these were heavily
redacted but were digitalized by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
Additionally, more than 80 million pages were discovered by accident in Guatemala on 21 October 2011.
These documents primarily concern Guatemala during their 36 year long bloody civil war.
12 The “Successful Failure” comes from the facts that the operation succeeded despite the tactical
and logistical problems that occurred. But more importantly, the incompetence of their enemy combined
with a massively successful psychological warfare campaign, allowed for the operation to succeed. It was a
one in a million victory that could not be duplicated in that form. It is why the operation was a complete
disaster in Cuba.

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looking to combat communism but in reality was operating to enhance the economic
benefits for the United States. 13
While there is little room to argue that there was a correlation to key members of
United States government involved in the operation were connected to the United Fruit
Company, it is a far stretch to say it was the main reason why the United States launched
an irregular operation against a democratically elected government. The United States
took massive risks even contemplating the operation with several security breaches
occurring prior to the operation even being launched. The potential political or even
military retaliation by the Soviets against the United States would make it unlikely that
the United States was “in it for the money.” Following World War II, there existed
paranoia about the Soviet Union, communism, and the threat it presented to the United
States. It is hard to prove that with all of the potential fallout and risk of starting a new
world war, the United States would intervene in Guatemala solely for economic gains,
specifically for the United Fruit Company. Kinzer and Schlesinger make a strong
argument that in the long term, the 1954 coup in Guatemala severely damaged U.S-Latin
American relations and destroyed the general notion of social democracy in Guatemala in
its aftermath.14
Historian Piero Gleijeses’ work, The Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States, 1944-1954, gives a thorough account of the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz

13 Schlesinger, Stephen C., and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American
Coup in Guatemala (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 7.

14

Kinzer and Schlesinger, 229.

xiv

regime from a Guatemalan background and perspective.15 Gleijeses argued that the brief
government of Arbenz might have become Guatemala’s best government until the
overthrow in 1954. Unlike Kinzer and Schlesinger, Gleijeses downplays the role of the
United Fruit Company. Instead he suggests that there was in fact a growing and
significant communist presence within the Arbenz regime. Yet despite the significant
presence, Gleijeses explains that Guatemala was in no danger of experiencing a
communist overthrow.
Gleijeses concludes that there was no “convenient villain of piece,” instead it was
a combination of imperialism, security concerns and economics that influenced the
intervention in Guatemala.16 This was something other historians have also concluded.
There was no one true “villain” to blame the cause of PBSUCCESS on. His account
showed that American and Guatemalan sources, both oral and written, show that “they
would have overthrown us even if we had grown no bananas.” While Gleijeses’ analysis
of the events and conclusions offer new insight, the political, military and economic
issues at this time in history make the narrative of the overthrown very complex with no
definitive answer. The most important piece that Gleijeses offers to the historiography is
his utilization of Guatemalan sources.

15 Unlike many of the other works exploring the Guatemalan coup, Gleijeses takes a different
approach to gathering information and first hand accounts. While other historians focused on the American
sources, Gleijeses interviewed Guatemalan sources and personnel close to Arbenz,. This is an invaluable
account in the historiographic account of the event. Gleijeses provides a new perspective for researchers
and historians.
16 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 7.

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From both a military history and an operational stand point, there are many firsts
that took place. This is the first time we see the development and implementation of an
irregular warfare operation outside the purview of a declared war. Before, any and all
irregular warfare operations that took place did so during a declared war. During World
War II, there were numerous examples of irregular warfare. One clear instance was the
French Resistance and their operation against the German Occupation in France. The
Resistance engaged in a wide variety of different attacks against the Germans with
everything from small direct engagements to assassinations of German military
personnel. The Resistance was aided by supplies, weapons and explosives given to them
by the Allied forces. Allied leadership credited the French Resistance for tieing up
thousands of German soldiers who could have otherwise been used to reinforce German
defenses during Operation OVERLORD.17 General Dwight Eisenhower, acknowledged
that without the assistance of the French Resistance, the liberation of France and the
defeat of Germany would have taken much longer and as a result greater Allied
casualties. Attempts by the Germans to deal with the Resistance fighters had only made
the guerillas more effective. 18 General Eisenhower estimated the value of the Resistance
to have been to ten to fifteen divisions at the time with one infantry division comprising
about ten thousand soldiers.19 The value of such irregular forces could not be understated
in relation to swiftness and success of the Allies in liberating France.

17 Operation OVERLORD was the code name designated for the amphibious landing across the
English Channel by Allied forces on the French coast. The successful operation allowed for Allied forces to
establish a foothold in what was once called “Fortress Europe.”
18 Will Iron, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (New
York: Public Affairs, 2006), 240.

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PBSUCCESS is a clear example of the United States undertaking and engaging in
irregular warfare outside a defined conflict. There was no official declaration of war
against Guatemala. In fact, the conflict itself was supposed to be conducted in a manner
that could not be traced back to the United States. The forces that attacked the
Guatemalan military during the coup were not technically under the command of any
specific military. Rather, they acted independently. 20 Castillo Armas’s forces attacked the
Guatemalan military as a guerilla force with the objective of overthrowing Arbenz
government.21
Beginning in the late 1940s, irregular warfare was in its infancy and would evolve
into a major tool in the United States military arsenal. Every war fought by the United
States following World War II had some aspect of irregular warfare within it. Specific
wars like the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan are more closely aligned with
irregular warfare because of the manner in which they were fought. The North
Vietnamese Army employed irregular warfare tactics against conventional American
military forces. United States Special Forces also employed the tactic against them
successfully. In Afghanistan, irregular warfare was the predominate manner in which the
war was fought. In the opening weeks of the War in Afghanistan, American forces

19Dwight

D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Norwalk, CT: Easton Press, 2001), 295.

20 In regards to military association, it is true that the United States was essentially the “Man
behind the Curtain” but Guatemala had no clear evidence that would stand up in an international court. The
United States managed to keep their distance just enough.
21 It is important to point out, that in the Post 9/11 world, Castillo Armas’ military force could be
defined as terrorists. Based on the parameters and definitions of 2019 United States military definitions,
the United States in 1954 could be seen as conspiring, sponsoring and encouraging terrorist actions against
a democratically elected government.

xvii

utilized local tribes and anti-Taliban militias to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces.
Taliban and insurgent forces did not engage in open direct battle, like was conducted in
World War, but utilized ambush tactics, fighting in cities, and terror tactics like
improvised explosive devices. 22
With irregular warfare style conflicts on the rise, the United States and her allied
have had to completely get away from nuclear deterrence and actively engage these
threats with standard military forces as well as with forces train to deal with this style of
warfare. Regular infantry forces are now trained in street-to-street fighting and guerilla
style engagements. This is a direct reflection of the forever changing battle dynamics
United States forces are required to deal with. In addition, the United States has increased
their deployment of local tribes and military forces to provide security within a territory
but also to engage in direct combat with the insurgent forces. The training of these forces
by U.S. military personnel allows the United States to reduce the number of combat
troops in a conflict region but also put more responsibility on the forces that will be
responsible for ensure the stability and control of the area.
This American strategy of fighting insurgents has evolved since the beginning of
the war. But the strategy for fighting in this manner can trace its lineage back to the early
1950s. The strategy developed under the Truman and Eisenhower administration had a
far longer reach than either administration could have possibly comprehended. The

22 In Afghanistan, the United States was the superior military force compared to the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda insurgent forces. As a result, the Taliban and insurgents failed whenever they tried to engage in
direct engagements with U.S forces. Instead, the Taliban and insurgents switched to an irregular warfare
strategy of fighting the enemy in hit and run tactics, ambushes, street to street fighting within a city as to
neutralize the American numerical advantage. To combat this, the United States relied more on Special
Forces and units trained in this style of fighting to spearhead operations,

xviii

events that led to and followed Operation PBSUCCESS provided the United States with a
stronger case study in the evolution of irregular warfare as a military strategy rather than
sole reliance on nuclear deterrence or massive military mobilization.
Based on the information presented, it is safe to conclude that the United States
did have mixed motives for their involvement in Guatemala but the prevention of the
spread of communism was a driving factor. From a military aspect, the strategy of
irregular warfare worked despite all of the negative aspects that came about in the
mission. It may not have been the prettiest or neatest operation ever conducted but it did
achieve its goal. In the context of military strategy, irregular warfare provided the United
States with another non-nuclear weapon in their arsenal of deterrence. Irregular warfare
could be a viable option against targets, enemies or countries where conventional warfare
was out of the question. Instead of risking open-war with the Soviet Union, the United
States could have a satellite force wage the war against communism without ever putting
an American soldier on the ground.
In the historiography of PBSUCCESS but also Latin America, more research
could be done into the complexities of irregular warfare across the whole of Latin
America. In the Post-9/11 era, there has been a massive expansion into the study of
irregular warfare.23 The evolution of battle in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken on the

23 On 11-September 2001, terrorists hijacked four domestic airliners in the United States with the
intent of committing mass suicide attacks. Two of the hijacked airliners were crashed into the both the
North and South Towers of the World Trade Center. The damage was catastrophic resulting in the collapse
of both towers. Another airliner was crashed into the side of the Pentagon in Washington D.C. The final
airliner crashed outside of Shanksville, PA after passengers on board stormed the cockpit and overtook the
terrorists. In total, more than 3,000 people were killed in the attack. The coordinated attack was perpetrated
by Osama bin Laden and the terrorist group al-Qaeda. As a result, the United States invaded Afghanistan
with the intent of eliminating Al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban Government. The ensuing conflict would

xix

qualities of irregular warfare. For future historians and researchers, PBSUCCESS and the
subsequent conflicts that ensued following PBSUCCESS might offer new insight into the
study and literature of irregular warfare. Additionally, with new documents being
declassified and digital archives making more of the information available. It would be
interesting to see what new information could reveal about the various aspects of the
build up to and the operation itself.

become the longest conflict in United States history to date. (Information taken from a variety of sources
including the Library of Congress, news articles from CNN, and the 9/11 Commission Report).

xx

CHAPTER I:
A Prelude to Irregular Warfare

After World War II, the United States saw the growth of the Soviet Union as an
immediate and imminent threat to U.S. interests. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine launched
the United States into a new era of foreign policy. 1 This policy would be put to the test
when political tensions reached a crescendo in Iran in 1951. Truman would not be in
office to see the final result of his policy; its follow through would fall to newly elected
president Dwight Eisenhower. Rather than undertaking direct military intervention to
prevent a Communist foothold in Iran and risk direct conflict with the Soviet Union, the
United States took a different yet more irregular route to handle the situation in Iran.
Following the situation in Iran, the United States saw communism as the main opponent
of the Truman Doctrine and U.S. interests. Iran was thought to be securely under British
control. The loss of Iran would mean loss of the resource of oil as well as a symbolic loss.
The Soviet Union and the ideal of communism was the clear and imminent danger. While
Iran was many thousands of miles away from Washington D.C., fear began to grow
within the United States government over how rapidly communism was spreading and

1

The Truman Doctrine was named after then President Harry Truman.

potentially where it could take root next. The major area of concern was Latin America,
specifically Guatemala. When a similar situation arose in Guatemala in 1952, the United
States again looked to a different method to combat potential communist growth. This
method would look to provide maximum effectiveness with minimal direct U.S. military
involvement and danger to U.S. military personnel all while maintaining deniability that
an operation was even happening.

In March 1947, Harry Truman declared that the United States would support
free peoples everywhere in “resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or
by outside pressures.” 2 This declaration came to be known as the “Truman Doctrine.”
3

The Truman Doctrine informed the world that the United States would not sit

passively by and allow outside governments or subversive forces to interfere in free
democratic countries. Truman identified with “Wilsonian Internationalism,”
especially with the League of Nations and neutrality revision.4 He had an
unquestioned faith in American moral superiority and favored a foreign policy of
military preparedness.5 While Truman supported the infant United Nations, he feared

2

Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman (Washington, DC, 1947)

179.
3 “Address of the President of The United States; Recommendation For Assistance to Greece and
Turkey.” (Delivered to: 80th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives; Document No. 171).
4 After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, he remarked that they should be left to destroy
one another. Although he opposed Germany winning, he likened Russian leaders to Adolf Hitler and Al
Capone and the “twin blight” of atheism and communism.
5, Arnold A. Offner, Provincialism and Confrontation: Truman’s Responsibility, Dennis and
Patterson, Thomas G., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations (Houghlin Mifflin Company, New
York, 2006) 304-306.

2

that appeasement, lack of preparedness and enemies at home and abroad would thwart
America’s mission to “win the peace” on its own terms. 6
Truman’s philosophy would be put to the test when the political situation in
Iran culminated in the installation of a new pro-Communist government in 1951. Any
operation or intervention under consideration by the United States in Iran would
require something other than convention military ground forces, like those being used
in a “police action” on the Korean peninsula.7 Conventional US military troops, along
with forces from different countries under the United Nations (UN), were being
deployed to aid in a “military police action” against Communist North Korea. UN
forces had intervened in the conflict on behalf of South Korea.8 Deployment of
conventional US ground troops against a potential pro-Communist government could
anger the Soviet Union, upsetting the delicate power balance and sending the world
into another world war or possible nuclear confrontation. Such an undertaking
presented a new and unique challenge for the Department of Defense and the newly
formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 9 In order for the United States to achieve

6

Offner, Provincialism and Confrontation: Truman’s Responsibility, 306.

7

The conflict in Korea is sometimes referred to as the Korean War or Korean Police Action.

8 In 1950, the United States, South Korea and forces from the United Nations were engaged in
military action on the Korean peninsula. The Communist country of North Korea, later supported by
Communist China, invaded the democratic country of South Korea on 25 June 1950. North Korea was
initially aided with materials and weapons from the Soviet Union and China. China would eventually
formally enter the war with its own troops on the side of North Korea. Allied and Communist forces would
eventually become stalemated and a ceasefire was signed on 23 July 1953. However, no formal peace
treaty ending the war was ever created.
9 The Central Intelligence Agency was developed from its World War II predecessor, the Office of
Strategic Services or OSS.

3

their mission objective while maintaining their distance from the operation they
would need to overthrow the Iranian government and install a pro-United States
government using minimal resources and non-US military personnel.
Immediately after World War II, Premier of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin
aimed to restore Russia’s 1941 boundaries, establish a sphere of influence in border
states and provide security against a recovered Germany or Japan or other hostile
capitalist state. 10 The Soviet Union sought to expand and tighten its grip on territories
that were captured from the Nazis. Soviet forces remained in northern Iran to
encourage pro-Communist groups and regimes in the region. The United States would
have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after World War II, but postwar
retrenchment by Great Britain from the areas east of the Suez Canal left a vacuum
that needed to be filled. For Iran, this meant that the United States would replace
Great Britain as the geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet Union.11 Washington
considered Iran to be a major strategic prize in the global power struggle and
ideological battle with the Soviet Union. During World War II, Iran was a critical aid
route for Allied supplies to Soviet Union forces fighting against Nazi forces. It served
as a major strategic point of interest within the region both politically and

10

Offner, Provincialism and Confrontation: Truman’s Responsibility, 304-306.

11 Scott A. Koch, “ZENDEBAD, SHAH!”: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of
Iranian Prime Minster Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC,
June 1998, 4.

4

geographically. Additionally, the United States strategically sought to deny the Soviet
Union the ability to gain control over this area, denying the expansion of communism
in the region.
On 7 March 1951, tensions in Iran came to a head when the Iranian leader was
killed. Islamic fundamentalists assassinated Iranian Prime Minster General Ali
Razmara. Mohammed Mossadeq succeeded Razmara as prime minister.12 (See Figure
1) Mossadeq’s immediate concern was gaining full control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC).

Figure 1.1: Image of Mohammad Mossadeq from Cover of Time Magazine13

12 Mohammed Mossadeq (Other sources have his name spelled “Mossadegh”) was described as a
“pixie” with a bald “billiard-ball head.” Before rising to power, he was known as a shrewd politician and
fervent nationalist. Walter LeFaber , The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy At Home And Abroad;
Volume II-Since 1896 (W.W. Norton and Company- New York-London), 545.
13 Image taken from Time Magazine Cover 4-June, 1951.
(www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19540628,00.html : Accessed 13 August 2018.)

5

The AIOC earned 250 million pounds sterling from its Iranian operations. Iranian oil
fields provided Britain with twenty-two million tons of oil products and seven million
tons of crude oil annually, which was essentially, 85 percent of all the fuel used by the
British Admiralty.14 The nationalization of the AIOC brought Iran and the Mossadeq
government into direct conflict with Great Britain and, in turn, the United States. The
loss of Iranian oil would have immediate and far-reaching consequences on the
economies of Western Bloc countries.15 For Great Britain it would have devastating
effect on their prestige and the perception of their place in the world. It would be the
inability of Great Britain and Iran to resolve this dispute on their own that inevitably
drew the United States into the conflict.16

14 Mary Anne Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil, and Iranian Nationalism, Dennis and Patterson,
Thomas G., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, (Houghlin Mifflin Company, New York,
2006), 340.
15 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-14) 8 January 1951, The Importance of Iranian and Middle
East Oil to Western Europe under Peacetime Conditions, 1-2.

16

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil, and Iranian Nationalism, 341.

6

Figure 1.2: Map of Iranian Oil Fields (Early 1950s)17

US officials saw the oil crisis as a potentially devastating destabilization force
in Iran and possibly the entire Middle East. Such a dramatic political shift in the
Soviet Union’s favor could have led to more communist advances and provide the
Soviets with a route to the oil-rich Persian Gulf. (See Figure 1.2) The US government
believed that the best option to stop the Soviet advance was a land barrier. The only
direct barrier to block the Soviet advance was Iran. Iran served as a crucial link in the
Western security chain. The loss of Iran to the Soviets would make defending Greece,
Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean impossible.18

17 Image taken from Stanford Digital Library, Undated Map of Iranian Oil Fields from CIA 1950s
(www.library.stanford.edu/iran)
18 Merrill and Paterson, Cold War Culture and the “Third World,” 340-341.

7

Iran was rife with intense domestic problems that required Mossadeq’s
immediate attention. Mossadeq alienated or angered many political groups within Iran
until the Tudeh, a pro-communist group aligned with the Soviets, was the only group
still supporting him. 19 American officials feared that a British failure to compromise
with Mossadeq would allow him to rally Iran’s virulent nationalism further, with
potentially devastating results for American interests. Initially, the Truman
administration behaved as an honest broker in the search for a settlement between the
British and Iran. On one hand, United States policy makers wanted a strong yet
commercially acceptable agreement that would not set a dangerous precedent or
encourage nationalism elsewhere. On the other, they sought a more flexible approach
to the rise of nationalism and the current dispute that allowed a settlement to be
reached before Iran domestically collapsed or succumbed to Soviet infiltration, both
politically and, potentially, militarily.20 The failure to find a compromise could see the
political situation in Iran spiral into chaos allowing the Soviet-sponsored Tudeh to
gain control of the country. The State Department believed that these developments
jeopardized the security and stability of the entire Middle East. In addition, the

19 Koch, 8-14. The Tudeh was Iran’s Communist Party. According to Koch, the Tudeh was Iran’s
best organized, best financed, and most effective political group.

20

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil, and Iranian Nationalism, 341

8

instability would send a clear message that the West was unable to protect the
independence of important Third World states.21
As the dispute continued and the destabilization of Iran became more of a
reality, officials within the Truman administration abandoned their neutrality stance
and aligned themselves with the British stance on Iran.22 By the summer of 1952,
Truman joined British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill23 in a joint AngloAmerican proposal to Mossadeq that formally joined the US government to the
British position.24 Iran was rich with oil reserves that US officials believed were vital
to the rebuilding and rearmament of Western Europe. Loss of such an important
resource would have terrible short and long term consequences. In the short term, it
would cause a serious shortage of aviation gasoline and other fuels needed for the
military effort in Korea. Long term, it would severely hamper not only the United
States’ ability to fight a protracted war against the Soviets, but all of Western
Europe’s. 25

21 Koch, 14. State Department memorandum noted that with American influence decreasing daily,
Iranians identified the United States with British interests.
22 At the same time the United States aligned with the British position on Iran, they aligned
themselves with the British on their stance in Egypt. Later, they would do the same with the French in
Indo-China. (Merrill and Paterson, Cold War Culture and the “Third World,” 341).
23 Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1940 to 1945
and again from 1951 to 1955. Churchill was leader of Great Britain throughout the entirety of World War II
overseeing all British military involvement. After the war, Churchill warned against the Soviet Union and
the rise of the “Iron Curtain” calling on European countries to unify against the Soviets.

24

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil, and Iranian Nationalism, 341.

25

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil, and Iranian Nationalism, 341.

9

On 20 November 1952, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC 136/1)
defined basic policy concerning Iran.26 NSC 136/1 maintained that the United States
was committed to ensuring Iran would not fall under communist control. Iran’s
strategic position in the region and its resources made it vulnerable to Soviet political
and military subversion.27 NSC 136/1 argued that if the Tudeh party seized or
attempted to seize control of the Iranian government, the United States, in
conjunction with the British, should create a contingency plan to support a noncommunist Iranian government militarily, economically, diplomatically and
psychologically.28
When Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in January 1953, his immediate
focus was not on Iran but on fulfilling his campaign pledge to end the Korean War.29
The Eisenhower administration maintained the US position backing Great Britain on
the Iranian situation. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles

26 National Security Council, NSC 136/1, United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in
Iran, Top Secret Report, 20 November, 1952. Documents obtained through the Iranian National Archiveshttp://iranianarchives.org/documents/1953-coup-in-iran/45-national-security-council-nsc-136-1-unitedstates-policy-regarding-the-present-situation-in-iran-top-secret-report-november-20-1952 (Accessed:16
March 2015).
27 National Security Council, NSC 136/1, United States Policy regarding the Present
Situation in Iran, Top Secret Report, 20 November, 1952. (Accessed 16- March 2015)
28 Koch, 14. Koch cites United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
1952-1954, Vol. X, Iran 1951-1954 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 529-534.
29 Dwight David “Ike” Eisenhower was formally a Five Star General in the United States Army.
He earned the rank of General of the Army. During World War II, he was the Supreme Commander of
Allied forces in Europe in World War II. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States in 1953.

10

believed that Mossadeq was simply giving the Soviet Union lip service, all the while
remaining firmly against communism.30 The new administration needed to re-assess
Soviet-American relations. The prolonged oil crisis was taking its toll on Iran
domestically. The dismal state of the Iranian economy coupled with the economic
dislocation spawned mass-demonstrations that US officials feared would grow into a
full-scale revolution.31
In March 1953, State Department officials met with British Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden to discuss the escalating situation in Iran following the collapse of the
Anglo- Iranian Oil negotiations. Washington viewed Mossadeq as a source of
instability and feared his continued position encouraged a Tudeh overthrow. In the the
United States government, the Soviet leadership would capitalize on the
destabilization and use it as a diplomatic opening. Potentially the Soviet Union would
add a submissive southern ally to the expanding Soviet sphere of influence.32 Further
compounding these fears, US officials believed that Mossadeq continued to grow ties
to the Communist Tudeh Party and to move his country closer to the Soviet Union

30 John Foster Dulles was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as Secretary of State on
21 January 1953. He was grandson of former Secretary of State John Watson Foster. During the 1950s,
Dulles and Eisenhower forged a close friendship that allowed him unprecedented access to the president.
His time in office was marked by the philosophy that peace could be maintained through containment of
communism. Biographies of the Secretaries of State: John Foster Dulles(1888-1959). Office of the
Historian, www.history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/foster-john-dulles. (Accessed 30-May 2018).

31

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil and Iranian Nationalism, 341.

32

Koch, 16-17.

11

and its satellites. He even threatened to sell oil to the Soviet Union through a new
trade agreement. In actuality, Mossadeq was a staunch anti-communist who hoped
these political maneuvers would gain him US financial assistance for his
economically wounded government. Unfortunately for Mossadeq, US fears over the
growth of communism would not allow them to dismiss his apparent flirtation with
the Soviet Union. 33
Before Iran and the Soviet Union could hold negotiations, Eisenhower decided
to remove Mossadeq as the Iranian Prime Minister.34 Mossadeq’s successor could
expect the full support of the United States. General Fazlollah Zahedi was hand
picked by the United States to succeed Mossadeq. The State Department recognized
that General Zahedi was not the ideal candidate but his positive attitude towards the
United States and Britain and his willingness to accept the job made him the best
option.35 Publicly, American officials limited their official statements to reassuring
the United States’ unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
Covertly, U.S. officials within Iran were instructed by the Eisenhower administration
to avoid using regular diplomatic channels but rather to utilize back-channels and

33

Heiss, Culture Clash: Gender, Oil and Iranian Nationalism, 341-342.

34

Koch, 18.

35

Koch, 18-19.

12

third party contacts to reassure the Shah of Iran and the new prime minister of
Washington’s full support and forthcoming military aid.36
Before any action was undertaken, Eisenhower’s administration convinced
several large international oil companies, including AIOC and Aramco, to cooperate
in preventing Iranian oil from reaching the global market. Mossadeq found that he
could produce oil but could not sell it. In early summer 1953, he asked Eisenhower
for economic assistance which Eisenhower promised only after an agreement on the
oil dispute was reached. Realizing his power was diminishing, Mossadeq called a
public referendum to approve his policies. He then fixed the results to gain 95 percent
of the votes which Eisenhower then inferred could have only occurred as a result of
Communist influences. When pro-Mossadeq supporters took to the streets in mass,
Eisenhower decided it was time to make a change.37
The Mossadeq situation left Eisenhower with several options. A conventional
military force could invade Iran but this was completely impractical because it would
draw world-wide attention and might lead to a full scale war with the Soviet Union. A
diplomatic solution was no longer viable. Previous attempts at finding a diplomatic
solution had failed and the situation in Iran was worsening daily. Eisenhower’s final

36 Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor
Government to Mossadeq, March 1953, Department of State, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Issues,
RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, National Archives and Records Administration. Original memorandum was
found through Koch’s citations and examined further. Cited in Koch’s work, Koch, 19.

37

LaFeber, The American Age, 545.

13

option was a covert and unconventional operation to be spearheaded by the CIA. This
covert operation, it was hoped, could secure the results that the Eisenhower
Administration desired with minimal casualties, cost and international attention. If the
operation failed or became compromised, Washington could disavow any knowledge
or connection. 38
The National Security Council (NSC) had made the decision that covert action
against Iran was a legitimate and justifiable instrument to enforce US policy.39
Eisenhower received only verbal briefings on the plans, never discussing them with
his Cabinet or NSC and left no documents that could implicate him. He also did not
discuss the plans with either his Cabinet or the NSC. Keeping his distance from the
operation, Eisenhower was constantly apprised of the situation by John Foster Dulles
in the privacy of the Oval Office, and maintained unyielding control of the CIA’s
activities.40
The main objective of the CIA campaign in Iran, through legal or “quasilegal” methods, was to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government and replace it with
a pro-Western government under the Shah of Iran’s leadership with General Zahedi as
38 Koch, 19. National Security Council, NSC 10/2 is cited as where this threat assessment and
course of action came from.
39 Available documents do not indicate who authorized the CIA to begin planning. Koch cites
Eisenhower’s biographer Stephan E. Ambrose as confirming that the absence of such documents reflected
the President’s “style.”

40

Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984),

111.

14

Prime Minister.41 The action was to be implemented in four phases.42 The first phase
was to strengthen the Shah’s ability to exercise his constitutional power and sign the
necessary degrees to have Mossadeq legally removed as Prime Minister.43 Phase two
was to mobilize and coordinate the efforts of political factions, with emphasis on the
highly influential clergy, sympathetic to Mossadeq’s removal in order to gain their
support for any legal action taken by the Shah to remove Mossadeq. 44 The third was
to maneuver the will of the people against Mossadeq by showing his collaboration
with Communists and the manipulation of his constitutional authority to serve his
own personal ambitions.45 At the same time, a “war of nerves” was carried out
against Mossadeq with the purpose of showing him and the Iranian general population

41 Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran Authority, July 1953(C01384505). No
formal title or location of origin is visible on the documents possibly sanitized by the CIA. Series of
documents contains four pages that contain some sanitized portions. Previously “Top Secret” accessed
from the National Security Archives at George Washington University.
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d363) (Accessed: 16 March 2015).
42 The section that would contain “Phase 4” is in a block section below “Phase 3” redacted,
meaning that it was purposely withheld. It is unclear if the section that followed was apart of “Phase 4” or
was done in conjunction with the initial phases.

43

Despite originally being broken up into four phases, there is only documentation of three

44

The Shah of Iran was the monarch of Iran.

phases.

45 Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran Authority, July 1953(C01384505)
(Accessed: 16 March 2015) Portions of the document have been sanitized and information has been
redacted or is missing concerning certain phases of the operation, mainly phase four.

15

that the United States was displeased with the Mossadeq government. Iran would
receive no further economic aid from the United States.46
An original date for Operation TPAJAX, code designation “D-Day,” was set
by the CIA but Mossadeq learned of the plan and took immediate counter measures to
neutralize the plan. 47 He arrested dozens of supposed conspirators and General
Fazollah Zahedi went into hiding at the same time the Shah fled the country. The CIA
continued as planned by convincing the Iranian population that the sole authority to
govern the people rested with religious leader, the Shah. Mossadeq’s continued to
stay in power in defiance of the Shah’s decrees removing him from office.48 The
Shah held true power to sway public opinion and influence the political sphere within
Iran.
CIA agents found supporters in the capital of Tehran, especially within the
military. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who had been the monarch since taking
over from his father on 16 September 1941, was much loved by members of the
military and the general populace.49 His father was forced to abdicate following the

46 Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran Authority, July 1953(C01384505)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d363 (Accessed: 16 March 2015)
47Specific information about the leak as to how Mossadeq discovered the plan, was “sanitized”
from the report. Additionally, information as to what specific action Mossadeq took to counter-act the plan
was also left out along with an actual start date. The document only reads “…was launched in the interm
between the original and final D-Days.”
48 Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran Authority, July 1953(C01384505)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d363 (Accessed: 16 March 2015)

49

LaFeber, The American Age, 545.

16

invasion by Anglo-Soviet forces during World War II. The Shah’s abrupt and
dramatic flight out of the country only fueled the Iranian people’s loyalty towards the
Shah. These actions cause a general revolt in Iran. CIA assets within Iran continued
to support the mass protests against Mossadeq. The military and security forces joined
the populace and Mossadeq was forced to flee on 17 August 1953. The official ouster
of Mossadeq was successfully accomplished on 19 August 1953 when he was arrested
by the pro-Shah military.50 As a result, the pro-Western Shah was returned to power.51
The operation in Iran was a resounding success not just for the Eisenhower
Administration and CIA but for the development of irregular warfare strategy. It was
a baby step towards its eventual growth into the more complex strategy deployed in
Guatemala. While military force, conventional or irregular, was not needed,
manipulating the will of the Iranian populace, and its psychological component was
fundamental to TPAJAX success. A key aspect that is commonly overlooked is that
Mossadeq did not want a military confrontation with the United States. Despite the
potential for Soviet Union support, there was no guarantee that they would pledge
any. At the first hint of an operation against him, Mossadeq began mass arrests. 52

50 Campaign to Install Pro-Western Government in Iran Authority, July 1953(C01384505)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d363 (Accessed: 16 March 2015)

51

LaFeber, The American Age, 545,

52 Historians like LaFeber and Heiss go in depth into the political and economic elements leading
up to the coup and Mossadeq’s arrest. They spend a lot of pages going over what the United States and
British believed about Mossadeq but what they do not go into is Mossadeq’s belief or thoughts on the US
military. Without having access to CIA files on the subject, it is clear from their research that Mossadeq

17

Mossadeq’s overthrow showed this type of operation was a viable option in
the U.S tactical arsenal. The mission objectives were achieved without the
deployment of conventional military troops all while maintaining operational
deniability. The United States was able to keep American military personnel
minimally involved by utilizing pre-existing forces and sympathetic entities within
Iran. While the personnel on the ground were nominal, intelligence acquisition,
logistical and political coordination were paramount to the mission’s success.
The Iranian operation gave Eisenhower, his administration, and the CIA the
confidence to explore other scenarios where an irregular operation was needed. Future
operations, like in Guatemala, would see an evolution in strategy. There, the United
States government would incorporate guerilla forces and non-state sanctioned armed
groups to actually conduct military operations within and against the targeted
government. Expanded missions would require increased logistics, planning, financial
influx, intelligence and personnel from both the CIA and the Department of Defense.
With more complex operations come increased risks as well as domestic and foreign
scrutiny. The situation that arose in Guatemala presented a more complex problem
which the United States would need a solution. The Guatemala problem would be an
audacious attempt to overthrow the democratically elected Guatemalan government,
an operational codename PBSUCCESS.

was trying to play the political game with the United States but it is very unclear whether Mossadeq feared
conventional military invasion or intervention by the CIA or intelligence forces.

18

The events that set Operation PBSUCCESS into motion in 1954 began ten
years before in 1944. Then, Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe tasked with defeating the Nazis. The
Central Intelligence Agency did not exist yet. In Guatemala, a revolution had begun
in 1944. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, future president of Guatemala, was a captain in the
Guatemalan army.53 Arbenz, Francisco Arana and Jorge Toriello Garrido led a
military uprising against the Guatemalan government in July 1944, forcing the
resignation of thirteen-year president Jorge Ubico. Ubico, who took power in 1931,
ruled Guatemala as a “fiefdom with tacit support of the traditional landowning class.”
54

Juan Jose Arevalo returned from exile in Argentina and was elected president of

Guatemala in December 1944.55 Francisco Arana became Chief of the Armed Forces
while Arbenz became the Minister of Defense. Arevalo’s new democratically elected
government turned increasingly more leftist in its policies. From the Revolution there
developed a strong national movement to free Guatemala from the military

53 Born in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, in 1913, to a Swiss father and Guatemalan mother, Arbenz
grew up in a middle-class family. Arbenz was primarily raised by his mother; his father committed suicide
when Arbenz was still very young. Due to the structure of Guatemalan society at the time, Arbenz had few
options to move into a different social class; instead Arbenz chose a career in the military. He attended the
Escuela Politecnica, the Guatemalan Military Academy, where he excelled under the leadership and
tutelage of U.S. officers who served at the Academy. He grew into a “superb” officer in a neglected army,
having the qualities of a born leader. These qualities would later allow him to retain the loyalty of the
officers in the Guatemalan military. He graduated as “sub- lieutenant” in 1935. He returned to Escuela
Politecnica in 1937 to teacher history and science. (Gleijeses, 15.)

54

Gleijeses, 136-137.

55 Arevalo was a university professor before being president and was exiled because of teachings
about politics and social reform. He would later freely remove himself from the country following Arbenz
overthrow in 1954.

19

dictatorship, social backwardness, and “economic colonialism” which had been the
pattern of the past. (See Figure 1.3) This new nationalist movement, coupled with a
small but growing communist sentiment, represented a clear danger to US companies
and investments in Guatemala.56

Figure 1.3: Map of Guatemala57

56

Gleijeses, 137-138.

57 Image taken from University of Texas-Austin Archive (www.legacy.lib.utexas.edu-Accessed 1August 2018).

20

The United States policy towards Guatemala was to maintain stability. It was
to remain a place for U.S. capital investment for corporate and private investors.58
After President Ubico’s removal from power, Guatemalans loudly voiced their
criticisms of foreign monopolies controlling their country’s resources. Until 1944, the
ruling Guatemalan elite made up 2 percent of the population but held 60 percent of
the land. The poorest 50 percent held only 3 percent of the land which they
desperately needed for farming.59 Total United States investment in Guatemala in
1944 was about $93 million, concentrated through three companies: the Empresa
Electrica de Guatemala, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), and
the United Fruit Company (UFCO). The Empresa Electrica was originally a German
company before the Guatemalan government seized control during World War I .
Under intense pressure from the United States, Guatemala sold the thriving company
to the US company Electric Bond and Share Company, a subsidiary of the United
Fruit Company for such a low price that it would fester in the minds of
Guatemalans.60

58Richard Immerman, The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (University of
Texas Press, 2007), 83.

59

LaFeber, The American Age, 546-547.

60

Immerman, 84-85.

21

The IRCA held the monopoly over the railways in Guatemala. Guatemala only
owned and controlled 29.5 miles of railway, seized from the Germans in World War
I, where as the IRCA owned and controlled 580.7 miles of single-track rail. The
absence of an adequate road system in Guatemala reinforced the effects of this
monopoly. The IRCA controlled the only railway that connected the capital,
Guatemala City, to the deep water port of Puerto Barrios where 60 percent of the
country’s foreign trade occurred.61
But the IRCA was not the biggest culprit when it came to the monopolization
of resources; it was the Boston based United Fruit Company.62 Earning the nickname
“the Octopus” because of the company “seemed to have a tentacle in different entities
and enterprises across North America and Latin America,” the UFCO was the world’s
greatest grower and exporter of bananas.63 They controlled almost all of the fruit
production, transportation and even regional governments. 64 The United Fruit
Company (UFCO) owned 42.68 percent of the IRCA, which they bought for half the
normal share price. Like the IRCA, the UFCO held a vast railroad network with over
200 miles of railway running through their plantations. The budget alone of the

61

Gleijeses, 86-87.

62

LaFeber, The American Age, 546-547.

63

Gleijeses, 89.

64

LaFeber, The American Age, 546-547

22

UFCO was larger than that of any of the countries in which it operated. Eighty-five
ships carried UFCO products, mainly bananas, to North America and Europe.65
In addition to the United Fruit Company’s wealth and resources, they had
strong political connections in the United States. Many of their shareholders were
members of the United States Congress. Lobbyists were kept on the payroll to make
sure that UFCO was well known to the State Department. They also sought to
convince the American people that the United Fruit Company deserved their support
and attention. A large contingent of lawyers supplemented the lobbyist’s efforts. 66 In
1936, the widely known American law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell negotiated
UFCO’s contract with then dictator General Jorge Ubico who controlled Guatemala.
Coincidently one of the firm’s senior associates was John Foster Dulles, the future
United States Secretary of State. His brother, future Director of the CIA, Allen Welsh
Dulles was also an employee of the law firm. 67
U.S. officials failed to grasp the magnitude of growing anti-American
sentiment and the force of Guatemalan nationalism building across the country. The
failure of the Truman Administration’s policies and collected intelligence on
Guatemala caused a cascading affect when coupled with the policies of the

65

Gleijeses, 86-87.

66

Gleijeses, 91.

67

LaFeber, The American Age, 546-547.

23

Eisenhower Administration. The result was an increased in hostilities towards US
based companies that had previously thrived. 68 United States companies who had
previously thrived and expanded in Guatemala faced growing opposition to their
presence and monopolization of land not only by the people of Guatemala but by the
Guatemalan government as well. The expropriation of U.S. land and resources in
Guatemala only furthered American suspicions that Guatemala was moving closer to
becoming a communist satellite in the Western Hemisphere. 69 By taking control of
the land from the U.S. government with the intent of returning it to the Guatemalan
people, the Guatemalan government, whether knowingly or unknowingly, aligned
themselves with the ideal of communism and the Soviet Union. This potential growth
of communism was cause for worry for the United States.
Not every member of the Arevalo government agreed with this trend. Arana
had hopes for a more moderate and conservative government in Guatemala, while
maintaining the United States as an ally. The presidential election in 1951 presented
Arana with an opportunity to achieve his political goals. Arana’s personal rival for
leadership, Arbenz, associated himself more closely with the Arevalo government and

68

Immerman, 85.

69 David M.Barret, Sterilizing a “Red Infection”: Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954
(Central Intelligence Agency Resourse: www.cia.gov – Accessed 24- Jan 2014), 23.

24

the shift towards a leftist position in Guatemala. When Arana was assassinated in
1949, Arbenz’s path to the presidency opened.70
Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala in 1951.(See Figure 1.4) He
received 65 percent of the vote in an election that historian Walter LeFaber contended
was a “remarkably open and free election.”71 In his inaugural address, Arbenz said
that his goals were to
transform Guatemala from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy
into a country that is economically independent, to transform Guatemala from
a backward country with an semi-feudal economy into a modern capitalist
country; to proceed in a way that will ensure the greatest possible
improvement in the standard of living of the greatest masses of our people. 72
As early as 1952, the United States government and policymakers became
alarmed with the growing Communist influence within President Arbenz’s
administration and established the belief that Arbenz had formed a working alliance
with the Communists.73 Arbenz was not the opportunist that the United States had
hoped for. His predecessor, Arevalo, was a staunch nationalist and could never have
been the “malleable” friend that the United States hoped him to be. Yet Arevalo had

70 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1962-1954 Volume IV, The American Republics,
Document 410. (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d410) Access 31-March 2014,
17:15

71

72

LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions,116.
Gleijeses, 149.

73 Gerald K. Haines, Central Intelligence Agency Staff Analysis: CIA and Guatemala
Assassination Proposals 1952-1954. June 1995 (Declassified documents obtained as part of the National
Security Archives of George Washington University).

25

hoped to maintain a cordial relationship with the United States, as he, too, was firmly
against communism.74 But Arbenz chose to become stubbornly defiant of the United
States.75 Furthermore, the elite in Guatemala helped persuade U.S. journalists,
members of Congress and the Executive branch that the Guatemalan government was
becoming increasingly more Communist.76

Figure 1.4: Image of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, President of Guatemala on the cover of TIME
magazine 77

74

Gleijeses, 116.

75 Gleijeses, 134. Gleijeses argues that it was Arbenz El Salvadorian wife, Maria Vilanova, who
pushed him towards being defiant of the United States. Gleijeses suggests that “he was putty in her hands.”

76

Barrett, 23.

77 Image taken from TIME Magazine, 28 June 1954.
(www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19540628,00.html : Accessed 13 January 2015.)

26

Early concern by United States officials over communists potentially
penetrating the Guatemala labor movement were only part of a much larger concern .
In addition to their ideological opposition to Communism, US officials were
convinced that the communists would use their influence among the workers within
the labor movement and the unions to gain political leverage. Overtime the
communists would work themselves into key positions within the Guatemalan
government, eventually taking complete control.78 According to the US State
Department’s National Intelligence Estimate on Guatemala, published on 11 March
1952, on the question of the present political situation in Guatemala and the possible
developments during 1952, U.S. officials concluded that “Communists already
existed in Guatemala as a political influence. Their influence will probably continue
to grow. The political situation in Guatemala adversely affects US interests and
constitutes a potential threat to US security.”79 The State Department summarized, in
its “white papers” on the supposed Communist penetration of Guatemala, the
international aspects of this Communist challenge:

The Guatemalan PGT (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, the Guatemalan Labor
party, which was controlled by Guatemalan Communists) acted within a global,
not a local Guatemalan context. It conceived of the ultimate triumph of
communism in Guatemala as part of a successful world wide advance of the
78

Immerman, 91.

79 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 Volume IV, The American Republics,
Document 410. National Intelligence Estimate- Washington D.C.- 11 March 1952
(http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d410) Accessed: 10 March 2014.

27

Communist [that is, Soviet] forces, and as a disciplined battalion in advance of
an army. It adjusted its tactics and objectives to support the main effort.80

One estimate in 1951 by U.S. officials estimated the total number of
Communists in Guatemala to be around two hundred.81 However, another estimate of
the Communist Party of Guatemala went as high as five hundred, and one-third of
them were militant.82 Many who believed that Guatemala was becoming dominated
by Communists were not simply subscribers to Joseph McCarthy83 extremism; rather
the idea was more widely shared by both liberals and moderates within governmental,
journalistic, and academic communities around the country.84 This belief was
solidified when President Arbenz enacted widespread agrarian reforms calling for the
expropriation and redistribution of uncultivated land, including land owned by the
U.S. based United Fruit Company (UFCO).85

80

Immerman, 103.

81 A former CIA official, Clair George, testified in 1983 that the agency's records on the coup
d’état ran to about 180,000 pages. Taken from NEW YORK TIMES 28-MAY 1997 (Accessed 24-Feb
2014) http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/guatemala/list.htm)
82 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1962-1954 Volume IV, The American Republics,
Document 410. (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d410) (Access 31-March
2014)
83 Joseph McCarthy was a United States Senator from Wisconsin from 1947 until 1957. McCarthy
believed that Soviet Communists had infiltrated all aspects of the United States government and were
impossible to detect. The term McCarthyism is derived from his name and describes his obsessive belief
that Communists had infiltrated.
84 Immerman,101. While the assumption of Guatemalans converting to communism was widely
held, the statistics and numbers are inconclusive about the idea.

85

Immerman, 104.

28

While many high level U.S. officials accepted the fact that an antagonistic and
hostile government in Guatemala was not a direct threat to the United States, their
fear came from the idea that Guatemala could potentially become a client state of the
Soviet Union. U.S. officials worried that if that were to become a reality the Soviet
Union could develop their own sphere of influence and power in Latin American and
potentially all of the western hemisphere. 86 However, Arbenz was convinced that the
success of Communism on a global scale was not only inevitable but desirable. He
believed that history was marching toward Communism and that capitalism would
cease to exist.87
When Arbenz was elected president in 1951, the cooperation between
communist entities and Guatemalan governement evolved into an effective working
relationship. After previously only being tolerated under the Arevalo government,
communist groups within Guatemala found themselves to have more freedom and
ability to spread their message. To ensure his election as president, Arbenz committed
to mutual support with the communists, but stopped short of pledging his full
commitment to them. 88 A small group of communists agreed with Arbenz’s proposed

86

Haines, 1.

87 Gliejeses,147. These are Arbenz thoughts and ideas as explained by his wife, Maria de Arbenz
through interviews conducted by Piero Gleijeses.
88 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 Volume IV, The American Republics,
Document 410. (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d410) (Access 31-March
2014, 17:15)

29

land reforms and offered their full support in his campaign against the UFCO. Arbenz
was willing to work with whomever he needed to, so long as they shared his ideas, in
order to win the election and make his campaign goals a reality.89
There were communist groups active in Guatemala during this time. Partido
Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) sought to advance nationally by pushing communist
ideals into the country-side where the peasants were more subjected to exploitation
and poor conditions.90 Communism was easily relatable to the communal beliefs of
the indigenous people. These relatable concepts allowed the PGT to gain a foothold
with the indigenous people.91 The influence of the communists in Guatemala had
increased significantly while the influence of the United Fruit Company (UFCO)
drastically declined. With their land holdings shrinking and influence dwindling, the
UFCO was helpless to stop Arbenz. Without direct political intervention by the
United States government, the UFCO would essentially cease to exist in Guatemala.92

89 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 Volume IV, The American Republics,
Document 410. (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d410) (Access 31-March
2014, 17:15)
90 Greg Grandin, Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004), 54.
91 Grandin, 123. Even after the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954, the PGT incorporated individuals
across ethnic and cultural boundaries in an effort to include everyone, including the inclusion of women. In
Grandin’s eyes, the PGT built and help provide a foundation for a modern democratic Guatemala.
92 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944- 1954
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991), 7.

30

The Guatemalan Congress, under heavy presidential pressure and pressure
from open public demonstrations in the capital, approved the bill for the land
expropriation in the early hours of 17 June 1952. The law was known as Decree 900
and was signed into law immediately by Arbenz. This series of democratic reforms
by Arbenz gave control of previously unused prime agricultural land back to the
peasants and poor farmers. A senior Arbenz official reported that the law “was
constructive and democratic in its aims…It would bring about a land structure and a
system of land tenure largely centering around the needs and aspirations of the
individual peasant families.”93 Arbenz actions, both private and public, made it clear
that agrarian reform was the key issue and would become “the heart of his program,
almost an obsession.” The United States Embassy reported that Arbenz was
extremely obstinate about land reforms and had never been so focused on a single
issue like this previously.94
Arbenz’s redistribution of land had an immediate negative effect on U.S.
business and economic interests in Guatemala.95 UFCO had set aside land as business
assets not be used or developed. UFCO officials argued that the banana industry

93

Gleijeses, 150.

94 Gleijeses, 146. Gleijeses obtained this information through interviews with the following
Guatemalan politicians: Galich (who was quoted) Charnaud, Morgan, Capuano. The second quotation was
taken from United States Embassy letters dated 27 March, 1952. See page146.

95

Haines, 1.

31

required that vast amounts of land be held in reserve since tracts of land were
periodically flooded so as to “drown out” the fungus-induced Panama Disease that
bananas in the region were susceptible to.96 However, it was Arbenz belief that
devoting so much of the country’s agricultural development on the growing bananas
and coffee severely restrict the long term potential for growth.97 The land
monopolized by the UFCO belonged to the people of Guatemala and needed to be
redistributed to them.
Under President Arbenz’s new land reform, UFCO would lose authority over
their Guatemalan land holdings (See Figure 1.5); they would be confiscated by the
Guatemalan government.98 His plan was to divide and distribute the idle land of any
latifundios that were larger than 233 acres.99 As of 1950, thirty two of the largest
latifundios totaled 1,719,740 acres. Of that acreage, 1,575,181 acres were not being
utilized for cultivation. Under this plan, Arbenz allowed those proprietors whose land
holdings were between 233 to 669 acres to keep a third of their lands uncultivated and
further exempted permanent pastures and woodlands from economic development. 100

96

Immerman, 80.

97

Immerman, 64.

98

Schlesinger and Kinzer, xv.

99

Latifundios is the Spanish term for large land holdings

100

Immerman, 65.

32

Figure 1.5: Actual map from 1952 of United Fruit Company holdings in Latin America 101

The expropriation of land began in December 1952.102 The Regional Peasant
Confederation, the units overseeing the redistribution, recommended the reallocation
of 55,000 acres of UFCO’s uncultivated lands in the Pacific region of Tiquisate.
Approval by the Agrarian Committee of the Guatemalan government was swift. By
25 February 1953, the committee approved an additional claim for 179,000 acres.
This brought the total number of UFCO’s holdings seized to 234,000 acres. 103 A
year later, on 24 February 1954, the Guatemalan government expropriated another

101 Image taken from La Salle University. www.lasalle.edu/~mcinneshin/303/week07.htm
(Accessed 21 February 2015)

102

103

Immerman, 65-66.
Immerman, 80-81.

33

173,000 acres of UFCO lands. The combined total of all the expropriated land was
over 400,000 acres, roughly one seventh of all of the arable land in Guatemala. The
fee the Guatemalan government offered to pay in compensation, based on the tax
records Guatemalan government possessed, to the United Fruit Company was
$1,185,000. The United Fruit Company petitioned the U.S. State Department directly
to intervene on their behalf. On 20 April 1954, the United States government formally
submitted a bill to the Guatemalan government for $15,854,849; nearly ten times the
total Guatemala offered to pay.104 The Arbenz government never made any
payments.105
The actions of the Arbenz government and the increasing fear over the
potential rise of communism in Latin America by the United States put both countries
on a collision course for confrontation. The major question was what type of action
the United States would take to handle this situation. Both countries were already
engaged in a political sparring match. Any course of action involving military
intervention needed to be carefully considered. Military action against a
democratically elected government would almost certainly cause widespread
condemnation by the rest of the world and potential backlash by the Soviet Union.

104

105

Assessment was based on the projected income and value of the land.
Immerman, 81-82.

34

Another major concern was that if tensions between the Soviets and the United States
reached a critical level, it could lead to a nuclear confrontation.
Any military operation or campaign in Guatemala would require a more subtle
approach than the Iran operation. The United States would need to maintain full
deniability. Unlike Iran, Guatemala was a more complex and volatile environment.
The overthrow of the Arbenz government could not be achieved without using some
type of armed guerilla force. This increased the risk of U.S. involvement being
discovered. Initially the Eisenhower Administration wanted to make Guatemala a
center-piece for anti-communist reform which other countries could follow.106 With
vital political and economic interests at stake, Eisenhower wanted more than to
simply topple the Arbenz government. He believed Guatemala could be a viable
democratic system with a thriving capitalist economy derived from trade and
commerce. Guatemala would once again become a place for investment and market
for U.S. entities, the United States being the primary trading partner.107
The Eisenhower Administration, in conjunction with the CIA and Department
of Defense, decided that direct intervention needed to be taken against the Arbenz
government.108 Rather than using conventional U.S. military forces, this operation
would remain covert with the emphasis on minimizing the risk of the operation being

106

Streeter, 3.

107

Streeter, 21.

108 Without the strong support of the Eisenhower administration, the actions taken in Guatemala
would never have succeeded.

35

traced back to the United States. Unlike the operation in the Iran, the complex
environment of Guatemala called for an upgrade to the blueprint used in Iran and an
evolution of strategy. The methodologies, operational constructs and tactics that were
employed would become integral components of the irregular warfare umbrella. With
all the pieces in place, it was time for the United States to begin preparations for the
operation, designated PBSUCCESS.

36

CHAPTER II:
The United States in Guatemala and the Development of
PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS

On 2 December 1823, United States President James Monroe issued a warning
to the rest of the world declaring that the United States would not tolerate further
colonization or puppet monarchs in the Western Hemisphere. This warning to
European countries would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine.1 Latin America
was of particular interest when it came to foreign policy and economics. The United
States government and private businesses had invested great sums of money, material
and personnel to develop a thriving infrastructure that benefited U.S. industries. U.S.
corporations owned enormously large pieces of land that were using for growing
profitable crops that could be sold in the United States. Portions of these lands were
often left unsown. To countries like Guatemala, this monopolization and exploitation

1 Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the 18th
Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823; Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823ca. 03/03/1825; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990; National Archives.
(Accessed 8-October 2019).

of the land had a detrimental effect on the local economies. The elite within
Guatemalan became wealthier on these capitalist ideas while the average citizen
struggled to make a living. To the Guatemalan people, communism could present an
answer to their problems, a redistribution of wealth that could benefit them. This is
what the United States government and private U.S. corporations feared most, both
from an economic and political stand point.
With global communism on the rise, the United States became increasingly
wary of any potential situation that would allow communist sympathies to grow and
potentially to blossom into a communist regime with loyalties to the Soviet Union.
Growth of pro-communist groups and a desire by the people of various countries to
liberate themselves from foreign dependency were becoming increasingly more
commonplace around the world. Latin America was no exception. To the United
States, Latin America was theirs to control. Loss of even a single country within the
U.S sphere of influence could launch a cascading effect that could push Latin
America communist, or so the United States believed, into the hands of the
communists. The murmurings of land reformation and redistribution in Guatemala
immediately drew renewed attention from the United States.
The CIA and members of the State Department began to publish reports that
supported the idea that Guatemala and the Arbenz government were quickly shifting
towards Communism. 2 Created under the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat.

2 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution And the United States, 1944-1954.
(Princeton University Press, 1991), 187-188.

38

495), the CIA was charged with coordinating the nation’s intelligence, correlating,
evaluating, and disseminating intelligence which affected national security under the
direction of the National Security Council. 3 Under this act, the Director of Central
Intelligence was defined as the head of the intelligence community, head of the CIA,
and principle intelligence advisor to the President of the United States. The Act also
prohibited the CIA from engaging in law enforcement activities, restricting them to
internal security functions. In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act allowed the
CIA to use confidential fiscal and administrative procedures and exempted the
Agency from many of the usual limitations on expenditures of federal funds. The
Agency was allowed to request funds through other budgets and departments and
have the funds transferred to the Agency without regard to initial budget
appropriation.4
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Walter Bedell Smith, and other
U.S. officials believed that the growing communist movement in Guatemala could no
longer be dealt with by the Guatemalan opposition and the anti-communist elements

3 Within the National Archives there is a discrepancy between the actual date the CIA began. The
official history of the CIA by the CIA has the established date as 18 December 1947. The National
Archives Guide, Sec.263.1 (1995) uses the 18 September 1947 as the establish date. (See National
Archives: Central Intelligence Agency. (12/041981-) )
4 Administrative History Note: National Archives: Central Intelligence Agency. (12/041981-) )
http://arcweb.archives.gov/ (Accessed- 2 March 2014)

39

in the country. 5 The United States government believed that the Guatemalans were
inept, inefficient and disorganized in dealing with the communist threat. The
conclusion reached by the DCI and the intelligence community was that without
intervention, the Guatemalans would succumb to the growing Communist influence,
thus undermining democracy and U.S. power and influence in the region. The anticommunist elements, such as the Catholic hierarchy, the railroad workers union, a
small percentage of university students, landowners, and the Guatemalan Army were
prepared to prevent a Communist ascent to power, but they had little outside support.6
While some United States officials saw the rise of communism as an ever
growing threat to the security of America other officials in the government did not see
this as such a threat to national security. Officials within the State Department called
for a more cautious approach, one that would not cause potential diplomatic fallout.
For example, officials at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs believed it would be
better not to appear as an “elephant shaking with alarm before a mouse.”7 State
Department officials preferred to apply diplomatic pressure to nations around

5 Walter Bedell “Beatle” Smith was a highly decorated officer who served in World War I and
World War II. During World War II, he served as a senior United States general and chief of staff to
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Following World War II, he became the ambassador to the Soviet Union
before leaving his post as ambassador to become the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

6

Haines, 2.

7 PBSUCCESS Planning Documents, Director of Operations, Latin American Division Records,
Job Number 79-101025A, CIA Archives (5). Accessed in the National Security Archives through George
Washington University.

40

Guatemala. They desired to withhold all cooperative assistance and end any military
defense pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. 8 The State Department’s
position became the official United States policy toward Guatemala. The result of the
support from within the Truman’s administration led to the creation of detailed covert
program specifically designed to take down the Arbenz government under the official
codename PBFORTUNE.9
Planning for such an operation would require an enormous amount of
resources such as intelligence, personnel, equipment and armaments. This would take
time to plan and to coordinate. In April 1953, following a meeting with the
Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza, President Harry Truman instructed Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) Smith to investigate the possibility of overthrowing the
Arbenz government using Guatemalan dissenters and exiles. Members of the Truman
administration, especially within his security council, sought some manner in which
to be involved, without “risking improper identification, even by implication, with
any movements in Guatemala against Arbenz.”10 Somoza bragged that he and

8 Bureau of Inter- American Affairs, “Alternative Policy Lines, 1953.” And NSC. “Guatemala,” 19
August 1953, FRUS, 4:1074-1086. Accessed in the National Security Archives through George
Washington University.
9 PBFORTUNE was to codename designate for the covert operation to be deployed in Guatemala
to combat communism and undermine or overthrow President Arbenz.

10

Immerman, 109.

41

Guatemalan exile Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas (See Figure 2.1)11 could overthrow
Arbenz using Guatemalan exiles and weapons provided by the United States. DCI
Smith required that human intelligence (HUMINT) be gathered in order to provide an
accurate and current analysis about the sensitive private information of individuals
being targeted and those who could possibly be used in the potential overthrow.12
HUMINT involves manipulating other humans as a source of information
using a wide variety of techniques.13 Agents trained in this type of intelligence
gathering frequently engage in both quantitative and qualitative intelligence
collection.14 All information gathered held some type of relevance towards forming a
larger picture of the overall objective or specific personnel being investigated. A
HUMINT agent codenamed SEEKFORD, was sent by Smith to make contact with
exiles and Guatemalan dissidents about the possibility of armed conflict against
Arbenz. SEEKFORD compiled a detailed report on his findings which were then
handed over to the Directorate of Plans (DP).15 “Directorate of Plans” served as the

11 Richard Immerman calls Castillo Armas a “fugitive” and “except for his thin mustache,” could
easily been mistaken for a native Mayan. Other authors and official sources refer to Castillo Armas status
as an exile.

12

Haines, 2.

13 Jeffrey H. Norwitz, “Armed Groups: A Study in National Security, Counter-Terrorism, and
Anti-Insurgency” (US Naval War College), 326.
15 “Directorate of Plans” served as the clandestine arm of the CIA and authority on the
coordination and evaluation of clandestine operations in the United States. Original files contained the
names of the person whom the reports were sent to and the recommendations made by that person were
later send to Dulles who had made official proposals to Smith. However, the name and branch that the
person worked for were blacked out. The only information about the individual that was provided was that
he was a Chief of a division within the Directorate of Plans.

42

clandestine arm of the CIA and authority on the coordination and evaluation of
clandestine operations in the United States. 16 DP made a proposal to the Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, that the CIA should supply Castillo
Armas with weapons, armaments, and $250,000. 17 In addition to the money and
weapons, Nicaragua and Honduras would provide the Guatemalans with air support.18

Figure 2.1: Castillo Armas in Full Military Dress Uniform19

16

“Mission of the National Clandestine Service,” www.cia.gov (Accessed 22-Jan 2015, 15:25).

17 In addition to the collection of intelligence on Guatemala for PBFORTUNE, SEEKFORD
collected intelligence on the Castillo Armas. Intelligence agents commonly collect information on
individuals they are dealing with in order to have a full and complete knowledge of the specific individual.
SEEKFORD reported that on 18 September 1952, Castillo Armas had reached out to Dominican Republic
dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trajillo for aid. In return for aid, Castillo Armas would be required to
eliminate four Santo Dominicans, at the time residing in Guatemala.

18

19

Haines, 2-3.
Image acquired from www.latinamericanstudies.org (Accessed 24-Mar 2014, 17:35).

43

A force that would be needed to execute this type of operation without
involving any U.S. military units directly could not be defined as a conventional
force. This force would be operating in covert means in an irregular warfare
campaign in Guatemala. The proposed plan of attack and Castillo Armas’ group of
exiles would be directly defined as an “armed group.” An armed group refers to any
group of terrorists, insurgents, militias, or criminal gangs. The motives of these
armed groups can be political, ideological, or religious. Armed groups are typically
characterized by their willingness and ability to challenge the authority and
legitimacy of states and international systems. Such groups have the ability to operate
and function in clandestine operations that can attack within and across global and
state boundaries. 20 For the United States, this type of group would be ideal for
deployment in Guatemala. While the political or ideological factor of defeating
communism motivated the United States into action, Castillo Armas and his armed
group would require more substantial and tangible rewards. Money was a large
motivator but for Castillo Armas, his hubris and his quest for power were the key
factors motivating him.21
Two key aspects that make these groups extremely dangerous for nations and
governments is the fact that they, along with the operations they conduct, are not

20

Dew, 257.

21

In modern definitions, Castillo Armas and his exiles could be classified as “insurgents.”

44

bound by the laws or conventions of international warfare, increasing their propensity
for potential indiscriminate violence. The second key factor, one the Castillo Armas
would seek to employ, would be to purposely by-pass the military superiority of the
nation and government in order to directly attack established social, economic,
political, and symbolic targets and personnel.22 This would be a major tactical
element within the US mission plan. A direct conventional engagement against the
Guatemalan military would certainly result in a resounding defeat of Castillo Armas’
force. In open field battle or conventional military engagements, the Guatemalan
military held the upper hand. The Guatemalan military greatly outnumbered Castillo
Armas. The Guatemalans also possessed mechanized units, like armored cars and
trucks, which Castillo Armas did not. In order to negate the Guatemalan military’s
numerical superiority, Castillo Armas would have to engage in small battles in
different areas simultaneously so as to not only confuse the Guatemalan military but
also to deny them the ability to deploy their forces en mass in any one place.
When PBFORTUNE was developed, the operation was one of the first of its
kind. The CIA was still in its infancy; this plan marked one of its first attempts at a
covert operation and was a direct evolution from the Iranian operation.23

22

Dew, 257.

23 The plan deployed in Iran was on a much smaller scale and did not require an outside insurgent
group to achieve the goal. As discussed in Chapter 1, Iran only employed entities within Iran itself to
achieve the mission goal. Guatemala would require more substantial planning and logistics.
.

45

PBFORTUNE became a detailed plan and outline for the covert assassinations and
kidnappings that would occur as a result of quelling the rising perceived communist
threat. The plan called for the creation of a “hit list” comprised of those individuals
who were deemed a threat. Those individuals were then divided into two separate
categories. 24 “Category I” was for those Guatemalans who were too dangerous to
continue in their present manner and needed to be eliminated.25 “Category II” was
comprised of Guatemalans that were to be imprisoned or exiled.26 The names
included on the “hit-list” were comprised using a 1949 Guatemalan Army list of
known communists and communist sympathizers as well as information given by the
Director of Intelligence. The CIA sent a telegraph to a CIA station on 26 January
1952, requesting a firm list of “top flight Communists” that the potential new
government desired be eliminated immediately in the event of a successful anticommunist coup.27

24 The original “hit list” is in the National Security Archives but due to the sensitive nature of the
information, all of the fifty names on the list are redacted.

25

The CIA never clearly stated whether these individuals were to be eliminated.

26 Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operation CALLIGERIS.
Actual list has been blacked out in addition to any names or agency that was possibly involved. The lists
were divided into catergories for either termination or exile depending on the category the individual was
placed in. “Category I” contained fifty-eight names. “Category II” contain seventy-four names. The list was
revision of an original list prepared by “Headquarters” in February 1952. (Accessed from National Security
Archive: George Washington University- Accessed 15 January 2014.)
27 The final destination of the telegraph sent to the CIA Station was redacted. It can be assumed
from the information available that the CIA Station in question was in the surrounding region of
Guatemala. The CIA had active stations in both Nicaragua and Honduras which could also have be the final
destination. Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret; Priority.

46

Officials compiled a list of essential personnel who would need to be
eliminated if the anti-communist coup was going to succeed. The list was comprised
of fifty eight Guatemalans who were put into “Category I” and seventy four
Guatemalans who were place in “Category II.”28 In a telegraph on 29 January, the
CIA station chief suggested an additional sixteen communist sympathizers be added if
the coup d’état was successful.29 These individuals were to be incarcerated
immediately. However the chief of station doubted whether the new government
could be in control for long unless these individuals were deported. 30
After gaining support within the State Department, Smith approved the plan
and began to initiate PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz.
However, planning for PBFORTUNE lasted only a month. The Secretary of State,
Dean Acheson, asked Smith to suspend the operation indefinitely effective
immediately in October 1952 after discovering that certain portions of the operation
had been leaked. Nicaraguan President Somoza leaked information that he and the

Information also seen in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 Retrospective Volume,
Guatemala, Document 5.
28 All names on the list have been redacted but there are fifty eight blacked out spaces in Category
1 and seventy four in Category 2.
29 Taken from CIA documents on PBFORTUNE. Cable from Washington to unknown recipient,
29 January 1952. The recipient of the cable was blacked on the document. Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret;
30 Taken from CIA documents on PBFORTUNE. Cable from Washington to unknown recipient,
29 January 1952. The recipient of the cable was blacked on the document.

47

CIA were involved in planning to support rebellious operations in Guatemala directly
and that led to the cancellation of PBFORTUNE. 31 The suspension of PBFORTUNE
directly coincides with the U.S. government’s desire for total deniability and
complete anonymity. With damaging information potentially undermining the
secrecy of the operation, the United States was unwilling to launch such a delicate
operation. The State Department maintained its unwillingness to sanction any U.S.
military operation in Guatemala.
Despite the cancellation of PBFORTUNE, intelligence and threat assessments
were still being gathered on the region and specifically Guatemala. When
PBFORTUNE was officially terminated, intelligence agencies continued to have
reports of planning and operations being undertaken. HUMINT, or Human
Intelligence, continued to receive both confirmed and unconfirmed reports of
assassination planning by opposition leaders in Guatemala. 32 The agent codenamed
SEEKFORD was still actively gathering intelligence in the region and continued to
maintain relationships with various contacts. In one verified report from November
1952, after having several conversations with Castillo Armas, SEEKFORD confirmed
that special assassination groups codenamed “K”groups had been assembled.33 The

31

Immerman, 120-122.

32 HUMINT or Human Intelligence refers to intelligence gathered, acquired, or disseminated by a
human source.

48

mission of these “K” groups was to terminate all leading political officials and
military leaders who were contained on the hit-list given to the “K” groups. In another
report on 12 December, SEEKFORD reported that Castillo Armas fully intended on
making these “K” groups fully operational and deploy the “K” groups to carry out
these missions. HUMINT sources also confirmed that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and
Salvadorian soldiers could potentially disguise themselves in civilian clothing and
infiltrate Guatemala in order to eliminate specific communist leaders.34
While PBFORTUNE may have been cancelled, the general blue-print and plan
for future covert clandestine and irregular warfare operations for eliminating
communist personnel in Guatemala was already formed. The conclusions reached on
PBFORUTNE were that Guatemala would have to undergo dramatic and considerable
changes before the environment would be suitable to implement an operation of this
magnitude.
When Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the situation in
Guatemala reflected the escalation of tensions between the United States and Soviet
Union. With the Soviet Union and communism expanding globally, the United States

33 Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be Disposed of During Military Operation of
CALLIGERIS,” (Castillo Armas) 18 September 1952, Box 134.
34 Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be Disposed of During Military Operation of
CALLIGERIS,” (Castillo Armas) 18 September 1952, Box 134.

49

desired complete control over its sphere of influence within Latin America.35 With a
new president came a new administration. John Foster Dulles became Secretary of
State while his brother Allen Dulles became the new Director of Central
Intelligence.36 Eisenhower’s immediate foreign policy focused on the external
foreign and security policies of other states.37 Eisenhower’s overall strategy did not
pay significant interest to the Third World except to defend U.S. credibility or to
ensure that particular states, like Guatemala, did not fall under communist control.38
On 18 March 1953, the National Security Council met in Washington, D.C., to
discuss the foreign relations policies of the United States government. The goal of the
Council was to identify the interests in specific regions and remedy the shortcomings
of the Truman policies.39 The Council laid out the objectives and potential courses of
action with respect to Latin America.40 The Council hypothesized that the trend in

35 Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five star general in the United States Army. He earned the rank of
General of the Army. He was formerly the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Europe in World War
II.

36

Barrett, 23.

37 Elizabeth Nathan Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2011), 52.
38 Saunders, 54. Richard Immerman defined Eisenhower as having a concrete set of ideals and
beliefs prior to ever running for president. Both Saunders and Immerman contend that these beliefs and
ideas were developed during his time in the Philippines, his various commands in the military including
Supreme Allied Commander as well as his experiences concerning the policies of nations he was in.
39 Eisenhower sent his brother, Milton Eisenhower to investigate the situation in Latin America
and to testify about the short comings of the previous administration. It was Milton Eisenhower who
reported that Guatemala had “already succumbed to Communist infiltration.” See Immerman, 133.
40 NSC 144/1 was a Top Secret “Statement of Policy by the National Security Council.” The
policy covered twenty countries dubbed “The American Republics.”

50

Latin America was that of growing support for nationalistic regimes maintained in
part by appeals to the general population.41 Responsively, the objectives coincided
with the goal of safeguarding the hemisphere from both internal and external
aggressions. 42 Specific emphasis was put on reducing and eliminating communist and
anti-U.S. subversion within Latin America.43
The State Department and the CIA continued to monitor the situation in
Guatemala. The primary agenda pushed for by the Agency was to eliminate key
figures in prominent positions within Guatemalan society and the government.
Secondary options such as sabotage, defection, infiltration and propaganda efforts
within Guatemala were also being explored.44 During this time, an active
psychological warfare campaign was undertaken directed out of Guatemala City.45

41 National Security Council, NSC 144/1. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With
Respect to Latin America. Documents obtained from the Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume 4, Document 3.
www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d3 (Accessed 1 Mar 2018, 1420)
42 DCI Dulles received information from the Board of National Estimates on 22 April 1954, that
“the Communists were now effectively control the political life of Guatemala” (Barrett, 23.) Taken from
ADDI Diary, 12 December 1952; Harold Bull to Dulles, 22 April 1954; In CIA Declassified Reference
Materials (CIA/DRM), Box 185, National Archives.
43 National Security Council, NSC 144/1. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With
Respect to Latin America.
44 Originally from a memorandum, “Purposed Course of Action If Plan is Not Continued in
Present Form.” Haines has this memorandum listed as undated, probably 1953, Box 154 (S).
45 Guatemala City or Cuidad de Guatemala is the capital of Guatemala. Founded in 1776, is the
political, cultural and economic centre of Guatemala Central Intelligence Agency used Guatemala City as a
center of operation for planning and conducting covert and overt missions.

51

Beginning on 15 April 1953 and continuing for thirty days, the CIA station in
Guatemala City began to send out “death notice” cards to all leading communists in
Guatemala. They repeated the same operation again beginning on 15 June 1953.
There were no reported reactions by any Communist leaders that received the
notices.46
Eisenhower had only been in office for six months prior to preparation for the
overthrow of the Arbenz government and it is unclear exactly how much operational
knowledge Eisenhower had of the situation prior to his election.47
Policymakers as well as the CIA were scrambling to come up with a viable solution to
dealing with the Arbenz government and perceived communist problems in
Guatemala. 48 On 12 August 1953, a Strategy Board was convened and approved the
exploration of operations concerning Guatemala. Within two weeks after the initial
meeting, Guatemala was given the highest priority among U.S. initiatives.49 Allen

46

Haines, 3-4.

47 Immerman, 133. Richard Immerman argues that it is unclear exactly how much knowledge and
intelligence Eisenhower had of the situation in Guatemala. However Stephan Streeter’s work, Managing
the Counterrevolution: United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961, explains that Eisenhower and his
administration had a firm grasp on situation in Guatemala. Eisenhower did not simply pass off matters of
foreign affair to his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had first hand knowledge of Guatemala
through his dealings with the UFCO and Ubico. Rather he was very active and a part of planning the long
term goal for Guatemala.

48

49

Immerman, 133.
John Prados, Safe For Democracy: Secret Wars of the CIA. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dec 2009), 107.

52

Foster Dulles gave the responsibility of Guatemala to a young CIA member, C. Tracy
Barnes. 50
The first key meeting on the Guatemala operation took place “around Labor
Day” 1953 in Frank Wisner’s office.51 The meeting’s attendees comprised Wisner,
Barnes and J.C. King of the Western Hemisphere Division. The purpose was to go
over all existing intelligence networks and operations in Central America. The “man
in Guatemala,” Carlos Castillo Armas, had already been recruited and immediately
faced significant obstacles. Castillo Armas’ overall position was weak. He did not
command any military force, possessed few assets outside the country, and even
fewer within the country. Additionally, his entire plan was centered around gaining
popular support within the country which would further weaken the Guatemalan
government’s position.52
Allen Dulles became the executive agent over PBSUCCESS. The overall plan
was based on the intelligence that the Guatemala army was a poorly trained, ill-

50 Specializing in Law, C. Tracy Barnes was described as one of the CIA’s “Ivy Clique.” The “Ivy
Clique” also included another important person in the Guatemala development, Frank Bissell. He received
his undergraduate degree from Yale. He worked extensively for Allen Dulles in World War II. Barnes was
a member of the Office of Strategic Services, OSS, twice parachuting into France to work with French
Resistance. He received the Silver Star and two French Croix de Guerres (one with Palm and one with
Star). Prados, 108.
51 Theoharis, Athan G., The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny (Westport,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 2006), 108. Frank Wisner was head of the Office of Strategic Operations during
World War II in southeast Europe from 1944 to 1945. Immediately after the war, he became the Deputy
Director of Plans (DDP) in charge of the Directorate of Plans of the CIA from August 1951 to 1 January
1959.

52

Prados, 109.

53

equipped force of no more than seven thousand soldiers. When the plan for
PBSUCCESS was created, the so-called “September 11 paper,” it immediately went
to Director Dulles for approval. 53 The paper called for an operation led by the CIA
coordinating an “overall-plan of combined overt and covert action of major
proportions.”54 The Directorate of Operations estimated that the operation would
require $2.74 million, rounded to $ 3million by the Directorate, to execute. The stated
objective of PBSUCCESS was “to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if
possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of
Guatemala.”55 Eisenhower’s policies towards limiting U.S. defense spending and
capabilities for conventional ground warfare suggest a shift towards utilizing more
covert operations. He favored these types of operations because they appeared to offer
a relatively quick, cheap fix.56 These operations aimed to use indigenous personnel
and institutions that already existed or could easily be reinstalled so that no significant
building or rebuilding of domestic institutions would be required. 57
The plan was to be executed in three phases. First, a propaganda campaign
would be launched in Guatemala aimed at undermining the loyalty towards President

53 It is important to note that the United Fruit Company, who was a principle supporter of some
type of intervention in Guatemala, wanted no part in any future action taken against Guatemala.

54

Prados, 109.

55 Gerald K. Haines, Central Intelligence Agency Staff Analysis: CIA and Guatemala
Assassination Proposals 1952-1954. June 1995 (Declassified documents obtained as part of the National
Security Archives of George Washington University).
56Saunders,

57

54.

Saunders, 54-55.

54

Arbenz. Simultaneously, the second phase would be an incursion of CIA trained
dissidents and mercenaries led by Castillo Armas. The third phase would be the
psychological warfare phase. A CIA air force would drop bombs, leaflets and other
propaganda material while the CIA radio station would broadcast false battle reports,
sounds of battle and casualty reports.58
Due to the top-secret and compartmentalization of the operation, only specific
individuals were given the plan to read. Dulles looked over the operation but he also
included the deputy director of Central Intelligence and Air Force General Charles P.
Cabell. Additionally, Wisner was to draft a memorandum to use with the Bureau of
the Budget to obtain the funds needed.59 The memorandum needed to contain only the
necessary information required to receive the funds, the true nature of the operation
was to remain top-secret. On 18 September, another key meeting was held, only this
time in Allen Dulles’s office. On hand were all of the key personnel involved,
including General Cabell, Frank Wisner, Tracy Barnes, Kermit Roosevelt and J.C.
King. Also present was CIA’s Senior Analyst Sherman Kent and Barnes’ newly
appointed chief of operations Hans V. Tofte. 60
J.C. King briefed the group on the obstacles and measures that would need to
be taken for the ground portion of PBSUCCESS to succeed. King gave a thorough

58

Prados, 109-110.

59

Prados, 111.

60

Prados, 111.

55

briefing covering the CIA stations in Central America, action required to build up the
necessary networks, the psychological warfare components needed and the personnel
that would need to be shifted. Diplomatic pressure needed to be applied against the
Arbenz government and would require a strong CIA compatible ambassador.
Additionally, other key diplomatic personnel would need to be relocated from other
areas into countries where CIA operatives would be working. The State Department
decided that the new Guatemala station chief would be John Doherty, codenamed
“Tranger.”61
In order for the logistical and military portion of the operation to be a success,
several countries would also need to be utilized leading up to and during the
operation. In Honduras the agency would build forward operation bases. These bases
would house the “black” radio station and specific air bases. Additionally Honduras
would be the location for the training center of Castillo Armas and his forces.62
Cooperation between diplomats and CIA assets was also a crucial factor. The
cooperation between the CIA and the State Department was most important in
Nicaragua. Nicaragua would be the location of both ground and air bases. It was vital
that the CIA and Nicaraguan government work in tandem throughout the entire
campaign. Fortunately for the CIA, Castillo Armas had long maintained ties with the

61

Prados, 111.

62

Haines, 4.

56

leadership in Nicaragua which he would refer to when speaking with the United
States as “friends to the North.”63
Once Dulles gave his approval and began the allocation of the funds needed,
Wisner was tasked with selecting a field commander for PBSUCCESS. He chose to
recall former army colonel and Korea Station Chief Albert Haney. The colonel had
CIA guerilla units in Korea and similar irregular forces would be required for the
paramilitary portion of the Guatemala operation. Haney accepted the position in late
October 1953 and immediately left for Opa Locka, Florida. Opa Locka was
codenamed “Lincoln” and serve as the main forward base for the operation. Haney
held general supervision over all CIA chiefs in the countries being utilized plus direct
control of the forces used in PBSUCCESS. Haney then used the psydonym “Jerome
B. Dunbar” for the operation. Dulles would later order that all communications and
cables relating to the operation be directed to Lincoln for Dunbar. 64
When Haney assumed command of the operation, he had many difficulties that
required immediate rectification, some of which came from within the CIA itself. The
director of their Western Hemisphere Division was a counter-intelligence person as
well but was from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) not the military. Joseph
Caldwell King, the man who had formal control of the station, , was not a supporter
of PBSUCCESS. King’s personal opinion was that the operation was completely

63

Prados, 112.

64

Prados, 113.

57

foolish and he did not want this operation to deprive him of any personnel. It would
be up to Haney’s deputy, Jacob Esterline, to maintain peace and cooperation between
the two men as well as the other departments that would be involved. Station Lincoln
opened a few days before Christmas 1953.65
While assassinations were not specifically mentioned in the general overall
plan, a high-ranking branch “chief” requested a special paper on the “liquidation of
personnel” on 5 January 1954. The paper would be used by senior officers to brief the
operational training chief for PBSUCCESS prior to his departure to link up and
beginning training Castillo Armas’ irregular forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954.
The following day a cable dispatch sent to the CIA requested twenty silencers for .22
caliber rifles. 66 The silencers shipped the following day. Three days later, the same
chief who requested the assassination papers met with SEEKFORD to discuss the
training plan for Castillo Armas and PBSUCCESS indicated that another officer
should be sent to train two assassins for the operation.67
While the paramilitary and psychological portions of PBSUCCESS contained
proposals of assassination and proposed individuals for assassination, none of the
proposals ever appeared to be implemented. Certain branch chiefs and members of

65

Prados, 113.

66

Haines, 4-5.

67

These “assassination specialist” were discussed again on 3 February 1954.

58

LINCOLN had wanted to use the “K” groups in the operational setup; however, there
was no support from the State Department or the White House. During weekly status
meetings of PBSUCCESS there were continual discussions about eliminating specific
Guatemalan high ranking leaders.68 Operation officials, agency officers and State
Department representatives had been instructed that these type of assassinations and
eliminations were included in the master plan and able to be carried out at a moments
notice, but in the interest of the operation it would be better to reassess the
assassination option at a later time should it be needed.69
Individuals selected for disposal had to meet a given set a criteria. Officers
revised and updated the prospective target list on 31 March. In order to qualify for
“disposal,” an individual needed first to be a high government or organizational figure
“irrevocably in Communist doctrine and policy.” Second, the United States
government had to confirm that the individual in question was a communist . The third
condition was that to ensure the success of the military action any individual in key
government position whose removal would benefit psychological, organizational or
“other reasons” be considered for “disposal.”70 Disposal did not mean execution; the

68 Discussions about potential targets for marginalization were at various meetings but the date 9
March 1954 is specifically mentioned in Haines’ work.

69

Haines, 6.

70 Memorandum to Staff Officers: Subject: Selection of individual for disposal by Junta Group.
Dated 31 March 1954

59

final list consisted of two categories.71 Individuals deemed Category I were selected
to be executed, while Category II was defined as imprisonment or exile.72 A
“tentative” agreement was established that any assassinations that were to happen
would take place during the actual invasion by Castillo Armas’ forces.73
Before the operation could move out of the developmental stage, a major
security breach had to be dealt with. In January 1954, an associate of Castillo-Armas
who was utilized as a courier named Jorge Delgado gave Arbenz and the Guatemalan
government copies of communications between Castillo-Armas and other important
individuals including Nicaraguan President Somoza. This went on for several months
and Delgado’s access to sensitive material made this even more problematic. Delgado
was present on 12 January 1954 when the first CIA “black” aircraft landed in
Nicaragua with weapons and supplies. With the information he provided, Guatemalan
police arrested the person responsible for being the liaison between Castillo-Armas
and the internal Guatemalan resistance. The Arbenz government immediately
presented all of the Delgado materials to the Organization of American Statesand

71

The 31 March list was the final revision of Guatemalan Communist personnel selected for

“disposal.”
72 Memorandum to Staff Officers: Subject: Selection of individual for disposal by Junta Group.
Dated 31 March 1954, Attachment 2.

73

Haines, 6.

60

other Central American governments condemning any and all United States
intervention. 74
The CIA immediately began damage control as they made Delgado out to be a
fabricator and a liar who wanted to sow unrest. Castillo-Armas was recalled to Station
Lincoln to meet with CIA operatives where he adamantly denied that his organization
was the source of the leak. Meanwhile, the United States Ambassador to Guatemala
John Peurifoy, kept political pressure on the Guatemalan government. He told a
reporter for Time Magazine that “public opinion” in the United States might “force”
actions “to prevent Guatemala from falling into the lap of international
Communism.”75
Eisenhower and his administration had a potential problem unfolding in
Guatemala that might require immediate action by the United States. Shipments of
armaments had begun arriving in Guatemala from Czechoslovakia, a satellite of the
Soviet Union. 76 As a result of clandestine negotiations, Guatemala was able to
procure weapons and ammunitions from the Soviet-satellite country of
Czechoslovakia. The negotiations for the armament purchase were held in Prague

74 Organization of American States is a collection of countries within the Americas. The goal was
to allow for a platform for The first International Conference of American States was held in Washington
D.C. in October 1889 for the “purpose of discussing and recommending for adoption to their respective
Governments some plan of arbitration for the settlement of disagreements and disputes that may arise
between them.” (www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp- access 25 Feb 2018); Prados, 113-114.

75

Prados, 114.

76

Immerman, 158-159.

61

from 21 January to 9 February 1954 between Major Alfonso Martinez, personal
representative of President Arbenz, and the high level officials of the
Czechoslovakian government.77 At the same time, steps were taken towards
establishing diplomatic relations between the Guatemalan and the Czechoslovakian
government overseen by Jose Manuel Fortuny. Fortuny, Secretary General of the
Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT), was sent to Moscow two months before the
negotiations and only returned home after the deal for the armaments was secured. 78
According to CIA records, neither the captain nor the crew of the Alfhem knew
either the final destination or the contents of their cargo. Their suspicions of what was
in the cargo grew once they saw the dimensions of the cases and the strength of the
packaging. Their suspicions were confirmed when the Alfhem was met by
Guatemalan military officers. Just hours before making port, the captain was told by
the Guatemalans that his destination was the port of Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. The
financial transactions were routed through various banks and entities. Great efforts
were taken to conceal the logistics of this mission through false manifests and
mislabeled crates and the Guatemalan military took every precaution to ensure the
cargo would remain secure. Despite the lengths taken to conceal the cargo, details

77 Although he bore a military title, Martinez had no relation to the Guatemalan government and
did not take orders from them. His official post was as the Chief of the National Agrarian Department.
Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 23-Jan 1954. Page Central Intelligence Agency
Declassified Documents released under CIA Historical Review Program “Release As Sanitized.” (Elements
of the document have been redacted) www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000921353.pdf
(Accessed 1-Mar 2018)

78

Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 23 Jan 1954.

62

became known. The shipment itself consisted of mortars, howitzers, grenades,
landmines, machine guns, automatic rifles and other military items. The CIA believed
that the amount of weapons and munitions far exceeded any foreseeable Guatemalan
need for national defense or internal structures such as police or government agencies.
79

When the ship finally docked in Puerto Barrios on or about 15 May, there was
a substantial increase in the number of police and soldiers throughout the port. The
Guatemalans tried to ensure security for their “innocuous cargo of machinery,”
however the amount of security present at the time of the Alfham’s arrival made that
nearly impossible. At any given time, there were twenty to thirty guards to ensure no
unauthorized personnel had access to any area around the ship. All military personnel
were moved to provide protection during the off-loading of weapons and subsequent
transport via rail. Any United States attaché or personnel were kept under constant
surveillance.80
The ship was welcomed into port by the Guatemalan Minister of Defense,
General M\anager of the International Railways of Central America (IRCA). No
manifests or bills of sale were presented to the general manager, as is normal for such
a vessel. The first railcars loaded with munitions left Puerto Barrios on 16 May.
Unloading of the munitions and weapons was completed on 23 May 1954. According

79

80

Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 24 Jan 1954.
Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 24 Jan 1954.

63

to CIA sources present at the unloading, the weapons were reconditioned Sovietmodels of varying caliber and type but seemed to be in excellent condition. The same
source confirmed that the weapons were accompanied with a large supply of spare
parts. The CIA concluded that the amount of weapons and munitions would be able to
last the Guatemalan army for “the next ten to fifteen years.”81 However, all the arms
and weaponry were obsolete and deficient in comparison to those of the United
States. The CIA believed that the Guatemalans would continue to seek more
armaments and maintained surveillance over suspected vessels carrying weapons
from that point forward.82
While the Soviet Union guaranteed that only a third of the armaments would
remain in Guatemala, the United States and the Eisenhower administration had no
way of confirming that no more armaments would make it to Guatemala or other
Latin American countries where Communists were active. Intelligence and
information about the growth of Communist subversion in Latin America became
clearer to the United States. 83 All the pieces were now in place for a confrontation
between Guatemala and the United States.

81

Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 24 Jan 1954.

82 The CIA document cites various sources and personnel involved including itineraries for key
individuals. Guatemalan Procurement of Arms From Soviet Orbit, 24 Jan 1954.

83

Immerman, 158-159.

64

CHAPTER III
The Successful Failure: Operation PBSUCCESS

In the months after Eisenhower was elected, the situation in Guatemala had
changed. President Jacobo Arbenz expropriated even more lands from the UFCO in
defiance of protest of the acquisitions by the United States. Arbenz also passed
legislation that legalized the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo1 (PGT, formally the
Guatemalan Communist Party) and suppressed the anti-communist uprising.2 The
immediate objective of the party was to continue their push into the leftist-nationalist
government and dominate the more radical intellectual circles of the country.3 The
PGT desired to further influence “progressive” Guatemalan political groups towards

1 With government support, the Communist group encouraged and organized popular feeling
against the United Fruit Company during the labor disputes in 1951.
2Gerald K. Haines, Central Intelligence Agency Staff Analysis: CIA and Guatemala Assassination
Proposals 1952-1954. June 1995 (Declassified documents obtained as part of the National Security
Archives of George Washington University), 4.
3 United States Department of State, Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the
Communist Policy, Guatemala (p57). Accessed 1 October 2018.
www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d33.

extreme agrarian and educational reform. They also sought to intensify the growing
nationalist resentment and dissatisfaction towards US private interests in Guatemala
as well as portray US foreign policy as the instrument of “imperialist
warmongering.”4
For Eisenhower, two main principles shaped his foreign policy. First,
communism could not be allowed to expand. Second, capitalism must not go bankrupt
trying to combat communism. As much as Eisenhower was obsessed with containing
communism, he feared that capitalists would ruin their system by spending too much
on defense. The president warned that those communists might be correct in their
assumption that capitalism was too selfish. Capitalists were too willing to spend and
profit later at the cost of long term interests, eventually destroying any free market
system. Eisenhower was worried that a militarized U.S. economy “would either drive
us to war- or into some form of dictatorial government.”5 Eisenhower was under
constant pressure from Congress and private corporations for increased military
spending. Instead, Eisenhower sought a cheaper and more practical way to contain
communism.6

4 United States Department of State, Communism in the Free World: Capabilities of the
Communist Policy, Guatemala (p57). Accessed 1 October 2018.
www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d33.
5 Eisenhower, because of his time in the military, greatly feared over spending and going to war
over communism.
6 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the
Present. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 540.

66

In mid-1953, Eisenhower and his top advisors met to work out a policy dubbed
Operation SOLARIUM.7 The group came up with three different plans of
containment. The first was continued containment largely through conventional
means. The second was to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear retaliation if the
Soviets tried to take anymore territory. The last option was using unconventional,
economic and propaganda campaigns against the Soviets. Instead of fighting
expensive and unpopular conventional wars, Eisenhower chose to use containment
and the threat of nuclear weapons against the Soviets.8 In Eisenhower’s eyes,
conventional operations against Guatemala were completely out of the questions. He
would need to rely on unconventional warfare against Guatemala.
In early 1954, the CIA was planning and assembling teams that would be
designated as “K” groups. The first two “K” groups would be tasked with sabotage
and harassment while the other two “K” groups would specialize and perform
assassinations. The main mission of these sabotage teams (also designated
“harassment teams”) was to attack local communists and communist’s property but to

7 Operation SOLARIUM was given code designation simply because the meeting took place in the
White House sun room.
8LaFeber,

The American Age, 540.

67

avoid attacks on the Guatemalan army.9 Intelligence packets were distributed to
Castillo Armas’ troops, codenamed CALLEGERIS, in the spring of 1954.10
In selecting an assassin, special considerations needed to be made in regards to
the qualities of the assassin. A clandestine agent must possess determination,
courage, intelligence, and resourcefulness. Most importantly, the candidate must not
be morally squeamish. If the assassin was to utilize special equipment during the
clandestine operation, he or she would need to be highly skilled with this equipment.
The assassins would need to blend into their environment completely and have
minimal contact with the target prior to the operation. The instructions were to be
given only orally by one person to the assassin. Ideally, the same person who was
instructing and giving orders to the assassin would cover the assassin’s withdraw and
evacuation once the target had been eliminated. Assassinations could be used in
resistance situations as a “counter reprisal” against the government or groups who
have taken hostile action against innocent civilians. 11
The psychological parameters of the assassins would vary depending on the
mission but the general guideline had been established for those who were deemed to

9

Haines, 5.

10 Memorandum to Staff Officers: Subject: Selection of individual for disposal by Junta Group.
Dated 31 March 1954.
11 Training File of PBSUCCESS (Undated) Job-79-01025A, Box-73, Folder 4. There are no page
numbers on these documents.

68

be the best candidates. The techniques that were described in PBSUCCESS training
documents detail that “assassination is an extreme measure not normally used in
clandestine operations.”12 These assassins were trained in various ways to kill their
target; their primary objective was the death of their target. “Accidents” were deemed
the most effective technique for elimination: a fall from seventy-five feet or higher
onto a hard surface, or down an elevator shafts, stair wells, at opened windows, or off
of bridges were also effective. Other methods such as drowning, automobile crashes,
arson, train and alcohol induced accidents were also described under the “Accident”
portion of the file.13
In war, there is a psychological component that must be utilized to the fullest
in order to cause chaos in the country in which military action is going to take place.
In conjunction with the operational information in PBFORTUNE before it was
terminated, a rigorous psychological warfare campaign was conducted in parallel with
the paramilitary operation. Using a network of anti-communists dissidents, agents at
LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign to discredit and harass the
Arbenz government. In addition, agents continued to use the model that had been
setup during PBFOURTUNE; they began sending “mourning cards” to various high

12

Training File of PBSUCCESS (Undated) Job-79-01025A, Box-73, Folder 4.

13 Training File of PBSUCCESS (Undated) Job-79-01025A, Box-73, Folder 4. Drug overdose and
poisoning were also discussed but only contained a small section. But it is important to mention that the
information was available and described to these assassins.

69

ranking Communist agents forewarning them of the eminent purge or execution . 14
The psychological campaign in Guatemala City also included sending wooden
coffins, hangman’s nooses, and fake explosive devises to selected individual’s
homes. Also included were slogans painted on the houses such as “Here Lives A Spy”
and “You Have Only 5 Days.”15
The primary goal of this psychological campaign was not to kill but to scare
their targets. LINCOLN believed in undermining and causing chaos within
Guatemala as well as destroying moral without mass bloodshed. The purpose was to
essentially destroy the usefulness of the person without having to eliminate the person
all together. LINCOLN reinforced this objective by turning down repeated requests
by the dissident leader to allow him to put together a covert group to carry out
“violent disposal” of key communist members in Guatemala (See Figure 3.1).
LINCOLN did, however, reaffirm the possibility that such actions could potentially
be carried out in the future and could remain a potential option later in the conflict .

14 Later files, memorandums, cables and intelligence packets would evolve on the frame work of
PBFORTUNE, making PBFORTUNE the initial starting point for future covert operations for eliminating
personnel in Guatemala.

15

Haines, 5.

70

Figure 3.1: Castillo Armas forces being trained in Honduras16

Individuals selected for disposal had to meet a given set a criteria. Officers
revised and updated the prospective target list on 31 March. In order to qualify for
“disposal,” an individual needed first to be a high government or organizational figure
“irrevocably in Communist doctrine and policy.” Second the United States
government had to confirm that the individual in question was a communist . The third
condition was the person should be in a government position whose removal would

16

Image taken from http://posthegemony.blogspot.com/2006/11/coup.html

71

benefit psychological, organizational or “other reasons.”17 The 31 March list was the
final revision of Guatemalan Communist personnel selected for “disposal.” A
“tentative” agreement was established that any assassinations that were to happen
would take place during the actual invasion of Castillo Armas’ forces.18
In the weeks that followed the betrayal by Delgado in January 1954, the
United States was forced to do immense damage control, both to the operational
integrity of PBSUCCESS and to its image abroad. The Guatemalan Foreign Ministry
rounded up numerous personnel suspected of being involved. It expelled New York
Times correspondent Sydney Gruson, CBS correspondent Marshall Bannell, and
several other United States journalists and a priest.19 Frank Wisner and J.C King met
immediately to discuss the damage and decide whether to continue or to abort the
operation. The conclusion was reached that the intelligence breach “unquestionably
has provided the enemy with adequate information to deduce the official support of
the US Government in Castillo Armas’s operation plus considerable details concerned

17 Memorandum to Staff Officers: Subject: Selection of individual for disposal by Junta Group.
Dated 31 March 1954.

18

Haines, 6.

19 Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C., 1994) 38. Portions of
Cullather’s work were redacted by the CIA, blocking specific names and details. Much of the information
collected comes from specific cables or letters sent between various agents or entities involved as well as
operational documents that have since been redacted or omitted.

72

therewith.”20 However, the decision was made that the United States was past the
point of no return and to press on with the operation. (See Figure 3.2)

Figure 3.2: Map of the Invasion of Guatemala, 1954. 21
With operational intelligence leaked to Arbenz, senior-officials within the
PBSUCCESS hierarchy worried of foreign sympathy and intervention. Mexico had
always maintained an interest in Guatemala and its democracy. The Mexican

20

Director to LINCOLN, DIR 36511, 30 January 1954, Job 79-01025A, Box 7. (Cullather, 38.)

21

Gleijeses, 325.

73

government, run then by Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, had strong ties of friendship to
Arbenz.22 In 1953, Cortines awarded the Great Necklace of Aztec Eagle, the highest
honor that can be bestowed to a foreign dignitary, to Arbenz. Officials worried that
while Mexico had previously caved to US pressures towards Guatemala, this time
Mexico would react strongly against any action. The overt response that could be
taken by the United States had to be limited and it was paramount to maintain
deniability.23
Arbenz released copies of all of the documents and materials concerning
PBSUCCESS but the international press and the skeptical worldwide public
dismissed the accusations as a political ploy to garner favor for Guatemala. The
American press followed suit accepting the US State Department’s delineation of the
charges being nothing more than an elaborate propaganda stunt. 24 The widespread
acceptance by the general public led to even more condemnation and a greater push
by the American press for action against Guatemala. Newspapers and broadcast
networks gave even more credence to the opinion by airing and publishing stories
about the dangers that were lurking in America’s backyard. In early spring of 1954,
the National Broadcast Company (NBC) aired a documentary “Red Rule in

22

Cullather, 33.

23 John Stephens Zunes, Decisions on Intervention: United States Response to Third World
Nationalist Governments, 1950-1957. (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1990), 66-67.

24

Gleijeses, 260-262.

74

Guatemala” portraying the Arbenz government as a significant threat to the Panama
Canal. 25 Publications like Reader’s Digest, the Saturday Evening Post and Chicago
Tribune released articles depicting Communist Guatemala as an ever growing threat
to America.
Reader’s Digest preached that Guatemala had become a Soviet colony, and
that Soviet intelligence agents filled Guatemala City and were busily establishing
military installations from which to threaten not only the region but the United
States.26 Every publication within the “liberal-conservative arc” vehemently
dismissed the accusations that the United States was plotting against the Arbenz
government. The New York Times, which harshly criticized the Guatemalan
government for the expulsion of Gruson and Bannell, published an editorial lecturing
the Guatemalan president. The article stated that “the Guatemalan Government could
help itself and the whole hemisphere by being less sensitive and less prone to carrying
a chip on its shoulder… it is fighting a ghost of the dead past, resurrected only in the
imagination of extreme nationalists and Communists.”27
Despite acquiring intelligence about the operation and openly accusing the
United States of plotting, Arbenz had failed to capitalize on the situation. His
accusations in January 1954 only increased anxiety among the Guatemalan public and

25
26

Cullather, 39.
Michael Scully, “Red Ruin for Guatemala?”, Reader’s Digest, December 1953, 25-30.

27 “Guatemalan Reforms.” The New York Times, 9 February 1954, p 26. Accessed 17 October
2018. www.nytimes.com/1954/02/09/archives/guatemalan-reforms.html

75

caused many within his country to believe this was a pretext to assuming a
dictatorship. He failed to turn his international accusations into diplomatic success.
Arbenz’s hope of using the meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS)
in March in Caracas to lodge formal charges against the United States were ruined by
the preparations John Foster Dulles took prior to the meeting. Dulles traveled to the
Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas to lobby for a resolution condemning
communism in Latin America.28 Dulles gambled on the fact that the Latin American
nation’s main priority at the conference would be on economics and as such would
yield on the issue of Guatemala in return for trade concessions and credit from the
United States.29 It paid off; despite the accusations and details Guatemala presented
against the United States, the other countries were too preoccupied with their own
economic issues to ally themselves with Guatemala. Arbenz and the PGT in
Guatemala came to the realization that they were alone against the United States. 30
The OAS voted seventeen to one in favor of condemning communism in Guatemala.31
However, when Dulles asked for help from the OAS in taking action against
Guatemala, they refused. Their decision was even more set in stone after Dulles

28 Jeremy T. Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National
Religion. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 220.

29

Immerman, 145.

30

Gleijeses, 284.

31

Gunn, 219.

76

admitted it was “impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan
Government to Moscow.”32
Even with the security setbacks, the operational planning continued to gain
momentum. Many of the security breaches came from within Castillo Armas’ own
inner circle.33 The general planning for the operation was complete, with some
logistical and intelligence assets still being gathered. As of 7 April 1954, no date was
given for the operation to actually begin. State Department officials pressed the issue
of assassinations further saying that “more drastic and definitive steps” were needed
to overthrow the Guatemalan government. 34 State Department officials and CIA
officers were directly questioned as to the viability of Guatemala being “salvageable.”
Their response was that it was no longer possible to salvage Guatemala and that
certain individuals needed to be eliminated. On 17 April, the State Department and
CIA gave “full green light” to PBSUCCESS.35
LINCOLN and senior officials came to the conclusion that severing Arbenz
from international communism and eventual removal would simply not suffice. Case

32 Walter LaFebar, The America Age: U.S. Foreign Policy At Home And Abroad 1750 to Present
(W.W. Norton and Company, New York, NY, 1989), 547.
33 Several of Castillo Armas associates failed polygraph tests regarding the security breaches. One
US official (whose name was redacted) confessed that members of Castillo Armas group had taken
classified documents containing irrefutable proof of United States involvement.
34 The official designation for the date the operation would begin was given the codename “DDAY.” Just like the original designation for OPERATION OVERLORD in 1944, this would that that the
military and paramilitary operations against Guatemala would begin on that date, D-DAY.

35

Gunn, 220.

77

officers carefully laid out the goals of PBSUCCESS beginning with the replacement
of Arbenz. Guatemalan politics required dramatic changes that would necessitate an
authoritarian leader whose allegiance and compliance to United States’ desires would
be absolute. This new leader could then terminate the land reforms and implement
total anti-communist policies. Planners foresaw an extended period of totalitarian rule
at which time Guatemala would be dependent on US aid, trade and armaments.36
Officials concluded that centralizing power around a single person created the danger
of a Somoza-style dictatorship.37 Instead of a single leader, a ruling committee or
junta would manage the country for the immediate six months following the operation
allowing for a moderate authoritarian leader to be selected.
The final plans consisted of three main areas of action: irregular, political and
psychological operations. 38 The overall preemptive psychological operations
succeeded in presenting the Guatemalan government as a repressive regime, just as
the United States wanted. Utilizing specific sabotage and assassinations, Arbenz
would be presented as losing control of Guatemala to not only the general population
but also to the military. But the more desired effect was to instill a sense of fear and
impending doom on those forces that would attempt to stop the invasion. In essence,

36

Cullather, 43.

38 The Psychological portion of the campaign had begun in early 1953 with the radio, newspaper
and false reports but operators at LINCOLN planted the seeds with the minds of the Guatemalans that an
active underground resistance existed. The additional focus of the early campaign was to instill doubt, fear
and a lack of faith in the leadership within the Guatemalan military.

78

the psychological campaign would soften the defense by using calculated raids and
eliminations of strategic individuals of importance. In turn, this would cause fear to
spread within the army and the communists within Guatemala potentially weakening
it before the invasion, causing desertions from the military and increasing the
likelihood of PGT members fleeing the country without having to kill them all .
Meanwhile, Castillo Armas and his forces were making final preparations for
their part of the invasion. His irregular forces completed their initial training. It came
to light that most of them could not read and could barely write. The American
advisors in charge of training Castillo Armas complained that the rebel forces could
not comprehend the technical concepts of tactical deployments. Castillo Armas was
given credit for being bold but was regarded as an incompetent officer.
Major delays in the training, particularly in the training of radio operators,
resulted in the date for the operation to be pushed back from May to sometime in
June. Thirty-seven saboteurs graduated from training in April and thirty field officers
graduated in May.39 Each soldier involved in the operation was issued a rifle and
ammunition. Since they would not have supply lines or reinforcements, the men
would have to take whatever food and rations they could carry. Castillo Armas force
was equipped for battle but would be without the support of armor or artillery. 40

39

Gleijeses, 293.

40

Callather, 52.

79

Even with all the planning and preparations done before the invasion, Castillo
Armas’ invasion force still faced a major obstacle once they entered Guatemala, the
Guatemalan army. Prior to the invasion, the Guatemalan army consisted of
approximately 6,200 soldiers, outnumbering Castillo Armas’ force. United States
intelligence briefings described the Guatemalan soldiers as poorly trained and illequipped with out-dated Soviet weapons. Its navy was comprised of various smaller
ships and about one hundred and fifty men. While the Guatemalan military did posses
an air-force, it lacked trained mechanics to maintain the planes and enough pilots to
fully deploy them.41 Arbenz, a professional army officer, had left the armed forces of
Guatemala virtually unchanged despite knowing of impending US intervention.42
By early May 1954, PBSUCCESS was ready to begin putting sustained
pressure on the Arbenz regime. Psychological warfare would be the primary method
during the initial phase. Propaganda and the impending threat of US military power
was designed to induce fear within the general public as well as the Guatemalan
army. The propaganda, equipment and insurgent force were designed to maximize the
psychological campaign not simply to function as a military force. Radio broadcasts
throughout May, claiming to be speaking from “deep in the jungle,” urged on people

41

Gleijeses, 198.

42 Michael Warner, Lessons Unlearned: The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair.
(www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol42no5/html) Accessed 22 Feb 2014.
Unclassified document: Based on internal probe of the failed Bay of Pigs operation.

80

to support Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and his forces of liberation.43 Due to
increased scrutiny from officials within Panama, a new broadcast station was
established at a classified location in Nicaragua dubbed SHERWOOD. This new
location increased the signal strength of the broadcast allowing messages to reach
Guatemala City clearly where previously they only came through intermittently. 44 On
1 May, SHERWOOD began broadcasting from Nicaragua to Guatemala.45
At the same time SHERWOOD became operational the Alfhem, the Swedish
freighter carrying the armaments from the Soviet-satellite Czechoslovakia, arrived in
Puerto Barrios. Arbenz was cleverly able to evade the US State Department and the
CIA’s efforts to delay or stop the freighter. Unfortunately for the State Department
and the Agency, they mistakenly believed the armaments were aboard another ship.
SHERWOOD immediately sought to turn the tables and capitalize on the arrival of
the armaments fearing that the new weapons could bridge the growing divide between
Arbenz and the Guatemalan military. The Guatemalan military commanders had
grown frustrated with Arbenz and his perceived lack of ability to lead the country.
Broadcasts began throughout Guatemala City spreading the rumor that the weapons
were not for the military but that Arbenz’s actual intent was to arm labor unions and

43 LINCOLN TO GUATEMALA STATION, LINC 2212, 29 April 1954, Job 79-01025A, Box 4.
(Cullather, 56) Exact document was taken from Cullather’s sources as it was unable to be verified in digital
form.

44

Cullather, 38.

45

Gunn, 220.

81

peasant militia for the communist cause. 46 Four successive sabotage teams were
dispatched to destroy the shipment from Castillo Armas force. Of the four, three
failed completely while the fourth only slightly damaged the train engine they were
being transported with. During the fourth attempt, one of Castillo Armas insurgents
and one Guatemalan soldier were killed. Before the Alfham arrived, there was still a
chance that State Department officials could cancel the operation. Once the Alfham
arrived, even the skeptics believed the Soviet and Guatemalan governments were fast
becoming allies.47
U.S. officials, especially CIA chief of clandestine operations Frank Wisner,
were furious over the failed interception of the Alfhem by the U.S. Navy. In response,
the U.S. Navy launched Operation HARDROCK BAKER on 24 May 1954, to
blockade Guatemala. Submarines and surface warships intercepted and boarded every
ship that entered Guatemalan waters. The intercepted ships were “forcefully
searched” for contraband and weapons that could be used by the Arbenz regime.48
American sailors even searched British and French ships, in violation of maritime
national sovereignty agreements.49 In correlation with the blockade, on 7 June 1954 a

46 Gleijeses, 309. Cullather and Gleijeses suggest that the United States alerts the Army to the
shipment but deemed it unlikely. Officials within the State Department and the CIA were completely
shocked when the shipment arrive, believing they themselves could stop it without any help from the
Army.

47

Cullather, 61.

48 Jerry Carrier, Hard Right Turn: Assassination of the American Left- A History (Algora
Publishing, New York, NY, 2015), 151.

82

force consisting of five amphibious assault craft, a Marine helicopter assault battalion
and aircraft carrier were sent to aid the blockage and support the impending invasion
force.50
By early June, the Arbenz regime began directly confronting any opposition
against him within Guatemala. Civil liberties were suspended and any suspected
“subversives” were detained. Those arrested were not kept in regular jails or prisons
but rather transferred to military facilities for processing. In the first two weeks of
June, 480 people were arrested, interrogated and many were tortured. By 14 June, an
estimated 75 detainees were executed and buried in a mass-grave.51
Staging for the invasion began on 15 June. Castillo Armas’s force of 480
insurgents were divided into four teams and sent to launch points in the Honduran
towns of Florida, Nueva Ocotepeque, Copan, and Macuelizo (See Figure 3.3). Prior to
the initial invasion, ten trained saboteurs would be deployed across the country with
various objectives ranging from destroying railroads, cutting telephone lines, blocking
roadways and, most importantly, sowing fear and confusion throughout the entire
country. Arriving at the border at midnight on 17 June, the four insurgent units were
to make separate simultaneous penetrating incursions into Guatemala giving the

49 Despite the flagrant disregard for established maritime agreements, the British and French did
not protest or lodge any formal complaints. For reasons unknown, the British and French governments did
not make any protests about the incidents.

50

Carrier, 151-152.

51

Gleijeses, 283-286.

83

impression of a massive assault. Another reason for dividing Castillo Armas’ clearly
outnumbered troops was to avoid the entire assault force being destroyed in a single
engagement.52 This maneuver would cause chaos and confusion within the
Guatemalan military. With no conventional military force to engage in a single
decisive battle, the Guatemalan troops would have no idea of where the main fighting
actually was.

52

Cullather, 65.

84

Figure 3.3 : Map of Guatemala Invasion 53

From a logistical perspective, PBSUCCESS had been set up to operate without
supply lines. Initial supply drops of cargo, propaganda pamphlets and “bombing” runs
were approved for 14 June.54 However, this was not as detrimental as it would be for
a large conventional force. In fact, it could be an advantage to Armas. His small force

53 Map taken from the National Archives- http://blogs.archives.gov/TextMessage/2012/02/13/thecia-in-guatemala/ (Accessed 24-Feb 2014)

54

Gunn, 220.

85

was outfitted with the same type of weapons and munitions that the Guatemalan army
used. By using the same types of armaments, Castillo Armas forces could use the
ammunition captured from the military or collected from fallen Guatemalan soldiers.
Instead of relying on supply drops and supply lines to keep Castillo Armas’ men
fighting, they would be able to be self-sufficient while operating within a hostile
territory making them a more versatile, mobile and potentially dangerous fighting
force.55
Each of the main assault groups had specific objectives. The largest force of
198 insurgents would cross the border near Macuelizo and attack the port city of
Puerto Barrios.56 A force of 122 insurgents staged at the town of Florida would
assault the Guatemalan Army’s largest frontier garrison at Zacapa. The third assault
group would divide into two separate groups of 50 insurgents each to be commanded
personally by Castillo Armas. The two groups would attack and capture the lightly
defended border towns of Esquipulas, Quezaltepeque and Chiquimula. Once these
towns were secure, the two assault groups would rejoin and march on the capital.57

55 The idea of utilizing the same weaponry as the force that is being fought against is one of the
principle ideas of Che Guevara. Guevara would become an iconic leader of the irregular warfare campaign
in Cuba that lead to the establishment of Communism in Cuba. In order for an insurgent or irregular
campaign to be successful, guerilla forces need to able to survive without the utilization of supply lines. To
achieve this, these forces would need to be able to scavenge ammunition from fallen or captured enemy
soldiers. By using the same caliber and type of weapon, ammunition and supplies would be more readily
available to the guerillas. This would allow for the irregular forces to conduct a more prolonged campaign
against the established enemy.
56 It is unclear from the documents and information whether or not the objective of the Macuelizo
insurgent group was to simply attack and keep the heavily guarded city occupied or capture Puerto Barrios.

86

The smallest insurgent group comprised of 60 men would launch from El Salvador
and penetrate into Guatemala from the south with the objective of capturing the
provincial capital of Jutiapia.58
Arbenz believed that Castillo Armas posed no threat. Before the invasion, his
informants in Honduras assured him that Armas’ forces numbered no more than a few
hundred and could easily be dealt with. In addition to their small numbers, Castillo
Armas’ forces had been armed with weaponry that dated back to World War II. This
was not a disadvantage to his forces solely because the Guatemalan army was armed
with the same weaponry. Armas’ forces did hold a clear technological advantage in
communications equipment and aircraft given to him by the CIA. 59
There is another factor that would make Castillo Armas and his troops difficult
to find and destroy. Castillo Armas lacked a centralized command structure, as exists
within a conventional military.60 A conventional army operates from forward
operation bases (F.O.B) and outposts with their area of occupation. These F.O.Bs and

57

Cullather, 65-68.

58 Cullather’s notes and official documents have been redacted with key information about
smallest assault group missing. From official documents, El Salvador refused to allow Castillo Armas to
invade from their country which would explain why he only commanded a force that launched from
Honduras. It is unclear what, if any, concessions were made by the CIA or State Department to El Salvador
for allowing an assault force from their territory or whether senior El Salvador officials knew they were
actually there. What is clear is that El Salvador wanted to limit any connection to PBSUCCESS in case it
failed and there were any political, economic or military ramifications.

59

Gleijeses, 321.

60 It is unclear whether or not the planners of PBSUCCESS originally intended for the operation to
be launched in this manner.

87

other high value targets were at risk for enemy attack. The destruction or capture of
high value targets like an airfield, communications facility or military installation
could potentially weaken or cripple government forces in that area. The lack of a
centralized command structure or permanent base of operations made the irregular or
insurgent force more difficult to track and engage in combat. Castillo Armas did not
operate out of a permanent command outpost. The small size of the force and lack of
mechanization meant that they were not bound to roadways.61 This made their
movements difficult to track and the chances of unintentionally engaging the
Guatemalan military slimmer. There was no definable target that the Guatemalan
military could attack or destroy that would immediately cripple Armas. Since his
forces were small and dispersed, Guatemala intelligence was unable to acquire actual
troop numbers, movements and locations. Additionally, the military air support that
Castillo Armas would receive was launched from another country, making it nearly
impossible for the Guatemalan military to identify and engage.
Before the main assault groups launched their attacks, the plan hit a major
setback. On the afternoon of 17 June, El Salvadorian police came across the Jutiapa
insurgent group on a roadway just outside of Santa Ana. The entire group was
arrested and thrown in jail in Santa Ana when the police discovered machine guns,
rifles and grenades hidden in the wagon they were riding in. They were eventually

61 The manner in which Castillo Armas’ force operated was very similar to how U.S. special
operations forces conduct operations behind enemy lines. Many of the tactics and methods are discussed in
FM (3-05.130), Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, Department of the Army,
Washington DC, 30 September 2008.

88

deported to Honduras, with help from Armas. Castillo Armas used his connections
within the region to get his men released but without their weapons. 62
The Ciquimula assault force encountered the first resistance of the mission
later in the evening of the seventeenth. When this force reached the border near
Esquipulas, they discovered that the previously unoccupied border station was
manned by a customs official and a soldier. The soldier was captured and the customs
official was killed, making him the first casualty of the operation for either side.63
Armas and his troops crossed the border at 8:20 P.M. on 18 June, a day later than the
Ciquimula assault group. Simultaneously, CIA airplanes buzzed pro-government
demonstrations at a railway station in Guatemala City. SHERWOOD blasted radio
reports across the city that a battle was underway around Esquipulas with “no tally of
a death toll yet.”64 Armas and his men made slow progress on foot to their objective
due to all the weapons and supplies they were forced to carry. They captured
Esquipulas several days later on the twentieth.
On 19 June, insurgent aircraft blew up the railway bridge at Gualan.
SHERWOOD continued to broadcast propaganda that people were fleeing in droves
from the major cities. By 20 June, the initial fear and panic of the invasion had begun

62

Cullather, 67.

63 LINCOLN to Director, LINC 3997, 18 June 1954, Job 79-01025A, Box 6. (Cullather, 67) It is
unclear from various sources is whether the Guatemalan customs official or the Guatemalan soldier
actually confronted the assault force or opened fire. Reports only indicated that the customs official was
killed.

64

Cullather, 67.

89

to wear off. Castillo Armas assault groups were making very slow progress and were
losing the initiative by failing to make strategic strikes into the capital. The same day,
the assault group of 122 insurgents heading for Zacapa encountered 30 Guatemalan
soldiers led by Lieutenant Cesar Augusto Silva Giron garrisoned at the town of
Gualan. Outnumber four to one, Lt. Giron engaged the enemy in a thirty-six hour
firefight without orders or reinforcements.65 Giron routed the insurgents; only 30
insurgents managed to escape capture or death.66 The surviving insurgents reported
back that they were “decisively defeated” by a superior force.67
The insurgents would suffer an even larger loss on 21 June at Puerto Barrios.
The assault was two pronged, a small force of about 20 attacking from the water
while the larger force attacked from the east. Police quickly armed the dock workers
who were able to repel the amphibious force. Those who were not capture or killed
refused to continue the fight either fleeing across the border back to Honduras or
dispersed into the jungle. The loss at Puerto Barrios cost Armas nearly half his
fighting force with no major objective achieved.68
CIA agents in Guatemala continued the psychological warfare operations by
undertaking a massive propaganda campaign spreading broadcasting rumors over the

65

Carrier, 152.

66 The defeat of the larger insurgent group by the small garrison of soldiers calls into question
both the training and fighting prowess of the insurgents but also the amount of training the Guatemalan
soldiers had.

67

Cullather, 69.

68

Cullather, 68-69.

90

radio in Guatemala City that two rebel divisions were converging on Guatemala
City.69 In an attempt to regain the momentum, American-flown planes were ordered
to drop small sticks of dynamite on the capital.70 CIA employed pilots dropped bombs
and launched strafing runs in and around Guatemala City.71 During all of the bombing
and strafing runs, no casualties were reported by civilians or military. The desired
effect was not to kill civilians or Guatemalan soldiers but rather to “shock and awe.”
The bombs used were designed to create maximum noise and smoke. Adding to the
psychological warfare portion, planes flew over populated areas or cities making
plenty of noise and even dropped glass bottles to create a shattering effect to induce
panic. The strafing runs were to convince the civilians and Guatemalan military that
they faced an overwhelming and technologically superior enemy.(See Figure 3.4)

72

The bombing and psychological campaign had the desired effect on Arbenz. A
frightened Arbenz made one last attempt to stand firm against Armas.73 Arbenz

69 While all of these events were unfolding in Guatemala, the United States government was
denying any involvement in the Guatemala. Washington Post and New York Times articles reported
different accounts than that the of the official government version of the events.
70 Walter LaFeber, The America Age: U.S. Foreign Policy At Home And Abroad 1750 to Present
(W.W. Norton and Company, New York, NY, 1989), 547.

71

Immerman, 174.

72 The psychological campaign that involved the aircraft was hindered somewhat by Armas’
constant demand for air-cover. With the major defeats in the other prongs of the attack, Armas threatened
that without out heavy bombardment and cover he would be forced to abandon the campaign. (Cullather,
70).
73 Castillo Armas ordered Arbenz unconditional surrender. It is unclear whether the conditions for
surrender were decided by Castillo Armas or the C.I.A.

91

believed that Armas attack was a diversion from where the real battle would take
place: Guatemala City. He believed that his army would defeat Armas and that his
efforts should be turned to dealing with U.S. retribution when Armas lost.74 Arbenz
was afraid that with Armas’s failure, Eisenhower would send in the Marines to finish
the operation.75

Figure 3.4 : Gasoline Depot bombed by CIA rebel Air Force76

74

Gleijeses, 323.

75

Gleijeses, 328.

76

Image taken from www.latinamericanstudies.org/cia-coup.htm (Accessed 31- Mar 2014 13:20)

92

Firmly believing that the Guatemalan army would handle Armas’ force,
Arbenz shifted to starting a new battle on the diplomatic front. The Guatemalan
government attempted to reach out to neighboring countries in Central America to
acquire their diplomatic support against the United States. The request to El Salvador
was met with the Salvadorian ambassador leaking the request to the United States
ambassador John Peurifoy. Mexico received the Guatemalan emissaries but remain
unapproachable on the issue. Arbenz only remaining hope was the United Nations. 77
Arbenz and the Guatemalan government believed they had a solid case and the
evidence of foreign intervention by the United States and complicity of Honduras and
Nicaragua would ensure U.N. assistance. The motion was put forth on 18 June, before
Armas force even entered the country, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Guatemala Jorge Toriello Garrido78 specifically against Honduras, Nicaragua and the
United Fruit Company.79 On 20 June, the Security Council approved a French motion
calling for “the immediate termination of any action likely to cause bloodshed .”80 All
members of the United Nations needed to abstain from giving any assistance to such

77

Gleijeses, 328.

78 Jorge Toriello Garrido was one of three leaders who lead Guatemala following the October
Revolution in 1945, along side a then Captain Jacobo Arbenz

79

Cullather, 70.

80 United Nations, Security Council Official Records, 20 June 1954, S/3236/Rev.1. (www.un.orgaccessed 2 April 2014, 17:35)

93

action. Toriello appeared before the Security Council again on 21 June to ask for the
Security Council to take more aggressive steps to stop the flow of foreign assistance
to the “rebels.”81
A rapid series of meeting and phone calls to discuss how to handle this
occurred between Winser, the Dulles brothers, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Eisenhower.
Eisenhower seemed to expect this contingency and was prepared to use the United
States veto power on the Security Council.82 During the four days leading up to the
Security Council’s decision, the United States put constant pressure and issued
numerous threats to various members in an attempt to sway their vote away from
action in Guatemala. The Security Council decided on 25 June to refuse to hear the
Guatemalan case.83
With the diplomatic battle being fought in the United Nations, the military
conflict in Guatemala continued. In the wake of consecutive defeats, Eisenhower
authorized U.S. Air Force raids againsts Guatemala military targets and cities. The
US government and the CIA lied to the media about US military involvement,
blaming the bombings on independent rebel air force.84 Initially, Arbenz’s Chief of
the Armed Forces urged Arbenz and leading politicians to have faith that the military

81

Gleijeses, 329.

82

Cullather, 70-71.

83

Gleijeses, 331.

84

Carrier, 152-153.

94

would defeat Armas. Arbenz made the executive decision not to arm civilians.85 The
PGT and other administrators agreed with this decision.86 What Armas was not
counting on was the betrayal of the Guatemalan military. The gravity of the desertion
would not be realized until 25 June, the same day the Security Council refused to hear
the Guatemalan case.87 In the eyes of the PBSUCCESS leadership, the prospects of
an insurgent victory seemed to be getting slimmer by the hour. The original assault
group that attacked Esquipulas divided their forces even further. The bulk of the force
remained in the town while a small contingency splintered into smaller detachments
consisting of ten to twenty men each and pushed on. Remnants of the Gualan assault
group and the small groups from the Esquipulas assault group spread out into towns
further south. From their vantage points, the insurgent groups could see government
troops on the move.
Planners of PBSUCCESS had counted on a certain amount of defections from
the Guatemalan military and local recruits who would in turn swell their ranks from
the original 480 to several thousand. This did not happen on the scale the planners had
hope for, though defections were substantial. In areas where the insurgents met the
most resistance, no defectors or recruits materialized. In fact it was quite the opposite;

85 It is unclear if this decision was made out of fear that the general population would use these
weapons and rise up against him or whether he genuinely believed that the Guatemalan Army could defeat
the insurgent force.

86

Gleijeses, 321.

87

Cullather, 73.

95

the insurgent force were the ones who were deserting. But in areas where no
resistance was met, deserters and new recruits began to fill the dwindling ranks.
Planners had logistically planned for an increase in numbers once the assault forces
entered and had prepared weapons and munitions to be airdropped into Guatemala to
arm this force. Armas’ forces in Chiquimula eventually grew to the ranks of 1200
men. But the group that Armas himself was commanding had dwindled from 180 men
to around only 30.88
Neither Arbenz nor his staff feared Armas’ scattered “army.” Rather, they
believed that this was the precursor for a larger invasion led by conventional US
troops.89 Arbenz was told that the US Marines and Air Force were standing by to
invade his country and not only completely destroy it but also to eliminate him.90
Arbenz chose to try and destroy Armas assault in a massive battle at Zacapa. He
ordered the Guatemalan military to amass at Zacapa and allow Castillo Armas to
advance unopposed. When Armas’s forces arrived at the outskirts of Zacapta they
witnessed train loads of supplies and troops arriving hourly. Despite the appearance
of clear military direction, the truth was that the Guatemalan officers were severely
demoralized and overwhelmed by the responsibility put on them to single handedly
save Guatemala. Like their president, the army feared direct military confrontation

88

Cullather, 74-75.

89

Cullather, 73.

90

Carrier, 152-154.

96

with the US military. But unlike Arbenz, they placed no faith in the United Nations
ability to reign in the United States. The entire time troops were pouring into Zacapa,
the officers of Guatemalan army wondered whether the United States marines were
landing in Honduras.91
Arbenz was initially warned by the PGT, upon their return from Zapaca on 23
June, that the Guatemalan army could not be relied upon to defeat Castillo Armas.92
Arbenz sent his own military advisor to give him a report on the situation. He
returned with the same findings and the message that “the officers think that the
Americans are threatening Guatemala just because of you and your Communist
friends. If you do not resign, the Army will march on the capital and depose you.”93
In the evening of 25 June, Arbenz called a meeting at the Presidential Palace
where he told various leaders of government and the labor confederations that the
army had deserted and the population must be armed. Party leaders agreed with
Arbenz and pledged several thousand volunteers, with the provision that the
volunteers be orderly armed and trained. The numbers promised to Arbenz never
came to fruition. Of the thousands promised, very few actually presented themselves

91

Cullather, 76.

92 The PGT reported on their return that there was a clear lack of discipline and leadership in
Zacapa. Officers were seen cowering in their barracks and refused to lead.

93

As quoted in Gleijeses, 332-333.

97

for training. Those who did come to train and fight never received the weapons that
Arbenz had promised them.94
Although the garrison at Zacapa had no interest in engaging in direct battle
and despite their growing numbers, Armas faced an increased threat from police and
armed peasants. On 26 June, nearly every one of his dispersed units called for air
support. The following day, Armas launched an assault on Ipala but was repelled.
With his forces spread thin, he still tried to capitalize and occupy large areas of
territory. Wisner and senior PBSUCCESS officials did not want Castillo Armas to
engage in direct conventional battle but rather turn the conflict into a true guerilla
campaign by attacking the enemy and then disappearing into the jungle. But there was
no need for a tactical change, the mission was over.95
The campaign in Guatemala was a success without much of a battle.96 On 27
June 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman resigned his position as Guatemala’s
leader. He sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City. The eleven
days that followed Arbenz resignation, there were five provisional governments
staffed entirely by military officers.97 Upon his resignation, the CIA immediately

94

Gleijeses, 342- 343.

95

Cullather, 77.

96

Barrett, 23.

97

Gleijeses, 353.

98

sought to support Colonel Elfrego H. Monzon, a Guatemalan military officer they
“persuaded” to assume the presidency once Arbenz had resigned. But Armas had the
support of U.S. ambassador Peurifoy. Peurifoy was the U.S. official in charge in
Guatemala. He spoke with power and authority on behalf of the United States.
Monzon was reluctant to relinquish his new position to Armas. Despite the support
Monzon was receiving from Guatemalan military officers, none of those officers were
willing to go against the United States.98
By 1 July, CIA officers involved with PBSUCCESS were concluding their
operational tasks and beginning to withdraw. The Voz de la Liberacion, the CIA
sponsored radio station responsible for much of the propaganda that went over the
radio waves, was dismantled and the equipment packaged for shipment to the United
States. Guatemala Station was ordered to destroy all documents pertaining to
PBSUCCESS. The CIA wished to capitalize on the “victory of PBSUCCESS .” In the
United States, the CIA wanted to use the operation to boost the Agency’s reputation
in Congress and with the Eisenhower Administration.99 The mission parameters

98

Gleijeses, 355.

99 Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954
(Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency: Washington DC, 1994), 8. Original text
was 113 pages and classified as “SECRET” but the document has been “sanitized” and much of the
chapters have been removed. The page numbers do not correspond to the page numbers on the paper but to
the pages that were available.

99

switched to gathering intelligence on Guatemalan communists, Soviet mechanisms of
communism in Latin America and key documents throughout the country.
When the election for president finally occurred, Armas had received ninetynine percent of the votes. Armas was elected provisional president of Guatemala on 7
July 1954. That same day, Armas joined forces with Monzon and together they
marched up the steps of the National Palace.100 When Castillo Armas took over as
president, he granted Arbenz permission to leave the country for Mexico had granted
him political asylum. Armas allowed 120 Arbenz government officials or communists
to leave Guatemala unharmed for other countries. Throughout the entire campaign,
there was no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed. 101

100

Immerman, 175-176.

101

Haines, 8.

100

EPILOGUE:

PBSUCCESS was the culmination of years of planning and work by the CIA
and State Department of the United States. It achieved its main goal of replacing
President Arbenz. The new leader, who would be selected by the United States, could
immediately terminate the land reforms and implement anti-communist policies
favorable to the United States. CIA planners had expected there to be a period of
totalitarian control in order to achieve the immediate desired changes. However, the
victory was short lived. The United States government vastly underestimated the
backlash that came from Latin America over the intervention in Guatemala and
overthrow of Castillo Armas.1 Despite there being no danger of a Soviet military
presence in Guatemala, the United States implemented a covert operation to dislodge
President Armas. The reverberations revealed the growing anti-United States
sentiment and nationalistic push in Latin America.2
The aftermath of the overthrow in Guatemala in 1954 had a profound effect on
many different areas. The Eisenhower Administration came under heavy scrutiny

1 Michelle Denise Getchell, Revisiting the 1954 Coup in Guatemala: The Soviet Union, the United
Nations, and ‘Hemispheric Solidarity.’ Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 2 (2015): 73-102.
(https://doi.org/10.1162/jcw_a_00549) Accessed 12-October 2019

2

Getchell, 101.

over its role in the operation. Guatemala became a symbol of the stubborn resistance
of the United States to progressive, nationalist policies in Latin America.3 Castillo
Armas new regime proved to incredibly inept. Once the United States left Guatemala,
Castillo Armas turned the country into a dictatorship. His repressive and corrupt
policies ignited a new civil conflict within Guatemala that last for over forty years.4
Both the United States and Arbenz had major failures during this operation .
Arbenz major failure that inevitably led to his downfall was his lack of understanding
of the geo-political state that the world was in at the time when he chose to enact the
land reforms that drew the attention of the United States.5 Arbenz may not have
intended to make the United States his enemy but his actions against United States
businesses and what were perceived as a movement towards a communist state was
enough to make him an enemy of the United States. Arbenz failed to understand
United States’ position towards communism. To the United States government, no
idea agitated and invoked fear more so than communism achieving a foothold in the
Western Hemisphere.6

3 Nicholas Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Accounts Of Its Operations In
Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 106.

4

Cullather, 106.

5 Nicholas Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 19521954(Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 75.
6 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 19441954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 338-342.

102

For the United States, PBSUCCESS was a “successful failure.” Senior level
officials at “Headquarters” had all but lost hope that the CIA trained invasion force
could overthrow the leftist Arbenz government when the Guatemalan military
unexpectedly turned on Arbenz. The sudden change by his troops completely shocked
Arbenz, who resigned and fled the country. The CIA learned from PBSUCCESS that
“coups are chaotic.”7 Despite all of the careful planning that went into the preliminary
stages of the operations, the later stages of the operations were not able to be crafted
in such a way simply because it was not sensible. Experience had taught CIA officials
to expect a certain amount of chaotic uncertainty after the initial stages in any
paramilitary covert operation; rigid plans were not possible. 8 The operation in
Guatemala did not succeed because the CIA-trained rebels won on the battlefield or
frightening Arbenz into fleeing. The combination of a paramilitary invasion,
psychological warfare campaign, and Guatemalan military’s growing concern of Arbenz
increasingly leftist policies gave the military pretext for overthrowing Arbenz. In
addition, the Guatemalan military feared the potential intervention of conventional
United States military forces. 9 CIA personnel met directly with high ranking members in

7

Gleijeses, 338-342.

Michael Warner, Lessons Unlearned: The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of
Pigs Affair. (www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol42no5/html) Accessed 22 Feb 2014. Unclassified document: Based on internal
probe of the failed Bay of Pigs operation, 5.
8

9

Gleijeses, 338-342.

103

Guatemala City face to face in order to persuade the Guatemalan military’s indecisive
leadership to act.10

The operation in Guatemala was a “successful failure.” The United States
government and the Central Intelligence Agency had achieved the goal of taking
down the Arbenz government in Guatemala and alleviating what the United States
government perceived as the threat of a communist Guatemala. They saw the
operation as a “success.” The framework for covert operations and intelligence
gathering were laid during PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS . The general sense of
success of PBSUCCESS by intelligence and State Department officials was
unfounded.
A variety of factors came together that allowed for the successful coup d’état
in Guatemala. First the division of Colonel Jose Castillo Armas forces created a
general sense of chaos in Guatemala. When Castillo Armas’ force invaded Guatemala
from the north, his forces were divided into two main separate groups. One group was
to make their way towards the capital while the other was to push eastward. The
result of this division lead to a general sense of chaos for the Guatemalan military
because they lacked the intelligence of just how many enemies they were actually
fighting and where the enemy actually was.

10

Warner, 5.
104

Second, the CIA launched a massive psychological warfare campaign coupled
with American flown aircraft undertaking a bombing campaign. The propaganda
broadcasts spread confusion and false information throughout the country.11 False
casualty reports, fake troop movements and constant broadcasts urging support for
Castillo Armas’ insurgents had the desired effect. The American flown bombing runs
spread fear and panic but more importantly gave the impression to President Arbenz,
the Guatemalan people, and the Guatemalan military that they faced a vastly superior
force.12
The third factor was a lack of general and human (HUMINT) intelligence on
the part of the Guatemalan military. This lack of intelligence played into the very
successful psychological warfare campaign that was conducted. Arbenz forces had no
idea where Castillo Armas’ invasion force actually was and how many they
numbered. He firmly believed that the Guatemalan military would quickly handle
Castillo Armas and rather than focus on stopping Castillo Armas, Arbenz redirected
his efforts to acquiring diplomatic support from neighboring countries.13 Playing on
this lack of intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency sent false broadcasts and
radio messages warning of thousands of troops closing in on the capital . Finally, the

11

Cullather, 48.

Walter LaFeber, The America Age: U.S. Foreign Policy At Home And Abroad
1750 to Present (W.W. Norton and Company, New York, NY, 1989), 547.
12

13

Gleijeses, 328.
105

revolt by the Guatemalan military against President Arbenz dashed any hope of
mounting a counter attack against Castillo Armas’ forces. All these factors directly
contributed to why the United States succeeded in Guatemala.
The false sense of success during PBSUCCESS carried over into the next
major paramilitary operation the CIA was going to undertake, Cuba. But unlike the
CIA, Fidel Castro, leader of Communist Cuba, learned from Jacobo Arbenz mistake’s
and the CIA tactics used in Guatemala. Castro was not about to make the same
mistakes that Arbenz did that allowed his country to be invaded and lost him the
support of the Guatemalan military.14
Yet one aspect of both operations that was never actually used but gave the
CIA a frame work for which to work off of for future operations was the assassination
guide and the “K-groups.” The importance of the assassins and their ability to
conduct their mission covertly and then withdraw without arousing suspicion was
key. In Guatemala, during OPERATION PBSUCCESS and PBFORTUNE entire
units were organized and trained to carryout eliminations on selected targets. While
the groups were never actually utilized, their training methods laid a blueprint for
conducting clandestine operations within Guatemala. With a system already
potentially in place, the CIA had trained assets on the ground in Guatemala for which
to carry out any covert assassination in the future. The operations conducted in the

14

Warner, 5.
106

1960’s in Guatemala by the United States government have their birth in the
framework of PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS.
By 1958, the CIA had evolved as a clandestine agency into formidable weapon
of the United States government. In Guatemala the situation had changed drastically
as well. Castillo Armas was no longer president of Guatemala, he was assassinated in
by a member of his presidential guard. His successor, General Ydigoras Fuentes
pushed the Guatemalan government towards being an even more repressive regime.
In November 1960, officers in the Guatemalan military attempted a failed uprising
against the Guatemalan government. These defeated officers fled to the hills where
they began an insurgency campaign against the Guatemalan government, marking the
beginning of the civil war that would span thirty years.
For Guatemala, the downfall of the Arbenz government marked a turning
point in their history. For the next several decades, from 1960 until 1996, Guatemala
would be embroiled in constant paramilitary fighting and civil war . Irregular warfare
was the primary manner the military campaigns were conducted by both the
government and insurgent groups in Guatemala. The Guatemalan military continued
to seek out and destroy any possible or potential threat against the totalitarian regime.
Under the guise of anti-communist operations, the military used brutal force against
its own people, mainly indigenous people, to ensure full obedience and control.

107

Assassinations, kidnappings, and torture were widely utilized practices by the
Guatemalan government.15
Regardless of why the United States intervened in Guatemala, the aftermath
was clear. For the United States and the CIA, Guatemala marked and early success
but also gave them a false sense of confidence in their abilities. But the CIA would
continue to grow and be involved in every major conflict the United States has been
involved in since its inception. Guatemala would enter into a cycle of perpetual
internal struggle and war. Countless civilians died as during these periods of unrest.
Communism never did become a major threat in Guatemala but rather Guatemala
became a place of despair and totalitarianism. All of which can be traced back to
Operation PBSUCCESS.

15 Greg Grandin, Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004), xvi.

108

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