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Thesis Sp. Com. 1994
A371e c.2
Alesky, Pamela D.
Evolution of the visual
presidential election
1994
EVOLUTION OF THE VISUAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN:
AN HISTORY OF TELEVISION STRATEGIES

by
Pamela D. Alesky

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Master of Arts Degree in Communication Studies

Approved by/
Committee Chairperson

Committee Member

Date

JWy to
Committee Member

y|j8C-'7 9g6

C .t

Acknowledgments
I would like to extend by sincere appreciation to those individuals who have
dedicated hours of their time assisting me with this project. I would like to thank my
committee chairman, Dr. Terry Warburton, for not only his general guidance on this
project but also his exhaustive revision and editing assistance.

Thanks are also

extended to Dr. Bob Wallace for his critical attention to content and technical details.
Finally, thanks to Dr. Tim Thompson for his encouragement and creative inspiration.
Without the patience and guidance of all these individuals, this project might never
have been completed.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

1

2

Page
Acknowledgments

1

Statement of the Problem
Research Focus..........
Definitions..................
Methodology..............
Justification................

1
2
5
8

11

Review of Literature
Historical Overview
Research Overview

15
15
20

3

The Birth of Presidential Image-Building:
29
Ike Starts a Trend in 30 Seconds..................
29
Developments during the Eisenhower Years
34
Developments after the Eisenhower Years .
Summary of Developments in the Use of Spot Advertisements ... 40

4

Low-Cost Presidential Image-Building:
Nixon Takes Charge of Television News
Developments during the Nixon Years.
Developments after the Nixon Years ..
Summary of Developments in the Manipulation of News Media..

5

6

42
45

49
51

The Ultimate Image-Builder:
Reagan Integrates Television Strategies............................
Developments during the Reagan Years..........................
Developments after the Reagan Years..............................
Summary of Developments in the Integration of Strategies

53
54
58

A Final Discussion

63

References

68

Appendix

73

li

61

CHAPTER 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The story of television is but a speck on the time line of world history. Yet
during its relatively short life span, the medium has come to pervade our society. It
informs us daily of world events, news of which at one time took months to reach us,
if it ever got there at all. It educates us about science, history, sociology, politics, art
and almost eveiy other discipline once relegated only to books. It entertains us with
stories, fantasies, and humor.

It provides us with contemporary role models and

enlightens us about the kind of lifestyles we can live. In the privacy of our own
homes, it introduces us to interesting local, national, and world figures we might
otherwise never come to know. Political figures represent one of the most influential
groups of people television brings to our attention on a regular basis, especially during
political campaigns.
In fact, despite less than half a century in existence as a campaign tool,
television use by all political figures, especially presidential candidates, has grown
phenomenally. Its role during presidential campaigns has evolved from occasional,
unplanned news coverage of campaign speeches to carefully planned use of the
medium that contributes significantly to a candidate's image and success.

Each

presidential election since 1948 has witnessed some new development in the use of
television, and each new development has expanded the boundaries of television use
by political candidates (Jamieson, 1984). Television advertising now accounts for the
largest single expense in presidential campaign budgets, and election stories account
for a significant proportion of news coverage during the campaign season (Graber,
1993). Television has evolved into perhaps the single most important aspect of a
candidate's campaign, yet systematic critical analysis of this developmental process
1

2

from a campaign strategy perspective over the course of several presidential
campaigns is virtually nonexistent. Existing studies have either focused on a particular
campaign or on one specific aspect of television, such as advertising in general
(Diamond & Bates, 1984) or the news media's role in presidential campaigns (Owen,
1991). These approaches do not completely address the total television strategies of
candidates, however.
Research Focus
The purpose of this study is to begin to fill that void by providing an historical
critical analysis of the development of television use as an image-generating tool in
post-convention presidential election campaigns. Generally, the strategies utilizing the
visual capabilities of paid and unpaid television to enhance the candidates' images will
be examined. More specifically, traditional five- to sixty-second spot advertisements
will constitute the paid element to be studied, and news broadcasts will be the main
form of unpaid television to be examined. While spot advertisements were initially the
main means of presenting presidential candidates to the viewing public, techniques
used to enhance their visual image in early spots were eventually transferred to
strategies for coping with the news media. As the use of television in presidential
campaigns continued to evolve, the visual communication strategies of paid and
unpaid television became integrated into one complex image-enhancing package.
In this study, the contributions of one presidential candidate for each of three
developmental periods between 1952 and 1992 will be examined both in detail and in
relationship to contributions made by other candidates during that period. The three
periods have been identified as 1952-64, 1968-76, and 1980-92. The beginning of
each coincides with the first successful campaign of each of three focal candidatesDwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan.

They tend to be most

3

widely associated with the emergence of spot advertisements, news media
manipulation, and integrated utilization of television's visual communication strategies,
respectively. Most experts, including Chester (1969), Diamond and Bates (1984),
Jamieson (1984), and Reinsch (1988) attribute the precedent-setting developments in
television spot advertising to Eisenhower. Similarly, Nixon is generally recognized for
the earliest and most profound contributions to the manipulation of the news media by
such researchers as McGinniss (1969), Mickelson (1972), Patterson and McClure
(1976), and Owen (1991). Finally, Schram (1987), Reinsch (1988), and Owen (1991)
recognize Reagan for firmly establishing the integration of the visual imagery strategies
of paid and unpaid television.
Because of the inherent difficulty of establishing precise periods of analysis in a
study of phenomena that continue to evolve over time and thus overlap with
subsequent periods, the three designated periods have been arbitrarily designated to
include the election years between the generally recognized emergence of one
phenomenon and the beginning of the next. There is a presumption that a majority of
the visual communication strategies utilized during these respective time frames will
center around the particular type of television use attributed to that period.

To

reiterate, however, the difficulty in making clear-cut distinctions in the emphasis
placed on television use in political campaigns is recognized as is the reality that
strategies do not just start and end with specific campaigns. For example, visual
communication strategies relevant to spot advertising certainly continued to develop
after 1968, and manipulation of news media began before 1968. These post-period
and historical developments are acknowledged throughout the study in order to
reinforce the significance of the evolution of visual communication strategies in
television utilization. Additionally, the emphasis on these three specific candidates,

4
who are coincidentally all Republicans, should not be construed to mean that other
successful, and even unsuccessful candidates, did not play a role in the developmental
process either by furthering the use of previously established techniques or developing
new ones.

In fact, other candidates will be mentioned as appropriate during the

various periods, although giving extensive attention to more than three candidates is
simply beyond the scope of this study. Since the three also ran for two consecutive
terms of office, their election campaigns provide opportunities for more extensive
evaluations.

Table 1 provides a summary of all the Democratic and Republican

presidential candidates according to developmental period
This study will be concerned specifically with the visual communication
strategies used to enhance the presentation of the candidates' images. The use of
television will be examined only from the campaign strategy standpoint. Neither
audience uses, responses, or impacts nor media's own strategies will be dealt with,
although the literature review demonstrates that considerable research has been
conducted in these areas. Furthermore, only those strategies specifically relevant to
the visual projection of the candidate's image will be studied.

5

Table 1
Summary ofPresidential Candidates by Developmental Period

Period

Democrats

1952-1964

Adlai Stevenson

Dwight Eisenhower

John F. Kennedy

Richard Nixon

Lyndon Johnson

Bariy Goldwater

Hubert Humphrey

Richard Nixon

George McGovern

Gerald Ford

1968-1976

Republicans

Jimmy Carter
1980-1992

Jimmy Carter

Ronald Reagan

Walter Mondale

George Bush

Michael Dukakis
Bill Clinton

Definitions
For purposes of clarification throughout this study, the following definitions
should be kept in mind. Strategy refers to those elements of the campaign that are
planned and purposeful. Unless otherwise specified, references to media strategy are
intended to imply television strategy. In this study, then, strategic utilization of
television means the planned, purposeful communication techniques used to present
the candidate visually via the medium of television during the campaign. However,

6
this particular emphasis should not be construed to downplay the importance of verbal
content. It is simply that the focus of this study will be on visual factors.
While paid media can refer to spot advertisements, longer paid programming
such as political documentaries or informercials, and telethons, paid media, in the
present study, refers to spot advertisements, which are the primary form of paid media
discussed in this research. When other forms of paid media are mentioned, they will
be appropriately designated. Similarly, unpaid media can refer to news coverage,
debates, official presidential speeches, incidental coverage in non-campaign
documentaries, and guest appearances on talk shows, but the primary focus for this
paper will be on television news coverage. Thus, the two terms, unpaid media and
news coverage, may be used interchangeably. Manipulation of the news media refers
to the planned management of news coverage to enhance the image of the presidential
candidate. Integration will refer to the use of television techniques devised for one
area but used in another. For example, techniques specifically developed for spot
advertisements were later used, or integrated, into the realm of media news
manipulation.
The concept of visual communication strategies is central to this research
and will include those strategies that involve the visual presentation of the candidate
and the environment. These will include the form and style of presentations, the type
and level of activity of the candidate, and background scenes used for public
appearances and advertisements. While not the main emphasis of this particular study,
such technical aspects of visual presentation as frequency, timing and sequencing
cannot be ignored. Frequency refers to how often a particular visual image is used
during a campaign. Timing is a function of who will view and when they will view the
various visual images.

Finally, sequencing refers to a tendency noted by both

7

Diamond and Bates (1984) and Wayne (1988) for election campaigns to follow a
certain order of broadcasting information about the candidate throughout the
campaign. This order generally begins with a presentation of the candidate's personal
characteristics or what is sometimes known as the humanization phase. This period is
followed by a presentation of themes and policies,

Then, any negative or

confrontational messages are generally presented. Finally, the campaign ends on a
"feel good” note.
Visual imagery will refer specifically to those elements of a television
broadcast that a person can see and that will help him or her form a mental picture by
which to understand the candidate. It may include such elements as how the candidate
is pictured (i.e., close-up, active, etc.), what the candidate is doing (i.e., smiling,
shaking hands, reading, making a formal or informal presentation), and background
pictures or images. Visual imagery contributes to the development of less tangible
aspects of the candidate's overall image, such as personal qualities, including
compassion, knowledge, strength, decisiveness, vigor, empathy, leadership ability,
integrity, and presidential demeanor (Denton, 1988).
Finally, it should be noted that while visual communication strategies and
visual imagery are closely related, visual communication strategies, discussed in the
preceding paragraph, help create overall images, not just visual images. While the
visual imagery created by various strategies is important, it is really visual
communication strategies, or those factors that involve the visual presentation of the
candidate, that will be the focus of this research. Visual imagery is one product of
these strategies. Besides the visual images, these strategies also help to create an
overall image that includes less tangible cognitive and emotional elements pertaining to
such attributes as likeability, trust, and appropriate presidential character.

8

Methodology
The mefhodology for this study will consist of a meta analysis, or review and
re-analysis, of other studies of presidential campaign strategies and television use. The
literature dealing with visual strategies used primarily by three presidential candidates
during six campaigns to present their images to the viewing public will be examined.
The campaigns to be examined include the 1952 and 1956 campaigns of Dwight
Eisenhower, the 1968 and 1972 campaigns of Richard Nixon, and the 1980 and 1984
campaigns of Ronald Reagan. The Eisenhower years will be studied because of their
importance in developing strategies for spot advertisements. The Nixon campaigns will
be studied because of their significance in the realm of manipulating the news media to
better project the candidate's image. Finally, Reagan strategy will be analyzed for its
ability to integrate the visual strategies of both spot campaigns and news manipulation
into a comprehensive campaign plan.
This decision to limit the scope of study to the three winning candidates was
made, not necessarily because winning categorically constitutes a successful campaign,
but because some method of limitation was necessary. The campaigns of the chosen
candidates, however, do tend to correspond with the strategic developments that usher
in new eras in campaign communication strategy, as previously noted. Also, there
tends to be more available research on these particular years and candidates,
facilitating a well informed historical documentation of strategy. Whether or not a
candidate won or lost using a particular strategy is not the real issue in this study, since
there are a number of other factors that are relevant to winning and losing that are
beyond the scope of this work. For the purposes of this study, strategies will be
considered successful based on their incorporation into the overall campaign plan, their
use by other candidates, and their use in subsequent elections.

9
The following five categories will be examined in order to trace the
development of strategic utilization of television in image-generation of presidential
candidates:

(1) Enhancement of natural attributes and minimization of the

shortcomings of the candidate; (2) Orchestration of public appearances; (3) Use of
visual symbolism; (4) Manipulation of reality; and (5) Frequency, timing, and
scheduling. These five visual communication strategies were chosen because of their
widespread application to both paid and unpaid television use. They are not derived
from any one specific source, but, rather, are based on a composite of suggestions for
campaign strategy by such leading researchers as Agranoff (1977), Diamond and Bates
(1984), Schram (1987), Reinsch (1988), Dye and Ziegler (1989), Owen (1991), and
Graber (1993). Scheduling elements related to frequency, timing, and sequencing,
which are an important part of strategy (Agranoff, 1976), will be mentioned within the
categories to which they apply.
In essence, data is derived from existing literature addressing campaign
strategy in the above categories. It is drawn from a variety of sources including
Leonard Reinsch (1988), radio and television director for the Democratic National
Conventions and presidential campaigns from 1948-68; Sig Mickelson (1972), the
Director of News and Public Affairs for CBS in 1952 and president of CBS News
Division in 1960; Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1984), one of the foremost contemporary
researchers on presidential politics and the media; and researchers such as Charles
A.H. Thomson (1956, 1960), Theodore White (1962, 1965, 1969), and Joe McGinniss
(1969), who provided in-depth, inside analyses of specific election campaigns. To help
maintain objectivity and incorporate a more complete perspective of the subject, the
sources of information, ranging from media and campaign insiders to external
researchers and journalists, have been kept purposely broad.

10
It is certainly recognized that an historical analysis of television strategy in
presidential campaigns has its limitations. To begin with, the history of television,
compared to that of other subject areas where historical analyses have been commonly
used, is relatively brief, which provides one possible suggestion for its neglect as a
singular research topic to date.

Additionally, television is a constantly evolving,

technology-driven field, which may make predicting future trends difficult because
unknown variables could easily emerge before the next election. Isolating television
from other campaign strategies may lead some to place too much emphasis on it to the
exclusion of other campaign strategies, which are also still important. Finally, the
nature of data collection, which depends heavily on secondary sources of information
can lead to an inherently subjective analysis. Nimmo and Sanders (1981), however,
emphasize the growing need for meta research, or the re-analysis, synthesis, and
review of primary research to help determine new relationships between events and
findings.

This type of historical research would require reevaluating existing

information from a perspective that perhaps was not considered by the original
researcher, (i.e., its applicability to campaign strategy) or identifying relationships
between the findings and events not previously recognized as significant.

The

subjectivity of this study is tempered by a recognition of where strong opinions exist
and a balancing of them as well as reliance on significant studies.
Although meta research represents a relatively new methodology in political
communication, it is deemed the most appropriate means of conducting an historical
critical analysis of television strategy in presidential campaigns at this time and
identifying the gradual integration of visual strategies from paid and unpaid media use.
It is believed that this study will contribute to a better understanding of how overall
television strategy by candidates is developed and utilized, suggest possibilities for the

11
future use of the medium by presidential candidates, and open the door for additional
and more comprehensive research in this area.

Justification
The value of the strategic utilization of television in presidential campaigns has
been recognized for some 40 years, and considerable research has been conducted on
various components of it.

However, as the literature review in this study will

illustrate, a comprehensive work specifically addressing the historical development of
television strategy as a presidential campaign tool is yet to be written. This topic is
routinely lumped in with general work on the development of mass media in politics
(Graber, 1980, 1993); or it is presented as only one of many components of general
campaign strategy (McGinniss, 1969; Jamieson 1984). Other works by Sabato (1981)
or Owen (1991) deal with the impact of television on presidential politics but do not
isolate campaign strategies as a specific point of interest. Furthermore, researchers,
such as McClure and Patterson (1973, 1976), Diamond and Bates (1984), and Kaid
and Johnston (1991), tend to focus on only one aspect of television strategy at a time,
such as utilization of advertising, audience impact and reactions, or the significance of
news coverage, respectively. Works that do deal specifically with television strategy
in presidential campaigns such as Patterson (1982) or Schram (1987) tend to look at
only one or a few presidential elections.
Studying the development of television use to enhance a candidate's image will
provide a more comprehensive view of how television was used by the candidates in
past elections and offer insight about how it will be used in the future.
development of visual strategies is particularly enlightening.

The

For example, do

background scenes of poverty and war build emotional support for war and thus
support for a candidate who favors war; or do they encourage the opposite? How can

12
a candidate be presented visually as both warm and caring but also strong and
decisive? Looking at the gradual integration of strategies can provide clues to which
mixture of strategies is most effective, although the intent of this paper is not
necessarily to provide a formula for winning a presidential election. The wide range of
variables important to winning an election are beyond the scope of this work. The
primary goal of this study is to provide insight into the potential strategies for
television use in future presidential campaigns. Which lessons from the past will be
integrated into campaign strategies in the future? In essence, what role will television
play in constructing the image of presidential candidates in future elections?
Furthermore,

while

significant

research

projects

utilizing

various

methodologies, including surveys (O'Keefe, 1975), panel studies (Patterson, 1980),
and content analyses (Kaid & Johnston, 1991), have certainly contributed to
understanding campaign strategy through analyzing different aspects of the election
phenomenon, an historical analysis can bring together the aspects of all such works
that contribute specifically to how campaign staffs establish a strategy for television
use.

Stevens (1975) suggests that there is a great need in modem political

communication research for comparative historical analyses. In fact, he contends that
an historical perspective improves almost any kind of study. Historical analyses have
long been used in social sciences but are just coming into use in the field of mass
media communication, which is a much newer discipline. In particular, any historical
analysis of television, either alone or in its role in political campaigns, would have been
somewhat meaningless until recently because of the relatively short history of
television and the even shorter history of its utilization in presidential campaigns
(Stevens, 1975).

Now, after some 40 years and eleven presidential campaigns,

however, the role of television in presidential campaigns has evolved to a point where

13
historical analysis offers a useful methodology for research.

Such researchers as

Jamieson (1986) and Diamond and Bates (1984) have already initiated historical
analyses of the role of mass media, including television, in contemporary political
presidential campaigns.
In addition, Stevens (1975) and Graber (1993) both suggest a need for more
longitudinal analyses in campaign studies. Stevens (1975) propounds that even though
historians have devoted considerable attention to presidential elections, there are still
new techniques to be applied and new relationships to be examined. For instance, he
notes that while electoral behavior over time has been widely studied, little study of
candidate behavior over time has been undertaken. Similarly, little investigation of
changing campaign strategies has been conducted. Graber (1993) further proposes a
need for analysis of the differing roles of media over time as candidates and issues
change in presidential elections.

This research would transcend the traditional

tendency to focus on only one or two elections and meet the need for study on
candidate strategy over time.

As Nimmo and Sanders (1981) note, "Political

communication is a field with continuously evolving theoretical approaches, subject
matter, areas, and methodological stances" and "as yet, there are no fixed boundaries,
hardened dogmas, methodological orthodoxies, or conventional truths" (p. 28).
This study will proceed with a literature review that provides an historical
overview of the utilization of television in presidential campaigns as well as an
overview of the significant research topics pertinent to television and presidential
campaigns that have been addressed. The next three chapters will analyze each of the
three periods of television utilization already mentioned. It should be noted that there
are some overlaps in years covered by each chapter as a result of the ongoing
evolutionary process of television strategies in the three realms under analysis. The

14

goal of each chapter, however, is to provide an inclusive discussion of each form of
television utilization while placing primary emphasis on the candidate most associated
with that particular form. Finally, this work will conclude with a discussion of the
findings and concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Despite its huge impact on not only presidential politics but also our lives in
general, television is a relatively new phenomenon. Television broadcasts only began
experimentally in the late 1920s, but they seemed to have an almost immediate
application to politics.

On August 22, 1928, the General Electric station in

Schenectady, New York covered an address given by Governor Alfred Smith as he
stood on the steps of the state capital in Albany and accepted his party's presidential
nomination (Chester, 1969). Television was officially introduced to the world at the
1939 World's Fair in New York City, where, according to Jamieson (1984), Franklin
D. Roosevelt became the first incumbent presidential candidate to deliver a speech via
the medium. Two television cameras covered the nomination of Wendell Wilkie at the
Republican National Convention in 1940 (Chester, 1969). World War II put a virtual
halt to the development of the medium, and according to Reinsch (1988), there were
only about 172,000 television sets in the United States in 1948, many with screens as
small as seven inches. While audiences reached were still quite small during the period
immediately following World War II, Jamieson (1984) notes that television's potential
as a political medium for presidential candidates was realized by this time, as
evidenced by its use in the 1948 presidential election campaign.
Historical Overview
The medium made its official debut on the presidential campaign scene at the
1948 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia (Reinsch, 1988).

In fact,

according to Reinsch (1988), that city was specifically chosen as the convention site
because of its television potential. The Republican and Progressive Parties, likewise,
held their conventions in the same city for similar reasons.
15

At a pre-convention

16
Democratic National Committee meeting, Roger Clipp of WFIL-TV in Philadelphia
made the first presentation to a Democratic arrangements committee on the
advantages of television. He boasted that live broadcasts could reach audiences from
Boston to Washington DC., and fast air delivery of the film to stations around the
country would assure a national audience. He added that one third of all Americans
were reachable by television (Reinsch, 1988). Additionally, he noted that there was
space next to the convention center that could accommodate an additional 25,000
people, and there would be enough television sets for all to watch the convention
(Reinsch, 1988). The Republican Convention similarly provided sets at the Paramount
Theater in New York City, where Dewey's acceptance speech was viewed live. In all,
an estimated 10 million people watched the conventions on television (Reinsch, 1988).
Even President Truman watched the Democratic Convention from the White House
(Reinsch, 1988).
As early as 1948, politicians began to realize how vulnerable television made
them and to consider the need for professional assistance. Television cameras could
pick up and broadcast to thousands of viewers unintentional acts of boredom or anger.
Additionally, speeches and gestures that might be effective with live audiences could
be very ineffective and even damaging on the new medium. According to Reinsch
(1988), Republican and Democratic political advisors alike warned their convention
delegates: "Television has a complete and merciless eye, shifting without notice.
Reading newspapers, yawning, and other signs of boredom are to be avoided" (p. 48).
While attempts were made to shorten speeches for television's sake, there was still
little attention given to floor layouts or slogan placements, details that would also
concern political advisors in the future.

17
As the 1948 campaigns moved into the fall, television advertising was first
used to promote a presidential candidate. On October 5, President Truman's Jersey
City, New Jersey speech was televised by Newark's WATV Channel 13 and became
the first paid political appearance by a presidential candidate (Jamieson, 1984).
Republican hopeful Thomas Dewey also bought time before the campaign was over.
Truman followed his noteworthy campaign up with the first televised inaugural
address on January 20, 1949 (Reinsch, 1988).
During the same election, Thomas Rosser Reeves, Jr., of the Ted Bates
Agency, offered to run a television advertising campaign for Dewey under the theory
that if the new medium could sell consumer products, it could also sell politicians.
Dewey refused the offer, claiming that such a strategy was not dignified. Reeves, who
went on to help elect Eisenhower in 1952 using the concept of a unique selling
proposition (USP) as part of a television spot campaign, contended that Dewey could
have won using television (Diamond & Bates, 1984). In 1950, Dewey did decide to
use television in his New York State gubernatorial reelection campaign. His win and
over 100,000 votes were attributed to his television finale (Diamond & Bates, 1984).
While limited use of television in presidential campaigns did begin in 1948, it is
generally accepted that the 1952 election represents the first organized use of
television in a presidential campaign (Diamond & Bates, 1984). By this year, the
number of television sets in the United States had risen to 19 million, and transmitting
stations existed in most major cities (Diamond & Bates, 1984). The implementation of
transcontinental cable that had occurred by this time also facilitated the coordination of
nationwide television networks. Forty-two percent of all American households and 62
percent of those in the Northeast could be reached by television (Diamond & Bates,
1984). During the 1950s, the American public was first introduced to the intricacies

18
of presidential politics through the national televising of political conventions and
exposure to news coverage. In 1952, the New Hampshire primaries were covered by
television for the first time, and later that year, the party conventions were televised
nationally for the first time. Televised political advertisements underwent a great deal
of development during the 1952 and 1956 elections and quickly achieved prominence
in the campaign planning process during the 1960s. Today they account for the largest
single expense in campaign budgets.
By 1960 politicians moved to incorporate into the campaign what Bergreen
(1980) refers to as one of the most important innovations in the political use of
television. Televised presidential debates offered large audiences the opportunity to
compare candidates who had been brought together before them to present themselves
and their positions. The debates are just one example of the strategic importance
attributed to television in the whole political campaign process during the 1960s as
emerging strategies both to attract larger audiences and to cultivate favorable media
portrayal of candidates dominated the period.
By the mid 1960s, advertising agencies specifically responsible for handling
television advertising had become a necessity, and the bulk of both parties' advertising
budgets was earmarked for television. Additionally, by this time, the early evening
news had become a prime target of political campaign strategists, leading to
acceptance of what was sometimes referred to as "Guthman's Law" (Mickelson,
1972). The phrase referred to Edwin Guthman, a member of the John F. Kennedy
campaign staff who suggested that three minutes of coverage on the early evening
news was worth more than any amount of exposure on any other medium at any time
of the day. The theory behind this premise is that the audience of any particular

19
network is large and relatively non-partisan. Thus a newscast is capable of reaching
committed, uncommitted, and opposition voters.
The 1968 election stands out as a critical transition point in the development of
integrated television strategy. Mickelson (1972) recognizes it as a model of efficiency
in the strategic use of television to package a candidate. Nixon's strategists had done
their homework on past elections strategies and understood the strengths and
weaknesses of television and how to use it to package their candidate (Mickelson,
1972). They were also adept at integrating these lessons with new technology. This
was the first presidential election campaign, for example, that color television was
available for general and widespread use, and Nixon's advisors were able to utilize it
effectively to add to the visual effects of their campaign (Mickelson, 1972).
Integrating what they had learned about effectively portraying a candidate on
television from both Eisenhower's spot advertisements and Nixon's botched debate
presentation in 1960, Nixon's advisors were able to enhance his image in news
coverage by the new medium of color television. The year ushered in what would
constitute a new era of media manipulation to enhance candidate image.
By 1972, manipulation of the media, especially television, as opposed to mere
utilization, had become reality. This new strategy seemed to facilitate the rise of image
building that was to dominate the presidential campaigns of the 1970s and early 1980s.
As Wilson (1979) notes, television had become instrumental in portraying character
because of the impressions pictures leave. These impressions depend heavily on how
the candidate looks and acts on television, which makes campaign strategy in this area
increasingly more important. For example, Nixon's strategy in 1972 relied heavily on
having him portrayed regularly on the evening news carrying out significant
presidential functions, especially in foreign affairs, thus building his image as a strong

20

leader. He also earned this concept into what became known as production idea
spots, where memorable impressions were created by utilizing real news items, such as
Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union (Mickelson, 1972),
By the 1980s, political strategists had mastered the integrated use of
advertising and manipulation of news coverage in the image-building of presidential
candidates. Reagan managed to intertwine the visuals from his ads with the visuals
from news coverage in a way that made the two less distinct from each other to the
average viewer (Wilson, 1979). Debates had become a regular part of the campaign
process and the need for effective presentation during them was well understood by
candidates and strategists alike. In their attempt to maintain a competitive edge in
presidential races during the 1990s, candidates have begun to incorporate strategies
that utilize more non-traditional aspects of television such as talk shows, infomercials,
and cable networks, as the 1992 campaigns illustrated.

These new realms have

required candidates to place new emphasis on personal communication and learn even
more effective methods of making presentations in front of a camera.
Research Overview
In its relatively brief but highly influential history, television's impact on the
political process has been the subject of a great deal of varied research. O'Keefe
(1975) notes that "presidential campaigns have traditionally been the most popular
subjects of study, no doubt because of their interest-generating ability and inherent
importance" (p. 130). Chaffee (1975) further elaborates that because mass media are
heavily involved in most campaigns, they have also been the object of extensive
research. In further support of the need for research on mass media and political
campaigns, Graber (1993) emphasizes, "Mass media coverage has become the
(political) campaign's pivotal point" (p. 257). As Arterton (1978) notes, mass media

21
represent the primary means by which voters acquire information about presidential
campaigns.

O'Keefe and Atwood (1981) concur with most other political

communication scholars that of all the media forms, television provides the most
campaign information to the general public.
As the importance of television has grown in presidential races, utilization of
available technology, carefully planned advertising, strategies for the manipulation of
unpaid television coverage, and advice and direction from media specialists have
become critical. Owen (1991) emphasizes:
The striking centrality of television's role in elections, coupled with the
growing technological sophistication of reporting techniques and the rise of the
role of campaign consultants, have fostered the development of a new type of
politics in the mass media age. Today's salient criterion for the recruitment of
presidential candidates is the ability to project a positive media image (pp. xvixvii).
In discussions on campaign television strategy, political advertising
traditionally comes to mind first. Joslyn (1990) reminds us that, after news coverage,
advertising is the greatest source of campaign information; while Patterson and
McClure (1976) proclaim political advertising to be even more informative than news.
Because of the importance granted it, political advertising, especially in presidential
campaigns, has been the subject of much research. Comprehensive historical looks at
the development of political advertising have been put forth by Diamond and Bates
(1984) and Jamieson (1984). These authors have also emphasized content analysis of
political advertisements as have Devlin (1986) and Owen (1991). Negative political
advertising has been studied by Diamond and Bates (1984), Jamieson (1984), and Kaid
and Johnston (1991). The influences of political advertising on political behavior are

22

also discussed in such works as The People Choose a President: A Study of Voter
Decisions in the Making (Mendelsohn & O’Keefe, 1975).
Owen (1991) goes on to say that political advertisements serve a multitude of
purposes including entertainment, persuasion, image promotion, candidate recognition,
maximization of race position, association of candidate with political objectives,
conversion of uncommitted voters, retention of committed supporters, encouragement
of supporters to go to the polls and vote, stimulation of fundraising and the generation
of stories for greater exposure. While they are beyond the scope of this particular
study, these purposes can play an important role in campaign strategy.
Diamond and Bates (1984) put forth a four-phase advertising strategy plan that
addresses the general concepts of the content categories later enumerated by Joslyn
(1990) and the purposes described by Owen (1991). The early-phase advertising
strategy in a presidential campaign consists of developing recognition of the candidate
and establishing a positive image of the candidate. These initial advertisements are
often referred to as "identification" spots. The second phase consists of "argument"
spots, which help to establish what the candidate stands for. These spots often address
both policy and emotional issues. The third phase of the strategy plan consists of
"attack" spots, which emphasize and illustrate the opponents' weaknesses. Diamond
and Bates (1984) identify the final phase as the "vision on the fate of a nation" spots,
which emphasize the candidate's upbeat vision for the future if elected. They further
suggest that the 1984 and 1988 campaigns, in particular, conformed to this strategy
model.
As further support of the need for advertising strategy plans by presidential
campaigns, Agranoff (1976) notes media scheduling that balances the reach,
frequency, and size of various campaign messages within the confines of a given

23

budget is a very important aspect of campaign strategy. He suggests three different
types of buying patterns that may be utilized separately or in combination with each
other to establish an effective overall message strategy. The first strategy is the "flat
buy,

in which amounts of advertising time are purchased at a constant rate

throughout the campaign. This reinforcement-type strategy was utilized by Nixon in
1968 and 1972, according to Agranoff (1976). The second strategy is the "accelerated
finish," which begins about 10 days to two weeks before election day by gradually
increasing the frequency of advertising spots to a saturation point. This method of not
buying ad time until the very end of the campaign tends to be a low-budget technique
geared to capitalize on the already heightened interest in the elections by both the
media and the voters. The third strategy is the "spurt schedule," which consists of
early saturation of the media with advertising spots for a couple of weeks, followed by
spurts of media saturation. Agranoff (1976) suggests that this is most commonly used
over a six- to nine-month period for lesser-known candidates or for those who do not
have well-established images.
While Owen (1991) responds that "choosing an appropriate and effective
advertising strategy is an essential part of a presidential campaign" (p. 27), strategic
planning of unpaid television coverage is possibly even more important as Patterson
and McClure (1976) suggest. Sabato (1981) also emphasizes:
Paid media gives certainty of control and flexibility, but it cannot match the
unpaid media for credibility or, in most cases, for size and attentiveness of
audience. The three networks' evening news now reaches an average of 28
million homes. The average local station, copying the national networks, is
devoting more time to public affairs programs and hiring far larger news staff.

24
All political consultants fully acknowledge that the unpaid media, more than
paid media, can make or break a candidate (p. 194).
Graber (1993) underscores the importance of such unpaid coverage when she remarks
that in a presidential election year, election stories account for 13 percent of political
news covered in newspapers and 15 percent of political news covered by television,
placing it at the same level of importance as foreign affairs. According to Graber
(1993), the media coverage is also the chief source of information about candidates'
personalities. Citing the 1978 Carter primary campaign as an example, she even goes
so far as to suggest that in recent years media people have actually done the casting
for presidential hopefuls and then judged their performance throughout the campaign
on that pre-designated role. Kathleen Kendall (1993) has also come to a similar
conclusion after in-depth, first-hand observation of the New Hampshire primaries. She
concludes that by deciding who they like early in the campaign, media representatives
set the course for the winners and losers throughout the remainder of the campaign.
Graber (1993 emphasizes that by biasing their coverage, the media can, in effect,
choose the winners and losers before the race has even begun. In 1976, for example,
of almost a dozen Democratic presidential hopefuls, Jimmy Carter was afforded more
air time and positive coverage during the primaries.

After the New Hampshire

primaries, comments such as those made by NBC's Tom Pettit, who called Carter "the
man to beat," focused positive attention on one candidate. Even failures such as the
Massachusetts race were referred to as exceptions rather than disasters.

Graber

(1991) contends that in 1976 the media created the psychological momentum for
Carter, and that the winning image became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Several researchers, including Patterson and McClure (1976), O'Keefe and
Atwood (1981), Dye and Ziegler (1984), and Patterson (1993) believe the media are

25

providing increasingly more coverage of the presidential election campaign itself rather
than the actual issues.

Patterson and McClure (1976) note that one-third of all

campaign coverage during the 1972 presidential elections was of the campaign itself.
The media, especially television, require activity regardless of substance, a
phenomenon these researchers refer to as the "horse race and hoopla" (Patterson &
McClure, 1976, p. 40).

They claim that the television networks fail to cover

candidates' qualifications to be president or the issues the candidates are campaigning
on but instead focus more on the pageantry of the campaign. Dye and Ziegler (1989)
likewise note that media attention during presidential campaigns tends to focus on the
"political game" when covering speeches, rallies, press conferences, and debates and
not necessarily on the issues. Their research indicates that 58 percent of network
evening news coverage of elections was "game" oriented, dealing with winning and
losing, strategy, logistics, appearances, and hoopla; 29 percent was substance oriented,
dealing with issues, policies, traits, records, and endorsements. Finally, in his most
recent work on electoral politics and the media, Patterson (1993) charges that the
values of journalism and politics are at odds with each other and that the media
mislead voters with their game-oriented interpretation of politics instead of issue-based
descriptions of events. He further charges that the current system of journalism has a
negative impact on both the candidates' campaigns and their leadership abilities, if
elected.
Because of the significant impact that unpaid media coverage can have on
presidential campaigns, AgranofF (1976) notes that a strategy for dealing with and
controlling this aspect of the media is critical to the successful campaign. He further
suggests that an effective strategy can save a low-budget campaign crucial funds by
making effective use of free publicity. AgranofF (1976) goes on to make several

26
suggestions for the development of an effective unpaid media strategy. He emphasizes
that every attempt should be made to facilitate coverage of campaign events by timing
them appropriately and providing the media with complete but concise information
about the event, what will take place, who will be there, and when it will occur. Good
rapport with the media and knowledge of their procedures are also essential. At least
one person on the campaign staff should have a close relationship with the news
people. To ensure coverage of news releases on issue and policy statements, he
emphasizes that the releases should be tied to some interesting and visual event.
Television, in particular, will not cover a news release unless it is associated with an
event.

Finally, Agranoff (1976) emphasizes that campaign events and candidate

appearances should be timely, significant, of local appeal, out-of-the-ordinary, interestgenerating, emotional, conflict-generating, or jolting to the views to attract effective
media coverage. Graber (1993) concurs that even public events, such as a candidate's
attendance at Sunday church services, need to be carefully timed and arranged to
attract favorable media attention.
The following categories of newsworthy happenings enumerated by political
consultant Hank Parkinson (Agranoff, 1976) are probably the most relevant to
televised political campaigns: Announcing candidacy; personal appearances; release of
candidate's schedule; issue stance announcement; poll results; testimonials and group
endorsements; appeals to specific age, economic, religious, racial, or regional interests;
attacks on opponents; denying accusations; features that can run parallel to other
campaign events; and special studies or unusual research findings. Owen (1991) adds
that media strategy is especially important to candidates challenging incumbents, such
as in 1976 and 1984, because of the incumbent's ability to generate free news coverage
while carrying out the duties of the office.

27

As has been exemplified, both paid and unpaid television coverage have
become essential to presidential campaigns over the past 40 years. Achieving a proper
and complementary mix of the two has also become important. For these reasons, it is
no wonder that campaign consultants and media strategists have become so important.
Television advisors now hold year-round, regular positions on campaign staffs.
The growing predominance of media specialists and consultants has given rise
to campaigns that utilize careful planning and analysis to structure the most effective
overall television campaign possible. Sabato (1981) emphasizes this need for media
specialists and carefully planned media strategies in successful political campaigns in
The Rise of Political Consultants. He says, "Mixing style with substance and imagery
with reality, media consultants have developed a wide range of formats, strategies,
techniques, and gimmicks both to inform and deceive a television addicted electorate"

(p. in).
Agranoff (1976) notes that campaign media strategies must be concerned with
the demographic characteristics of station coverage areas and program audiences as
well as station and program ratings. They should understand the connection between
the medium and certain voter groups. The strategists must be able to determine spot
availability by time and location for paid ads as well as be able to estimate available
public service and controlled media time, such as political commentary programs.
They need to know how much time and space have been purchased by their opponents
and have an estimation of the content of and strategy of the opposition's advertising
campaign to develop an effective strategy to deal with it. The campaign planners must
be aware of station policies on disclosures and allowable message lengths.

An

understanding of any particular time-buying peculiarities, such as football games, near
election day is also critical to overall strategy planning. Strategists need to be familiar

28

with the availability and market penetration of cable and public television networks.
Finally, an awareness of the past history of political broadcasting and its possible
impact on a particular campaign is crucial.

CHAPTER 3
THE BIRTH OF PRESIDENTIAL IMAGE-BUILDING:
IKE STARTS A TREND IN 30 SECONDS
Of all the presidential candidates discussed in this study, Eisenhower is the only
one who can claim sole rights to developing the concept and starting a trend in the use
of television in presidential campaigns. Every other candidate since him has had the
experiences of one or more previous campaigns to build on, even if they did take that
information in new directions.

Eisenhower, however, was the first presidential

candidate to extensively use spot advertisements in his campaigns. Because of the
newness of television and advertising via the medium, he had no prior political
experience to build on and only some very limited experimentation with product
advertising available. Yet, as primitive as these ads may seem by today's standards of
political advertising (Devlin, 1986), they laid a foundation for almost all future
developments of the use of television by presidential and non-presidential candidates
alike.

Not only did these new political advertisements start the trend in spot

advertisements, but the lessons learned in this area were expanded into almost all
realms of television use. Techniques used to present a candidate and manipulate
reality in 30 seconds were used in longer paid political presentations, the debates of
future years, and orchestration of political events for the purpose of news coverage.
The candidate image-building process, which has come to pervade presidential
campaigns, has really been a gradual building process started by Eisenhower's simple,
seemingly direct addresses to the American people in the 1950s.
Developments during the Eisenhower Years
While Eisenhower's contributions to political advertising in the form of the spot
are significant, it should be noted that he was not the only candidate in 1952 or 1956
29

30

to use this technique nor were spots the only strategy used by him. Democratic
candidate Adlai Stevenson also used spot advertisements, and both candidates used a
variety of alternative forms of presentation that both drew from lessons learned in spot
advertising and added to the knowledge base used to develop spots. Both candidates,
for example, used longer broadcast endorsement speeches and learned valuable lessons
about presentation and scheduling from those. These lessons were equally useful in
the presentation of spot advertisements. The Democrats, for example, were careful to
save money by buying their 18 half-hour time slots well in advance and thus avoiding
the additional cost of pre-emption fees. They also scheduled these speeches to air
regularly between 10:30-11 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. They learned, however,
the valuable lesson that cheapest is not necessarily best (Diamond & Bates, 1984).
They also learned about human nature and how to attract the largest possible
audience. The Democrats may have saved money, but they lost a large part of their
potential audience through having regularly scheduled programming that was held too
late in the evening to attract the prime time audience,

Viewers had sufficient

forewarning about the programming, which, subsequently, attracted only those already
committed or leaning toward Stevenson.
The Republicans, on the other hand, paid the higher pre-emption fees to ensure
themselves a prime time slot that the audience would have more trouble avoiding. The
Republican lesson of this venture was that pre-empting prime time programming was
effective as long as the most popular shows were not bumped. Pre-empting "I Love
Lucy,” for example, created a backlash of write-in complaints, and the Republicans
were forced to go back to pre-empting less popular shows (Jamieson, 1984). The
Republicans outspent the Democrats by $2.1 to $1.5 million for television time in 1952
(Barkin, 1983); but they also reached an estimated average audience of 4,120,000 to

31
the Democrats' 3,620,000 (Jamieson, 1984). Thus, lessons about scheduling and cost
effectiveness that could later be applied to spot advertisements were also learned.
In fact, in both 1952 and 1956, care was taken in the scheduling of
Eisenhower's spot advertisements. In 1952, they were aired primarily during the last
three weeks of the campaign to avoid both boring the viewers and also any rebuttal
from Stevenson. A technique known as "hitchhiking" was also devised whereby ads
up to five minutes in length were scheduled between prime-time shows, avoiding the
cost of pre-emption but still being able to take advantage of the large audience
accumulated at that time.
Eisenhower's spot advertising campaign came about because Batton, Barton,
Dustin and Osborn (BBD&O), the agency handling his advertising campaign, did not
believe that his speeches conveyed the warm, friendly appeal that they felt he naturally
had. As a result, they developed a campaign that allowed him to address people in a
more warm and friendly manner. According to BBD&O president Bernard Duffy, the
goal of the campaign was "merchandising Eisenhower's frankness, honesty, and
integrity, his sincere and wholesome approach" (Diamond & Bates, 1984, p. 52).
Eisenhower's television advisor, Rosser Reeves, suggested utilizing a spot advertising
strategy. Experts cut campaign issues to a list of about a dozen, based on concerns
most often voiced by voters in public opinion polls, which were used for the first time
in 1952 to help determine political campaign strategy (Diamond & Bates, 1984). A
series of twenty-eight 30-second ads entitled "Eisenhower Answers America," and a
one-minute spot campaign focusing on three specific issues were developed (Diamond
& Bates, 1984). The one-minute ads addressed the issues of Korea, corruption, and
cost of living, issues George Gallop suggested were the most troubling to Americans.
According to Reeves, he drew from Eisenhower's own speeches to put together the

32

television scripts dealing with these issues. These particular spots were aired heavily
during the last ten days of the campaign, while the "Eisenhower Answers America"
spots were used prior to that time.
The Eisenhower Answers America" spots were simple and unartistic by
today’s standards but fairly innovative for the 1950s, and they were effective (Diamond
& Bates, 1984).

Basically the ads involved a "humble, real citizen" asking the

candidate a personal question and Eisenhower then giving his "frank, honest, and
personal answer". While only 28 eventually aired, 40 such spots were made very
quickly at a total production cost of only about $60,000 (Diamond & Bates, 1984).
They aired in mid-October in about 40 states, with the heaviest scheduling done in
what were considered the critical states of New York, New Jersey, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland, Indiana, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Connecticut (Diamond & Bates, 1984). According to Diamond and Bates (1984),
market penetration was maximized over a three-week period at a cost of about $2
million. It is here that "hitchhiking" saved the Republicans a great deal of money. By
buying advertising time between two popular shows, the show sponsors, in essence,
spent all the money to accumulate the large audience. The small spots in the middle,
and the Republican Party, reaped the benefits.
It is with these simple spots, however, that minimization of candidate
shortcomings and manipulation of reality began. Eisenhower did the commercials
without his glasses, even though he could not see the cue cards without them. This
problem was overcome by printing his cues in large print on poster board. According
to Jamieson (1984), his speaking style was also modified to be clearer and simpler than
it normally was. Thus, potential weaknesses that could be construed from the wearing
of glasses or speaking too complexly were overcome.

33

Eisenhower seemed to adapt easily to the recommendations of his advisors on
how to enhance his image for television. Stevenson, on the other hand, was never able
to effectively adapt to the demands that television placed on his image and openly
admitted to this problem (Jamieson, 1984). According to Jamieson (1984), despite
teleprompter training and repeated recommendations from his advisors, Stevenson was
unable to overcome distracting problems that included an uneven speaking style and
annoying habits, such as flashing a quick, and apparently artificial, smile and drawing
attention to his bald head by looking down when speaking. While Eisenhower had a
similar problem with his bald head, he was able to heed the advice of his staff and deal
more effectively with it by looking up and reading large print cue cards in front of him
(Jamieson, 1984).
While manipulation of candidates' personal attributes was certainly an issue
during the 1952 campaign, the real controversy about the ads, however, arose over the
practice of first filming Eisenhower's answers to hypothetical questions and then later
filming the questions asked by "average-looking" Radio City Music Hall tourists who
were selected to come to the studio and read pre-designated questions. The tourists
were carefully selected to represent different regions of the country (Diamond &
Bates, 1984).

According to Diamond and Bates (1984) many interpreted this

approach as a manipulation of reality. The individuals used to ask the questions were
not necessarily representative of the American public by virtue of the fact that they
were tourists in New York City, a group that could be construed as elitist. Nor did
they ask their own questions. They read questions that political advisors had pre­
determined to be representative of popular American concerns.

And, finally, the

practice of taping the answers before the question was even asked was perhaps the
most offensive element of the process to many critics (Diamond & Bates, 1984).

34
Again in 1956, many of the issues about television image building that were
important in the previous presidential election campaign resurfaced. The Republicans
outspent the Democrats in television advertising $2.9 million to $1.8 million (Diamond
& Bates, 1984). According to Diamond and Bates (1984), the Republican advertising
strategy was much the same as it was in 1952, although the Republicans did buy up
time earlier and before the Democrats were well organized.

The "hitchhiking"

innovation was utilized by both parties, and the five-minute spots, proved to be much
more effective and less costly than pre-empting a favorite half hour show. According
to Jamieson (1984), data at the time also suggested that the five-minute spots reached
larger audiences than half-hour programming anyway. The Republicans began this
strategy in mid-October with "Your Government and You" spots, which featured
various government officials explaining how government was working for the people.
Again, the simple, straight forward style of the 1952 campaign was maintained.
For the most part, during the 1956 campaign, television scheduling, visual
image-building techniques, and the nature of spot advertisements resembled those
methods used in 1952. One of the few innovations of the 1956 campaign was the
introduction of negative advertising to television (Diamond & Bates, 1984). Negative
spots were initiated by the Democratic Party and were confined to attacks on vice
presidential candidate Richard Nixon. In later years, negative political advertising
would come to play a major role in political campaigns and include attacks on the
presidential candidates, also.
Developments after the Eisenhower Years
During the 1960 presidential campaign, thanks perhaps in part to the candidacy
of a handsome, youthful, charismatic John F. Kennedy, who was perfect for television,
spot advertisements and television utilization, in general, reached even greater heights

35

(Diamond & Bates, 1984).

The televised presidential debates were the major

innovation of 1960, however, and they tended to overshadow the significance of spot
advertisements.

Nonetheless, lessons learned about television utilization from the

debates were important to the spot advertisement campaign of 1960 as well as later
campaigns.
Kennedy tended to utilize television much more than Nixon did, employing
spot advertisements liberally throughout his campaign. He optimized his winning
presentation and performance in the presidential debates by utilizing debate excerpts
for his spots. One five-minute ad, for example, accentuated Nixon's negative attributes
by picturing Kennedy diligently taking notes with an intent look upon his face, while
Nixon was shown looking around nervously and apparently uncomfortable. This clip
from the debates graphically illustrates the vulnerability imposed on politicians that
was suggested back in 1948 by political advisors (Reinsch, 1988). Other spots were
derived from equally successful Kennedy speeches. One- and five-minute spots, for
example, were extracted from his highly successful speech to the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association on September 12 and aired in key cities prior to his arrival
there and heavily during the last two weeks of the campaign in areas where there were
deemed to be Protestant objections to Kennedy (Jamieson, 1984). These types of
spots were possible because the Democrats took advantage of the new technical
innovation of on-location shooting and the practice of securing and editing video tapes
of key events. This practice allowed them to get new ads based on key current
campaign events on the air late in the campaign because the production process was
much quicker than with the old method of filming spots. For example, the drama of a
discussion by Kennedy with West Virginia coal miners about unemployment was

36

captured for a spot late in the campaign. Kennedy was, thus, projected as an active
candidate out discussing issues with the people (Jamieson, 1984).
The process of on-location shooting did have its drawbacks, however. The
candidate had to be active and looking his best at all times. Kennedy's tendency not to
follow written scripts also made it difficult to predict ad-worthy segments of his
speeches, which meant the whole speech had to be taped and pieces of it carefully
pulled and edited. This whole process was both time consuming and expensive. The
200 spots of Kennedy's campaign required one quarter of a million feet of video tape
to be shot during the primaries and general election (Jamieson, 1984). According to
Kennedy speech writer and aide, Theodore Sorensen (1965) this represented a
significant expense for a financially strapped campaign that had to limit the distribution
of bumper stickers and signs, cut long distance phone calls, and eliminate the use of
some reserved television time.
As a result of lessons learned from previous elections and the technological
innovations of 1960, Kennedy was forced to become much more conscientious about
the image he projected on television. Maintaining a positive image required him to
orchestrate public appearances, enhance his natural attributes, and minimize his
shortcomings (Jamieson, 1984). For example, he changed from a neutral gray suit and
white shirt to a dark blue suit and blue shirt at the last minute for the debates when it
was determined that the lighting might otherwise cause a glare. In all his public
appearances and ads, Kennedy was shown as active and vigorous (Jamieson, 1984).
His heroism during World War II in the South Pacific was emphasized in the PT 109
commercials. Not only during the debates, but throughout the campaign, Kennedy
capitalized on his natural attributes and projected himself as energetic, quick-witted,
and poised. His good looks, charm and ability to mingle with people were all captured

37

on film. Utilizing the still new phenomenon of television, Kennedy was able to build
an image of himself as a strong, capable, and charismatic leader. He, in fact attributed
his presidential victory to television (Sabato, 1981).
Nixon, on the other hand, avoided television during the 1960 campaign,
despite earlier successes with it in 1956. From July 25 to October 25, he made no paid
television appearances, including spot advertisements, and was seen very little in other
coverage, except for the devastating debates (Diamond & Bates, 1984).

In any

television coverage of Nixon and during his spot advertisements late in the campaign,
he appeared aloof and detached from the American people.

Spero (1980) has

suggested that Nixon could have won the 1960 election had he effectively utilized the
still novel medium of television.
In contrast to the 1960 elections, there were few television innovations in 1964
(Chester, 1969) and few innovations in visual communication strategies used to
actually present the candidates. However, the year did see the emergence of two new
trends in political advertising that are worth mentioning at this point because of their
indirect relationship to candidate image-building.

Both negative and soft-sell

advertising emerged as powerful forces in presidential campaigns.

According to

Jamieson (1984), the Democrats were able to build a very successful negative
advertising campaign around Goldwater's notorious faux pas, including statements
about lobbing missiles into the men's room of the Kremlin and sawing off the eastern
seaboard. The infamous "Daisy" commercial, the creation of New York recording
specialist Tony Schwartz and ad agency Doyle, Dane, and Bembach, also ushered in
the era of soft-sell spot, or emotion-laden, advertising that would dominate the next
several elections campaigns (Diamond & Bates, 1984).

38

After 1964, the goal of spot advertisements was to appeal more to emotions
than USP (Diamond & Bates, 1984). The "Daisy" commercial, aired on September 7
and then never shown again because of the protests and outrage it generated, was
followed closely by a second emotion-laden commercial on September 12. This spot,
which aired during "Saturday Night at the Movies," pictured a small girl licking an ice
cream cone and a soothing maternal voice over that reverts to an authoritative male
voice over at the tagline. There were no bombs or explosions, yet the Goldwater
threat was implicit (Jamieson, 1984). Of these commercials, then White House press
secretary Bill Moyers noted that the "Daisy" spot was "good advertising and bad
politics" (Diamond & Bates, 1984, p. 132). Jamieson (1984) similarly noted that both
spots represented the most imaginative political advertisements to date.

Through

visual symbolism and maximization of the opponent's weaknesses, the spots were able
to emphasize the shortcomings of Goldwater's image while indirectly enhancing the
image of Johnson. While the 1964 spots offered a new perspective to the imagebuilding capacity (or in this case image-destroying capacity) of television that is
beyond the scope of this research project because they did not visually present the
candidates themselves, they certainly need to be acknowledged as important
developments in the strategic use of television in presidential campaigns. Interestingly,
the Republicans did not pick up on the new advertising style as the Democrats did.
The soft-sell concept continued in political advertising during the 1968 and
1972 campaigns, although according to Patterson and McClure (1976), it began to
blend soft imagery with harder issue selling by 1972. Political spots began to bear a
greater resemblance to product commercials. According to Patterson and McClure
(1976), they were characterized by a manipulation of symbols, use of primary
photography techniques, and generation of emotional responses. Gone, it seemed,

39
were the days of the talking head of the candidate simply stating his concerns and the
policies he planned to implement. Nixon, in particular, utilized the symbols of the
presidency, emphasized his accomplishments as president, and highlighted his personal
attributes and personality characteristics through portrayal of specific deeds to project
an image of himself as the only qualified and capable leader of the countiy during a
significant period of need.
After his disastrous campaign in 1960, Nixon realized that to win in 1968 he
would have to use television and that he would have to have it managed by men with
tastes similar to his (McGinniss, 1969). He subsequently chose a group of young men
who were especially astute about the political uses of television. He chose William
Gavin, a suburban Philadelphia high school teacher, as speech writer. According to
McGinniss (1969), Gavin wrote Nixon a letter in 1967 urging him to run for president
and to base his campaign on a bold use of television.

Gavin sent the letter on

University of Pennsylvania letterhead because he thought Nixon would pay more
attention to it if he believed it came from a college professor. After having lunch with
him a couple times, a Nixon staff member then hired Gavin (McGinniss, 1969). Gavin
considered the goal of Nixon's speeches to be to convince the public to like him. He
believed editing would solve the needs of effective presentation and messages for
television. Henry Treleaven, the former vice president of J. Walter Thompson Ad
Agency in New York, was chosen as the creative director of advertising. His concern
was over Nixon's lack of humor and warmth, which he believed could be rectified with
good writing.

Nixon's team experimented with various television techniques to

determine those that best conveyed the image that they wanted to get across
(McGinniss, 1969).

40
Spots, for example, were created out of his trips to China and the Soviet
Union. Nixon was pictured toasting Chinese leaders at state dinners and working to
solve world arms proliferation problems with Soviet leaders. Nixon also became one
of the first political candidates to take advantage of television's ability to juxtapose
otherwise unrelated images to suggest an idea that if verbalized might be extremely
controversial (Jamieson, 1984). One significant example of this technique was a spot
used more to damage the image of Hubert Humphrey by depicting scenes of war, the
ravaged streets of Chicago, and Appalachian poverty juxtaposed with his smiling face
as he accepted his party's nomination for candidacy. As if the ad, itself, was not
negative enough, it was aired during "Laugh-In"; many viewers thought it was part of
the show, thus adding to the further destruction of Humphrey's credibility as a
compassionate candidate (Jamieson, 1984).

As will be seen in the next chapter,

besides being able to visually construct an appropriate presidential image or a negative
image of his opponent in spot advertisements, Nixon also became very adept at
manipulating the news media to further enhance his image on unpaid television.

Summary of Developments in the Use of Spot Advertisements
The appendix summarizes developments in the evolution of the more visually
effective presentation of presidential candidates in spot advertisements during the
period between 1952 and 1964.

During this period, spots evolved from simple,

talking-head presentations of the candidates, such as those used by Eisenhower, to
subtle forms of negative and soft-sell advertising that utilized techniques ranging from
clips of the candidates' public appearances to relatively complex visual symbolism.
Eisenhower's spots began as straight-forward answers to common voter questions and
simple statements on issues of public concern. Beginning with these types of early
ads, the candidates learned to capitalize on their attributes and modify their

41

appearances and presentation techniques to visually enhance their images on the new
medium of television. By means of trial and error over several campaigns, they also
learned valuable lessons about optimizing the frequency, timing and scheduling of spot
advertisements in order to attract the greatest possible audience at the most reasonable
cost. Finally, the developments of the period provided Nixon with a variety of useful
strategies and lessons that would be incorporated into his successful manipulation of
the news media, as will be illustrated in the next chapter.

42

CHAPTER 4
LOW-COST PRESIDENTIAL IMAGE-BUILDING:
NIXON TAKES CHARGE OF TELEVISION NEWS
Before looking specifically at Nixon's strategic utilization of the news media to
further the interest of his campaigns, it is helpful to look at some earlier attempts to
deal with the broadcast media by other presidential candidates.

As with spot

advertisements, recognition of the importance of news coverage and the need to make
special arrangements to deal with it really began to take shape at the 1952 party
conventions.

An estimated 60 million Americans watched at least part of the

convention proceedings that year (Reinsch, 1988), and campaign staffs were faced
with accommodating the new medium. Attention to the length of proceedings and
speeches, the projection of sound, the presentation of visually appealing decorations,
signs, and slogans, and the distracting potentially behavior of delegates became
important concerns of campaign staffs. At this early stage, the Democrats learned by
watching and avoiding the mistakes of the Republicans, who did not initially even want
television cameras at their convention and did little to adapt for them once they arrived
(Thomson, 1956). The Democrats, for example, were careful to paint floors and
furniture that glared on camera during the Republican convention a dull gray color and
place speaker platforms and cameras in a way that ensured head on shots of speakers.
While it would be difficult to accuse early candidates of manipulating the
media, as campaigns moved into their post convention stretches, it can certainly be
argued that they laid the strategic groundwork over the next couple of years that
would give Nixon a good foundation for his more obvious manipulation. In light of
the limitations of television technology and the need to accumulate as much coverage
as possible, campaign travel in 1952 was adjusted to make it more compatible with

43
television appearances (Thomson, 1956).

Major speeches were scheduled to be

presented in cities that could originate network television, which at this early date
were limited in number. Former president of the CBS news division Sig Mickelson
(1972) also notes that candidates were able to shift their dependence on large rallies
held at night to small day rallies at airports. The earlier need to attract the greatest
possible audience was superseded by the fact that speeches given during the day would
be picked up by television and heard and seen by more people anyway. The new
challenge in campaign strategy became presenting the candidate as favorably as
possible for television. According to Mickelson (1989), for example, Eisenhower's
appearances were meticulously planned.

His September 4, 1952 kick-off speech

required a 39-page blueprint to ensure audio and visual preparations that would be
conducive to positive television coverage. It included explicit written directions about
everything from where the candidate would stand to the allocation of 25,000 fresh cut
roses, 300 noise makers, 500 flags, and 25,000 programs to the crowds (Mickelson,
1989). As the campaign progressed, it became important to include high school
bands, cheerleaders, and colorful local citizens in the backdrop of all televised events.
Candidates took to wearing blue shirts because of the tendency of early television to
draw a black line across white objects, including shirts (Mickelson, 1972).
According to Becker and Lower (1962), the 1956 election campaign did not
see any major broadcast innovations, although existing techniques were refined. News
coverage of the presidential campaigns both improved and increased.

A survey

conducted by CBS from Labor Day to election day of that year showed that about 20
percent of all newscasts were dedicated to presidential campaigns (Chester, 1969).
The international crises of the Soviet Union invading Hungary, Israel invading Egypt,
and England and France intervening in the Suez Canal, in particular, boosted coverage

44
for Eisenhower. The power of the incumbency to attract television coverage was thus
realized (Diamond & Bates, 1984).
While technological innovations may have been limited, the image-building
capacity of television can be seen emerging in the 1956 election campaign. It can be
argued that the vigor, endurance and energy of Eisenhower was portrayed all over the
country to the exclusion of issues (Jamieson, 1984).

Even during the various

international crises of the campaign season, the emphasis seemed to be on portraying
him as strong and energetic enough to cope with the rigors of the job of president. In
the wake of a Democratic attack on his age and health, the Republicans turned the
controversy over his age into a national celebration of his 66th birthday that was both
personal and patriotic and, of course, well covered by the news media (Jamieson,
1984).
The Democrats, too, were trying to present themselves in the most favorable
light possible for the news media. Stevenson, who was in the midst of a divorce, tried
to project a positive family image by ensuring that the news caught shots of him with
his sister, children, and new grandchild. Nixon, during this campaign, also discovered
the political value of appearing on college campuses, where he was surrounded by a
ready-made audience of bright, articulate young people and attractive backdrops of
stately, ivy-covered buildings (Mickelson, 1989). In fact, campus visits would become
an established part of Nixon's later campaigns, with the exception of 1960, where he
avoided television as much as possible (Mickelson, 1989).
Kennedy, on the other hand, continued the trend of making use of television
news coverage along with his spot campaign in 1960. Spero (1980) notes that "the
Kennedy organization never knowingly missed a television opportunity" (p. 40).
Reinsch (1988) suggests that the Kennedy staff embraced the idea of the presidential

45
debates, knowing that they would also get their candidate a great deal of free news
coverage. And, in fact, the coverage had a very positive impact on the Kennedy
campaign, while nearly devastating Nixon.
Just before the 1964 election campaign, the length of network newscasts was
expanded from 15 to 30 minutes in length; and according to Patterson (1982),
network news became the center of journalistic coverage of presidential politics.
Similarly, he notes that since 1964 the nightly news has been the principle target for
campaign activity, and campaign strategies have been based on deadlines and
assumptions about what television station themes will be. Presidential candidates have
found the nightly news to be an extremely effective target for campaign activities
because of the broad-based national audience that it reaches. Johnson was able to take
advantage of this situation in 1964 to draw regular news coverage as he went about
his presidential duties of dealing with the fall of Czechoslovakia and the explosion of
nuclear weapons in Communist China. He also caused considerable controversy over
the FCC's "equal time" clause when he initially addressed the nation live on October 18
on all three networks concerning these matters. This move, however, generated free
air time to present himself as president, a strategy only available to an incumbent
(Reinsch, 1988).
Developments during the Nixon Years
Of the three main candidates running for the presidency in 1968, Nixon was the
only one to have the experience of a prior presidential campaign to build on, and he
used the lessons learned to manage his television campaign more effectively
(McGinniss, 1969; Reinsch, 1988). George Wallace seemed to lack the know-how to
develop an effective television strategy, while Hubert Humphrey lacked the funds for a
strong post-convention television campaign as well as control over such events as

46
rallies that could have given him positive free publicity (Mickelson, 1972). Nixon, on
the other hand, centered his campaign around television. While he did not necessarily
use a great deal of paid television coverage, Nixon managed to keep his image in the
public eye on a daily basis through the effective manipulation of the news media. His
goal during the campaign was to have one story a day in the news (Mickelson, 1972).
According to both Jamieson (1984) and McGinniss (1969), the 1968 election
became the first one where image and public perception of the candidate became the
real issues of the campaign. McGinniss is especially emphatic in noting that image was
much more important than issues to the Nixon campaign. According to Mickelson
(1972), the Nixon staff was especially effective in strengthening their candidate's image
by blending television techniques of previous campaigns with newly developed tactics
that addressed Nixon's strengths and weaknesses. To begin with, his appearances
were restricted to tightly controlled situations. Every aspect of any coverage, from
what the candidate would say and how he would be presented to the people and
scenes in the background, were carefully planned and executed. Part of this strategy
of careful control was to ensure that there were no debates in 1968 (Mickelson, 1972).
Nixon and his advisors were intent on distancing themselves as far as possible from the
disaster of 1960. What they did not need was to have the discussion of the matter
reopened in 1968.
Another important aspect of this careful strategy of control was how the news
media was handled. Nixon considered television news coverage critical, and his goal
was to attract as much national coverage as possible (Mickelson, 1972). According to
Patterson (1982), attracting this type of coverage can be as simple as making personal
appearances in large cities and in front of large crowd. He contends that the news
media are not interested in new speeches, just travel. For Nixon, the process was not

47
quite that simple, however. Particular attention had to be paid to ensuring that he
came across as warm, friendly, and empathetic to potential television viewers, who
would far out number those present at even the largest rally. There had to be an
assurance that the crowds would be friendly and that appropriate symbols of American
patriotism such as flags, clean-cut, inspired young people, and historic landmarks
adorned both the backdrop and the areas immediately surrounding the president
whenever news cameras were on him. (McGinniss, 1969) The angry confrontations
between the candidate and hecklers that characterized some of Humphrey's rallies
were avoided by Nixon's staff by planning well organized rallies (Reinsch, 1988).
They was also especially careful to ensure that direct access to their candidate by
reporters and camera people was strictly controlled (Mickelson, 1972).
To both control media access to Nixon and ensure regular coverage on the
evening news, the staff had news releases on campaign events and issues available
daily at 3 p.m. In what Mickelson (1972) calls "careful precision," Nixon was then
conveniently not available for any comment on these statements. In this way, the
media received exactly the information that campaign strategists wanted them to have,
exactly when they wanted them to have it. Television was not given an opportunity to
extract anything but the campaign's intended meaning out of information provided.
The candidate did not have to deal with impromptu questions, which might highlight
his weaknesses in the realm of personality more than his capability of effectively
dealing with the issues,

Nor did the campaign staff have to woriy about the

appearance of their candidate in front of cameras on any occasions other than those
when they had plenty of time to prepare and ensure that Nixon looked his best. When
Nixon's staff did deem personal interviews on the nightly news important, they made
him available for extended interviews with either the chief news executive of a local

48
station or a primary news broadcaster with a large following (Mickelson, 1982). This
strategy allowed the candidate to present his views to a local audience under the
auspices of someone with a strong local identification and at no cost to the campaign.
Again, it also allowed for much better control over the types of questions asked the
candidate and his appearance in front of the camera. Finally, if the station conducting
the interview was a member of a larger group of stations, it was suggested that other
stations might also be interested in the broadcast. This strategy both increased Nixon's
exposure and the prestige of the original station, and everyone thus benefited
(Mickelson, 1972).
As a result of Nixon's position as an incumbent candidate in 1972, he was able
to manipulate the media even more than in 1968, where it has been shown that
development of those techniques was just beginning. In 1972 he was able to use
television news extensively to promote his foreign affairs successes for political
purposes, often to the exclusion of issue discussion (Patterson & McClure, 1976). He
promoted his travels to China and the Soviet Union extensively.

According to

Jamieson (1984), Nixon, in fact, only paid for one political speech broadcast on
November 2, one day before the elections.
As in 1968, Nixon's television presentations remained highly controlled in 1972
and confined to presidential activities. Television cameras were only allowed at formal
and carefully orchestrated ceremonies, and reporters were kept far enough away from
the president to ensure that he was not asked any embarrassing questions. Mickelson
(1989) notes that care was taken to show the president in strictly dignified situations
going about the business of being head of state. His primary strategy was to take
advantage of his incumbency to create a favorable impression of both his personal and
leadership abilities (Patterson & McClure, 1976). He relied heavily on the symbolism

49
the office could provide him in both paid advertising and news coverage. These
included, but were certainly not limited to, official speeches from the Rose Garden,
portrayal of him as the first American president to visit the Russian capital, and
glimpses of him at a state dinner in China. According to Patterson and McClure
(1976), Nixon's strategy to enhance his image as the man most suited to be president
was to make the triumphs of his administration and the nation appear to be personal
successes. He presented strong pictorial documentation of these personal successes to
the American people via televised nightly news.

Developments after the Nixon Years
In 1976 Ford carried on the precedent firmly entrenched by Nixon of utilizing
the powers of the presidency to promote a "presidential" image to the news media,
although he did it in a somewhat more relaxed manner. Ford was careful to show
himself off in White House settings carrying out presidential activities such as signing
bills into law. In fact his activities during the fall campaign had their roots in a June
White House memo that proposed a "no campaign" campaign to counter a public
perception that Ford was not presidential enough (Schram, 1987). The memo was
sent by two aides, Michael Duval and Foster Chanock, to chief of staff Richard
Cheyney and suggested a strategy that ensured frequent opportunities for television
coverage of the president doing his job and not just campaigning.
To a greater extent than in previous elections, there was more emphasis in
1976 on shifting media attention to more personal aspects of the candidates' images
and characters. Carter, for example, was shown draining the family pond, frying fish,
playing softball, teaching Sunday school, and inspecting the family peanut business.
Although Ford was also forced to emphasize more personal aspects of his character
while balancing his need to appear presidential, Jimmy Carter seems to epitomize the

50

manipulation of the news media to promote his personal image from the earliest days
of his campaign

According to Arterton (1978), Carter began maximization of

television news coverage as early as January 14, 1976 with the Iowa Caucuses. While
most of the other candidates were in Des Moines, Carter was in New York gaining
access to the morning news programs. In the end he appeared on all three national
network news shows, while other candidates received only local coverage in Iowa.
Throughout the primaries, the media seemed to be captivated by Carter, and he used
this to its fullest advantage (Reinsch, 1988). By the beginning of the fall campaign,
Carter was very adept at manipulating the media (Reinsch, 1988). He was able to
present himself in both paid and unpaid television coverage as a man of "will" with no
bad habits, such as smoking, drinking to excess, or womanizing (Mazlish & Diamond,
1979). Through television he was able to translate many personal characteristics, such
as his small stature, less-than-threatening demeanor, large smile, unique facial
expressions, and high-pitched and uneven voice into a likable image that attracted
voters to him (Buchanan, 1987). Ironically, these same characteristics would later
haunt him as he tried to maintain an appropriate presidential image in the face of media
attacks that he lacked appropriate presidential qualities (Buchanan, 1987).
While making the most of personal attributes, Carter was also careful to
minimize shortcomings in his character. Mazlish and Diamond (1979), for example,
noted that while he could have been perceived as reserved in his personal life, he made
every attempt to appear much more outgoing and friendly in his political life. Advisors
were careful to ensure that he was seen by television cameras shaking hands with
throngs of well-wishers, hugging and kissing women, holding babies, smiling
enthusiastically, and basically presenting himself as exuberant and personable during
his campaign (Mazlish & Diamond, 1979). Unfortunately, by 1980, a number of other

51
factors besides the ability to manipulate television were also at play, and Carter was
unable to rely on simply image-building to get himself re-elected. As just one example
of the nature of the problems he faced, he and his administration were perceived as
failures because of the Iran Hostage Crisis. By this time, however, a new player, who
seemed able to take television to even greater heights, had emerged on the presidential
campaign scene. Again, like the men before him, Ronald Reagan was able to both use
the techniques learned from the past and build on them over the two elections in which
he was involved.
Summary of Developments in the Manipulation of News Media
The appendix continues its outline of the evolution of visual communication
strategies begun during the Eisenhower period with a summary of the developments
relevant to Nixon's manipulation of the news media,

While strategies, such as

scheduling public appearances, planning background scenes, and using patriotic
symbols were given attention prior to Nixon, he perfected these techniques. Tightlycontrolled public appearances that limited the news media's access to the candidate
characterized the Nixon campaigns. Everything from the candidate's appearance to the
smallest details in the background scenes were carefully planned and executed. Use of
patriotic symbolism, especially symbols of the presidency, abounded. Attracting daily
news coverage in order to keep Nixon in the public eye became a primaiy goal of his
campaigns. He instituted the strategy of issuing daily news releases to facilitate this
process. Finally, as time went on, other candidates, such as Ford and Carter, earned
the precedent Nixon had established for presenting a positive visual image of himself
to even more personal realms of their lives. As the next chapter will illustrate, Reagan
then began to integrate the visual communication strategies of paid and unpaid

52

television into the most complex presentation of a candidate's visual image up until
that time.

CHAPTER 5
THE ULTIMATE IMAGE-BUILDER:
REAGAN INTEGRATES TELEVISION STRATEGIES
While prior to 1980, elections seem to have been characterized by an emphasis
on the part of the candidates on some particular aspect of television utilization, such as
spot advertisements, debates, or the news, Reagan appears more than any candidate to
bring all aspects of television's visual communication potential together into one
integrated strategy. To be sure, this process had begun long before 1980, but it is
Reagan who seems to have perfected it. Eisenhower used both paid and unpaid
television to help enhance his image, although the two realms tended to be somewhat
independent of each other. Kennedy began to realize the importance of integrating
strategies, when he started tying segments of the debates into his spot advertisements.
Similarly, Nixon began blending newsworthy aspects of his presidency into spot
advertisements in such a way that they carried the same theme as the news coverage
that was occurring at the same time. Both Carter and Ford tried to maintain a
consistency in their visual images across the paid and unpaid media.

Carter, for

example, endeavored to present himself as both warm and personable while, at the
same time, appearing knowledgeable and qualified to be president,

Both his

advertisements and news coverage captured him in casual, down home settings, while
still addressing issues of concern to America at large. By 1984, Reagan carried this
blending of advertisements and news coverage to the point where it became difficult to
distinguish between the two. His presentational styles and imaging in both realms
seemed to become inseparable.

53

54

Developments during the Reagan Years
Compared to the complexity of ads in previous elections, the Reagan ads of
1980 could be construed as very simplistic. In fact, Jamieson (1984) notes that the
success of the talking head ads, which dominated his 1980 spot campaign practically
defied conventional wisdom. Republican campaign research, however, indicated that
the voters were not interested in slick ads. They were more interested in seeing the
candidate address the voting public directly. The Reagan staff had such confidence in
their candidate's ability as a communicator that they decided to go with simple, straight
forward ads (Jamieson, 1984). As a result, the Reagan campaign of 1980 saw more
straight forward advertisements with the candidate speaking directly to the camera
than any presidential campaign since 1960 (Jamieson, 1984). Of the 254 ads that year,
33 percent were talking head types, 41 percent were documentaries, and 26 percent
were anti-Carter spots (Jamieson, 1984). Seventy-four of the ads were five-minute
documentaries that recapped Reagan's life, record, and plans for the future. Reagan's
record as governor of California was discovered to be useful and was used in these
and other spots to provide the viewing public with a picture of him as an executive
with a good record.

Sixty- and thirty-second spots were also lifted from these

documentaries. The whole purpose of this approach, which Jamieson (1984) refers to
as a "case history in the art of identification" (p. 431), was to familiarize voters with
the candidate. Reagan's ability as a communicator was also capitalized on in his
presentations for unpaid news coverage, which were designed to attract the most
possible sound bites, an element that was critical to attracting news coverage
(Jamieson, 1984).
As with most candidates who have had an opportunity to run for two terms,
Reagan was able to perfect his television utilization strategy by his second campaign,

55

where a true integration of visual image-building in the paid and unpaid realms can be
seen. In 1984, for example, spot advertisements were deliberately designed to blur the
distinction between political commercials and news (Wilson, 1979).

Public

appearances that would be covered by the news were staged to recreate the same
visual image being presented in advertisements at the time. Similarly, what Wilson
(1979) calls "appropriate" people were strategically placed in the front of crowds used
in political advertisements so that the ads would look like news events. In fact,
according to the president's television assistant, Michael Deaver, the goal of the
campaign was to have one good news story and one spot drawn from a news story
every day (Reinsch, 1988). To help ensure this situation, copies of both Reagan's and
George Bush's speeches were released to the news media in advance. In this way,
Reagan avoided much of the direct contact he had with reporters in 1980 and forced
them to use his prepared material. By adhering to this plan, the Reagan campaign
appeared organized, while Reinsch (1988) criticizes the Mondale campaign for not
understanding this principle of organization and thus coming across as disorganized.
Owen (1991) notes that from the beginning, all aspect of Reagan's television
campaign were carefully planned and focused to ensure that the most effective visual
image of him was presented. His public appearances were carefully orchestrated,
major events (Owen, 1991). His 1984 Labor Day campaign kick-off event offers a
good example of the type of planning that went into events throughout the campaign.
It consisted of well planned, highly visible festivities at his sunny California home,
which contrasted sharply with Mondale's poorly thought out kick-off day consisting of
a virtually unattended labor parade in rainy New York City, followed by a dull and
negative kick-off speech in an even wetter Wisconsin (Schram, 1987). According to
Schram (1987), Mondale campaign planners failed to understand the importance of

56
planning, as exemplified by their scheduling of too many events spread out all over the
country on kick-off day, instead of one large patriotic, gala event. He suggests that
they further failed to realize the nature of events that the media would focus on. All of
Reagan's public appearances, on the other hand, were wrapped in patriotic symbolism,
and his speeches were liberally sprinkled with short, quotable patriotic statements. It
is these short 10-second sound bites that appealed to the emotions that helped identify
the better communicator of the two candidates (Lemann, 1985).
In addition to his public appearances and general campaign activities, Reagan's
spot advertisements were also consciously designed for the entertainment medium of
television. Owen (1991) notes that prior market research lead to a strategy choice of
simple, positive, low-key, and emotional ads. Most of the 50 separate commercials
were heavily laden with symbols of patriotism and core American values of honesty,
integrity, hard work and self assurance (Owen, 1991). Visual symbolism utilizing
images of factory workers, cowboys, and people getting married was presented in soft
focus photography.

Reagan, specifically, was presented as a typical down-home

neighbor and empathetic with the average American's dreams and problems, yet still
presidential. His verbal messages were upbeat and positive, sending the message that
it was great to live in America. His "Morning in America" spot series exemplifies this
concept. The ads, which declared, "It's morning again in America," compared the
despair of the Democratic past with the with the optimism that the Republican future
held. Additionally, they targeted middle-class America, as the following quote from
one of them exemplifies:
In a town not too far from where you live, a young family has just moved into
a new home. Three years ago, even the smallest house seemed completely out
of reach. Right down the street, one of the neighbors has just bought himself a

57

new car, with all the options. The factory down the river is working again.
Not long ago, people were saying it probably would be closed forever. . . Life
is better. America is back. And people have a sense of pride they never felt
they'd feel again. And so, it's not surprising that just about everyone in town is
thinking the same thing. Now that our country is turning around, why would
we ever turn back (Jamieson, 1984, p. 451).
The proliferation of cable television and the existence of continuous news
channels by the mid-eighties also provided the Reagan campaign with a new challenge
in reaching audiences. While there were some 85 million television homes available,
the market was much more fragmented than ever before because cable provided nearly
endless viewing choices for people (Reinsch, 1988). According to Reinsch (1988),
however, Reagan advisors understood television and made the most of it.

They

bought time, for example on major cable networks like ESPN, WOR, and WTBS.
Mondale admitted shortly after the election that his inability to effectively use
television was one of the major reasons for the failure of his campaign (Reinsch,
1988). Reagan, conversely, emphasized television and ignored the Washington press
corps (Reinsch, 1988). In most cases, both Reagan's spots and public appearances
glowed with optimism and patriotism. In both, there were plenty of flags and happy,
smiling people. Reagan was almost always portrayed as a smiling, confident president
in emotionally upbeat situations such as toasting Chinese leaders, speaking to happily
employed Michigan auto workers, opening the Olympics, and starting a Daytona
Speedway race (Reinsch, 1988). According to Lemann (1985) networks were forced
to broadcast Reagan's theme of the day because it was the only material given to them,
and it was followed up with the appropriate visual activity on which the news cameras
could focus. As has been shown, the Reagan campaign staff was not only adept at

58

manipulating the news media to ensure that an appropriate visual image of its
candidate was presented on unpaid television, but it was also able to integrate this
strategy with the visual images presented in paid television coverage to formulate a
consistent visual image of Reagan that could be transferred to the American public
(Schram, 1987).

Symbols of the presidency, such as the white house and the

presidential seal, were built into spot advertisements. The visuals portraying downhome, American life and the positivism of a prosperous country, found in the backdrop
of news coverage, were also evident in spot advertisements.

Developments after the Reagan Years
The integration of the visual communication strategies of paid and unpaid
television has continued to develop since the Reagan campaigns and, as Owen 1991)
has suggested, may have even tested the bounds of media manipulation. In George
Bush's 1988 presidential campaign, image makers and media consultants were very
important. In fact, Owen (1991) attributes much of the success and organization of
Bush's campaign to the fact that he turned over the responsibility for strategization to
the experts, while Dukakis tried to control his campaign himself, which led to
disorganization.

Roger Ailes, a leading media expert, was brought on to the

Republican campaign staff to lead a team of experts from small agencies around the
country.

These experts had fresh ideas, extensive regional knowledge, and an

understanding of the concepts behind Reagan's media successes (Owen, 1991). The
television strategy for the Bush campaign had three main objectives (Owen, 1991).
First, the strategists wanted to refocus a somewhat blurry image of Bush into a clearer
one. Every attempt was made to present him as warm and personable while still being
a man with strong leadership skills. Second, they wanted clear, coherent campaign
themes such as the idea that their candidate represented mainstream America. Finally,

59
they wanted to draw a major distinction between the two candidates by portraying
Dukakis negatively, thus the large number of negative advertisements during this
campaign.
One of the keys to Bush's image building strategy was the development of
highly personal identification spots.

The heartland theme was emphasized.

Biographical spots that were careful to depict him as a leader and make use of visuals
of presidential settings, highlights of his national convention speech, and his successful
years in government were used. Even the negative ads that dominated this campaign
carefully manipulated reality with visual strategies so that both the visuals and the
verbal messages attacking Dukakis had a coherent negative impact, while those spots
emphasizing Bush's attributes had an equally coherent positive impact. For example,
an attack ad on Dukakis' inability to clean up Boston Harbor pictured Bush riding
around in a boat in the debris-ridden harbor pointing out the garbage. According to
Owen (1991), of Bush's 51 spot advertisements, 14 of them were negative in nature,
and 40 percent of his $35 million advertising budget went to airing them.
While news coverage was certainly important in the 1988 campaign, Owen
(1991) suggests that advertising almost nullified its significance. This observation was
in part due to the media focus on the negative advertising phenomenon. In fact, she
notes that more often than in any other previous election campaign, reporters did
nothing but cover the development and production of spot advertisements. It would,
however, be inaccurate to ignore the role news strategy played in both campaigns.
Similar to the situation that occurred in 1984, Owen (1991) notes that the Republicans
received more and better news coverage than the Democrats because their campaign
was better organized and television strategies were more coherent, although the
additional power of the Republican incumbency should not be ignored. Consistent

60
with the value agenda of his spot campaign, Bush also appealed to the public in
televised news coverage as the representative of mainstream America. Mimicking
Reagan's strategy, he was careful to plan the day's agenda so that there would be
appropriate visual backdrops along with a "line-of-the-day" that would make a good
sound bite (Owen, 1991). For example, he was presented discussing his environmental
in front of a crystal clear California lake. As already discussed, Bush used this same
strategy of visual backdrops in his ads that criticized Dukakis.
The 1992 election campaign seems to have been characterized by even greater
integration of a wider range of television utilization strategies than in 1988. A whole
new utilization strategy for alternative forms of television coverage seemed to
intertwine itself in the already existing integrated mix for spot advertisements and news
coverage. As Elizabeth Kolbert (June 16, 1992) of The New York Times aptly noted
early in the campaign, "four years ago the measure of a candidate's media savvy may
have been how many times he could get himself on the evening news with a flag
factory or a police union. This year it seems to be how much exposure he can get
interacting with real, live, ordinary Americans." (p. A20). Greater use of interactive
television programming, such as special campaign-sponsored call-in shows, is just one
example of the many alternative forms of television, including network magazine
shows, Donahue-like audience participation programs, and late night entertainment
shows, that characterized the 1992 campaign. While detailed discussion of the use of
alternative television strategies is beyond the scope of this paper, their emergence is
important to mention because they are likely to play increasingly more important roles
in political campaigns in the future and because many of the visual strategies and the
need for the integration of these strategies across the variously utilized forms of
television coverage is still important. It was important, for example, for the candidates

61
to present a coherent campaign theme and visual images that were integrated
throughout all the various television forms. Clinton's strategy, for example, was to
present himself as one of "us." To do this he needed to be presented as down-toearth, empathetic, and personable in both his news coverage and spot advertisements
as well on alternative forms of television. Playing the saxophone on Arsineo Hall, for
example, fit into the visual image he was presenting elsewhere. Likewise to ensure
that he was perceived as warm and friendly on the more interactive programs, he had
to develop effective body movements and gestures that welcomed viewers.

Summary of Developments in the Integration of Strategies
As this chapter and appendix illustrate, the process of using the images from
unpaid media in spots began as early as the Kennedy campaigns. In the 1970s, Ford
and Carter, in particular, became associated with maintaining consistency in the images
they presented in paid and unpaid television coverage. Reagan blurred the distinction
between news coverage and spot advertisements by not only presenting a consistent
image of himself in both realms but also utilizing similar backgrounds and symbols for
both and ensuring that they were scheduled to air at the same time. Elaborate patriotic
symbolism was particularly prevalent. His campaigns were noted for orchestrated
public events designed specifically to appear patriotic and attract news coverage.
Even in bringing back the simplistic, talking-head spots of the Eisenhower
period, Reagan integrated visual techniques used in them with his straight forward
public addresses. Parts of these public appearances were then picked up by the news
media. He became particularly adept at getting short, quotable, patriotic sound bites
on the news. Finally, with the increased predominance of cable television networks,
Reagan forged new and important paths in scheduling their utilization both for paid
advertising and unpaid news coverage.

62
Since Reagan, integration of paid and unpaid media techniques has developed
in the realms of negative visual strategies and interactive communication strategies.
Bush was able to use negative visual symbolism and verbal messages in both spot
advertisements and news coverage. With the use of more interactive forms of media
coverage, such as talk shows, the 1992 campaigns saw a further evolution of the
blurring of the distinction between spot advertisements and the news begun by Reagan
in an increased similarity between entertainment and news realms under Clinton.
Now that the whole idea of presenting a consistent visual image via an
integration of strategies across various forms of television utilization has become well
established in political campaigns, as exemplified through the historical analysis of the
situation, it seems reasonable to assume that this strategy will continue in future
campaigns; and new uses of television will simply be incorporated into the overall
campaign plans.

CHAPTER 6
A FINAL DISCUSSION
Television has succeeded in just 40 years to do what no other medium was able
to do in the history of presidential campaigns in this country. It has brought some 220
million Americans face to face with the candidates who seek to run their country. It
has imposed a visual dimension on politics that was hitherto inconceivable. Because of
this new visual perspective, the image of presidential candidates has become
increasingly more important to political campaigns. A combination of advances in
technology and the popular expectations of a society that is virtually dependent on
television has forced those aspiring to the presidency to develop complex and
meaningful strategies in the realm of visual image-building. To be sure, the visual
dimension is not the only element of presenting candidates in the television age, but as
this historical analysis has illustrated, it has played a significant role in campaign
strategization. This paper has provided a focused and systematic presentation of the
evolution of the use of television to generate marketable visual images of presidential
candidates. These strategies have evolved from merely coping with the new realms of
paid and unpaid television to a complex integration of all aspects of television
utilization that presents a comprehensive picture of what political strategists think the
American public wants in a president. The appendix and the three relevant chapter
conclusions provide a summary of the evolution of these visual communication
strategies by developmental period.

The following discussion summarizes the

significant conclusions about developments in the five main categories of the strategic
utilization of television for image-generating purposes that were introduced at the
beginning of this paper. They also leave the reader with a sense of the potential
strategies for television use in future presidential campaigns.
63

64
(1) Enhancement of natural attributes and minimization of shortcomings:
Whether it was in the production of spot advertisements or in presenting themselves
for news coverage, all candidates have been required to develop specific visual
communication strategies that both enhance their positive attributes and minimize their
shortcomings. Eisenhower did not wear his glasses on camera. Nixon used the power
of his incumbency and the symbols of the office he held to illustrate his leadership
qualities. Reagan capitalized on his acting abilities.
(2) Orchestration of public appearances: All candidates have orchestrated
public events at some level to work within the constraints of their own personal
attributes yet still enhance their images.

For Eisenhower, much of this strategy

centered around scheduling public events to coincide with the availability of the best
possible news coverage. Nixon, on the other hand, practically staged his public
appearances to ensure the best possible control over them. Reagan planned his public
activities so spot advertisements could also be extracted from them, thus ensuring
continuity of the image he presented.
(3) Use of visual symbolism: In virtually every televised appearance, paid or
unpaid, that presidential candidates have made since Eisenhower, visual symbolism has
been important. In many ways this symbolism has not changed over the years. It has
just become more sophisticated. Simply picturing flags, bands, families, and happy
Americans in patriotic settings has evolved into more subtle images of the virtues of
working America, life in the "greatest democracy on earth," and the important national
and international dimensions of the presidency.
(4) Manipulation of reality: In the beginning, strategies for manipulating
reality were noticeably primitive by today's standards. The intent that really has not
changed over the years, however, was there from the start.

Since Eisenhower,

65
candidates have endeavored to present a positive visual image of themselves and a
negative visual image of their opponent to the American public. Often this image
presentation has required the manipulation of reality. Presenting a visual perception of
intimacy has been especially critical. All candidates at some level have attempted to
make themselves seem warm, friendly, and empathetic toward the American public
even if that was not a particularly natural attribute for them.

Beginning with

"Eisenhower Answers America" spots, which have been interpreted by many as a
manipulation of reality because of their filming of Eisenhower's supposedly personal
answers to direct questions prior to the filming of the questions at an entirely different
session, television has been used to deceive the American public. Nixon was able to
accomplish this feat through carefully controlling access to himself by the media and
thus ensuring that he could always look and act his best on the news.

Reagan

manipulated reality by blurring the distinction between his paid and unpaid television
appearances.
(5) Frequency, timing, and scheduling: And, finally, none of these visual
image-building strategies could succeed without the increasing attention that has been
given to the frequency, timing and scheduling of televised presidential appearances.
For Eisenhower, these lessons were learned primarily in the realms of spot advertising,
with some limited attention to news coverage; while for Nixon, it meant carefully
timing public events for the purpose of maximizing news coverage. Reagan used
scheduling to facilitate his integration of the realms of paid advertising and news
coverage to present a consistent image of himself as both presidential and familiar.
This historical analysis of the development of television's visual communication
strategies for the purpose of image-building in presidential campaigns has yielded
several not-so-profound conclusions, although it has at least provided a systematic and

66
focused empirical analysis of an area of political campaign research that has either been
neglected or included as only one small part of more comprehensive studies. This
study has demonstrated the difficulty that exists in drawing clear-cut distinctions
between the strategies used by campaign strategists in paid and unpaid television
coverage.

While Reagan and subsequent candidates have more obviously

demonstrated an integration of the strategic utilization of television by blurring the
distinction between all forms of television, this process really began as early as
Eisenhower. All candidates have been required to deal with both aspects and have
thus gradually integrated techniques over time. Additionally, no other election period
after the fifties can be recognized as having developed truly novel strategies. Instead,
the development of strategies must be viewed as an incremental process of building on
lessons learned during previous campaigns. Even seemingly new developments or
trends, such as the manipulation of the news, are attributable to some aspect of
strategies developed by previous candidates.
What does seem conclusive is the overwhelming importance of successful
television strategies to visual image-building and the presidential campaign process.
The reality of politics now is that candidates need to be able to deal with television.
Those presidential contenders, such as Stevenson, Humphrey, and Mondale, who
admittedly could not effectively cope with the growing medium of television did not
fare well. The candidates who have been most successful are those who could present
themselves effectively on television and work with the medium as a whole. Similarly,
with the rise in the importance of television strategies has come a rise in the
importance of media specialists who can guide candidates. Again, those candidates,
such as Stevenson, who were unwilling to heed the advice of these people met with
defeat. The trend for the future seems to be an increasing integration of current and

67
new realms of television coverage to provide candidates with even more intimate
contact with the American voter.

Consequently visual image-building, complex

utilization strategies, and knowledgeable media experts will continue to be crucial to
successful presidential campaigns. With the potential for technological innovations in
television just beginning to blossom, the future of visual image-building strategies via
the medium is both exciting and promising.

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Appendix
Summary of the Evolution of the Strategic Utilization of Television by Presidential
Candidates According to the Primary Period ofEmergence (1952-1992)

Period

1952-68

Paid Media

Unpaid Media

30- and 60-second spots

Coverage of New Hampshire
Primary

Five-minute spots
Prime-time paid programming
Hitchhiking

Nationally televised convention
coverage

Question and answer spots

Scheduling campaign speeches to

Talking-head spots

attract news coverage

Modification of candidate

Use of power of incumbency to

appearance

attract news coverage

Use of clothing colors appropriate Use of patriotic symbols in
for television

background scenes

Merchandising candidate's natural
attributes

Televised debates
Orchestrated public appearances

Strategic scheduling of spots
during certain times in
campaign
Targeting of certain regions with
spots
On-location taping

73

74

1952-1964

Use of clips from public
appearances
Negative advertising
Soft-sell advertising

1968-1976

Color television widely used

Color television widely used

Negative visual symbolism

Nightly news becomes target of

Use of product ad techniques

campaign activity

Juxtaposing unrelated images

Daily visual images of candidate

Use of symbols of the presidency

Tightly controlled public
appearances and rallies
Daily press releases
Promotion of presidential
activities for political
purposes
Attention to personal aspects
of image

1980-1992

Return to talking-head spots
Candidate directly addressing the
voters

Attracting sound bites becomes
important
Theme of the day

Strong patriotic visual symbolism

Strong, patriotic visual symbolism

Spots look like news events

Line of the day with corresponding

Emotion-laden

visual image

75
1980-1992

Scheduling time on cable networks Large, carefully focused, upbeat
public events
Public appearances staged to
present same visual image as
spots airing at the same time
Negative visual symbolism
Appeal to cable news networks