THE BATTLE OF KURSK: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TO STALINGRAD, STUDY ON
MEMORY, AND RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION

By:

Sean C. McGovern, B.A.
East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History
To the office of Graduate and Extended Studies
East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

May 7, 2021

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ABSTRACT
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts
in History to the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies of East Stroudsburg University of
Pennsylvania.
Student’s Name: Sean McGovern, B.S.
Title: The Battle of Kursk: A Comparative Analysis to Stalingrad, Study on Memory, and
Russian Environmental Preservation
Date of Graduation: May 7, 2021
Thesis Chair: Michael P. Gray, Ph.D.
Thesis Member: Christopher Brooks, Dr. Phil.
Abstract
The Eastern Front of World War Two is one of the most studied elements of the Second World
War. On the Eastern front, some battles stand out more than others. Most notably the Battle of
Stalingrad stands out as being the ultimate turning point where the Eastern Front was lost and
unable to be revived from the perspective of the Germans. When studying the numbers and
accounts, the Battle of Kursk trumps the Battle of Stalingrad as the true turning point. While the
Battle of Stalingrad simply changed the direction of the war, the Battle of Kursk is the last time
the Germany Army could have turned the tides of the war. However, historians and society do
not see it that way. Through various means of popular culture and speeches, the rhetoric that
Stalingrad is the battle that changed the course of history is constantly reinforced. Furthermore, a
more contemporary look at environmental history will illustrate how the bogs and marshes
Russian countryside act as natural museums. Preserving anything that falls into their clutches,
mother nature not only prevails, but preserves for future generations.

Acknowledgments:
I would like to thank Alexandra Wear, Jake Mills, Mark McMahon, Nick Rogers, and
Mark Reitz for being with me through every step of my undergraduate work. Additionally, I
would like to thank Dr. Haywood for introducing me to this specific area of study, and shaping
me to the researcher I am today. Dr. Haywood also pushed me to my maximum potential,
questioned my reasoning, and inspired me to always be the best researcher and teacher I possibly
can during my undergraduate career.
Dr. Bornstein also deserves recognition for guiding me through my undergraduate
studies, and not only ensuring that I graduated on time with the required credentials, but showed
me what it means to truly be an educator.
A special thanks goes to Dr. Gray and Dr. Brooks for dedicating so much of their time to
revising this thesis, and further refining my work to make it the best it can be. Furthermore, I will
be forever grateful that Dr. Gray and Dr. O’Donnell were such incredible mentors and role
models for me throughout my graduate studies. Dr. O’Donnell opened my eyes to a whole new
realm of research and history that I have otherwise would have never thought to pursue. Dr. Gray
also opened my eyes to a realm of history that I otherwise would have glanced over. They both
made me realize the potential that I have, and have made me into the writer and researcher that I
am today.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this to my future wife, Allie, my Mother, Father, and
Grandfather for influencing me to who I am today, always supporting me throughout my entire
life, and giving me endless opportunities.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………..VI-VII
Chapter
Introduction: A Background of Barbarossa and the Misconception of Stalingrad………..VIII-XX
Chapter I: Kursk Triumphs: A Comparative Analysis of Kursk Over Stalingrad ....………...1-33
Chapter II: Kursk In Memory and Mind: Monumentation, Speeches, Movies, and Popular
Culture.............................................................................................................................…….34-52
Chapter III: Mother Nature Sustains: Environmental Museums in the Swamps and Bogs of
Russia That Preserve History………………………………………………….……..………53-67
Works Cited....………………………………………………………………………….…….68-73

An unknown Soviet soldier prays minutes before heading into battle at Kursk.
Picture found at:
https://www.deviantart.com/jesseclark152/art/Russian-Soldiers-Preparing-for-the-Battle-of-Kursk-45544757

V

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1. An unknown Soviet soldier praying before fighting at Kursk……………………………V
2. An unknown German soldier waiting to be captured after the battle of Kursk…………VII
3. Operation Barbarossa……………………………………………………………...……..IX
4. Front lines of Stalingrad, 1942……………………………………………………..…..XIII
5. Operation Uranus………………………………………………………………….……XV
6. T-34 on display…………………………………………………………………….………4
7. KV1 heavy tank…………………………………………………………….……………...5
8. KV2 heavy tank………..………………………………………………………….……….5
9. SU-152 on display……………………………………………………………….………...6
10. Zis-6 BM-13-16 “Katuysha” on display…………………………………………………..6
11. Lend-lease Churchill heavy tank………………………….…………………….…………7
12. Panzer III on display………………………………………………………………………8
13. Panzer IV on display………………………………………………………………………8
14. PTRD and PTRS anti-tank rifles on display………………………………………………9
15. StuG with side skirts……………………………………………………………………..10
16. Tiger 131 on display……………………………………………………………………..10
17. Panther tank on display…………………………………………………………………..12
18. Sloped armor effectiveness….…………………………………………………………...12
19. German plan of attack at Kursk……………………………………………….………….15
20. Actual German advancements during the attack at Kursk……………………………….22
21. “Motherland Calls” statue………………………………………………………………..35
22. The flour mill on Volgograd……………………………………………………………..37
23. Kursk monument…………………………………………………………………………38
24. Screenshot from Call of Duty: United Offensive……………………………….………..42
25. Russian WW2 propaganda poster………………………………………………………..47
26. Russian WW2 propaganda poster………………………………………………………..48
27. Captured T34 after being pulled from a bog……………………………………………..56
28. Ammunition from the T34……………………………………………………….……….57
29. The recovered T34 on display in Russia...……………………………………………….57
30. StuG pulled from a lake……………………………………………………….………….58
31. Crew remains and artifacts from the StuG……………………………………………….59
32. The body of Boris Lazarev…………………………………………………….…………60
33. Paperwork from Lazarev…………………………………………………………………60
34. Lazarev’s identification papers…………………………………………………………..61
35. Philipp Costenko's parachute and sidearm……………………………………………….61
36. Philipp Costenko's identification papers……………………………………….…………62
37. Panther being pulled from a pond in Poland……………………………………………..63
38. Closeup of the Panther turret……………………………………………….…………….63
VI

39. The recovered Panther fully restored and on display…………………………………….63
40. A KV1 being lifted from the Neva River………………………………………………...64
41. The recovered KV1 restored and on display……………………………………………..64
42. A “Molotov Cocktail” found in the Russian countryside………………….……………..66
43. The “Molotov Cocktail” thrown and burning………………………….…………………66

A German soldier next to a knockout artillery piece in the aftermath of Kursk, waiting to be
captured by the Red Army, 1943. Source found at:
https://incredibleimages4u.blogspot.com/2011/02/battle-of-kursk-in-pictures-part-4.html

VII

INTRODUCTION:
A BACKGROUND OF BARBAROSSA AND THE MISCONCEPTION OF STALINGRAD

To fully understand the Battle of Kursk, one has to understand the opening phases of the
Eastern Front with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, code named: “Operation
Barbarossa.” At the first sign of sunrise on June 22nd, 1941, German air and land forces invaded
the Soviet Union with intensity. Red Army troops, vastly overwhelmed and dealing with an
overall lack of leadership due to Supreme of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin’s military purges,
were quickly overrun and pushed back throughout the Soviet Union across a several thousandmile front. Additionally, the adoption of the Tokarev SVT40 in early 1941 hindered weapon
production since the factories at Izhevsk and Tula where in the process of retooling their factory
floors. This further added to the confusion, and resulted in many of these new rifles falling into
enemy hands early in the fight.
The attack force designated to invade the Soviet Union was the largest the world had seen
up to that point. Hitler decided, against his military tacticians’ advice, to attack the Soviet Union
in late summer of 1941. The German force tasked with this operation was composed of three
million men, over 600,000 motorized vehicles, 3,580 tanks, 7,184 artillery pieces, and over 2,740
airplanes. Additional forces from Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and Spain would

also aid the German advance, under the name of “Blue Divisions.” At 7:00am on June 22nd, a
massive artillery barrage opened up on the Russian defensive lines in Poland, and the invasion of
the Soviet Union began.1
As the Wehrmacht cut through the Soviet Union, women soldiers were found in large
numbers. This also results in a change of the mindset amongst soldiers and high command early
in the war. Nazi ideology valued the women as the home keeper whose sole job was to have
children, maintain the house, cook, clean, perform other household duties, and work to support
the war effort. In the early 1920’s
the Nazi party established different
youth groups to groom young
women to fit into their vision of
German society. There were two
primary leagues established for
girls under 18, the Jungmädelbund
and Bund Deutscher Mädel. The
Jungmädelbund was created for

Source found at: https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1761.html

girls between the ages of 10 and 14 and the Bund Deutscher Mädel was created for girls between
the ages of 14 and 18. These two groups installed anti-semetic views, along with training these
young girls to work on farms and different state building projects. The Glaube und Schönheit
was added in 1938, and was a voluntary group open to girls between 17 and 21. This league was
intended to groom young women for marriage, domestic life, and their future career.
Furthermore, these girls were highly encouraged to be married and have children once they were

1

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, a New History, (Continuum, New York, 1995) 467-468.

IX

of age, and awards were even created for women who had three, six, and nine kids to further
promote German heritage.2 This program was also used to justify the lebensraum argument that
Germany needed more living space for the German population. As the German army pushed
through the Soviet Union, seeing women on the fronts brought them to the conclusion that the
Soviet Union could not be won by crushing just the Red Army. The people of the Soviet Union
were viewed as being radicals, and the entirety of the population would have to be liquidated in
order to win the war within the Soviet Union. Resulting in immense bloodshed and a war of
attrition being fought on the Eastern Front.3
There was no true singular objective to this attack, but several spread-out objectives.
Controlling the cities of Stalingrad, Moscow, and Leningrad were primary goals, along with the
rich oilfields of the Caucasus. These four different targets would spread the German front over
several thousand miles. Furthermore, with the establishment of different family programs, the
Nazi party claimed that invasion of the Soviet Union was necessary to provide more living space
for the German people. The vast farmland would provide sufficient food and housing
opportunities for new German families. Later on, during the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler
would develop an obsession for taking Stalingrad. A city that stretched about 30 miles across the
Volga river, control of the city would allow for Germany to control the shipping routes through
the Volga that supplied both Moscow and Leningrad. Additionally, the city had multiple
bridgeheads, and held a large industrial complex that included: Dzerzhinsky tractor works; which
now made tanks, Barrikady munitions factory, Krasny Oktyabr metal plant, and the Lazur

2

Lisa Pine, League of German Girls (The Bund Deutscher Mädel), (Jewish Virtual Library, American-Israeli
Cooperative Enterprises, 1998-2021).
3
Greatest Events of World War Two in Colour, Season 1, Episode 5, “Siege of Stalingrad,” directed by Ailsa
Fereday, Aired 2019, on Netflix, accessed January 22nd, 2021,
https://www.netflix.com/title/80989924?source=imdb.

X

chemical works.4 Hitler saw it as an opportunity to crush the morale of the people and troops of
the Soviet Union. With Hitler’s decision to cut his forces in the South in half in order to focus on
taking the city of Stalingrad, the Caucasus oil fields would be hardly touched by a German
advance. This would only worsen as the Battle of Stalingrad started to extend over several
months.
Entering the third month of the war against the Soviet Union, the German army was still
going relatively unopposed in a continuous German conquest of the Soviet Union. This is when
the first Battle of Kursk would take place. Kursk would fall to the Nazi army with little to no
resistance. The Russian army was still executing a “tactical withdrawal” across the Soviet Union.
Finally, Stalin would mandate a direct order to stop “tactical withdrawals” across all fronts; this
was the infamous “Order No. 227, which called for an end to retreat and demanded that every
foot of Soviet soil be defended.”5 This order would come into effect before the main battles at
Stalingrad. From a Russian perspective, losing Stalingrad would destroy Soviet morale, and
would lose one of the last major strongpoints on the Eastern Front. From a German perspective,
taking the town of Stalingrad would be a morale boost, and allow for the entire German army in
the Southern half of the Soviet Union to focus their efforts and units on the attack and seizure of
the oil fields located in the Caucasus. These oilfields were the lifelines of the Soviet military, and
would severely damage or even make the Russian army come to a halt. Eventually, a stand had
to be made, and that stand would be at Stalingrad.6
The Battle of Stalingrad would start on August 23rd, 1942 with the German attack, and
would end around February 2nd, 1943, resulting in the total liquidation of the German Sixth

4

Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 290.
5
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013) 24.
6
A. M. Nikalaieff ,The Red Army in the Second World War, (Russian Review, Vol. 7, Moscow, Autumn 1947) 54.

XI

Army. When the battle began, the Germans tried to take the city with a pincer move, surrounding
the city and attacking from two flanks, crushing the enemy in the center. However fierce Russian
resistance would stop the Germans, and the first attack of Stalingrad would not commence until
late August. The German army was able to surround the city on the Western side of the Volga
River, but was stopped from taking the entire western side by a few pockets of Russian soldiers
who refused to surrender. This would start what is known as the second part of the Battle of
Stalingrad. The Germans would soon launch a massive artillery bombardment and bombing
campaign from the Luftwaffe. This attack would destroy the city, and reduce it to next to
nothing. Ultimately the Red Army and Wehrmacht would fight a war of vindictiveness in close
quarters as the body count quickly rose. Some of the Second World War’s most fierce fighting
would take place over Stalingrad. Historian Stephen G. Fritz comments: “This was no longer an
operational Battle of movement that required skill, coordination and effective cooperation of all
arms, something at which the Germans excelled. This had become… a Rattenkrieg (rats’ war)…
in piles of rubble, in factories with twisted metal frames and shattered machines, in grain silos
and cellars, through sewers from one house to the next.”7 Flamethrowers, grenades, and ruthless
hand to hand combat would be used to fight in the city, and entire days would be fought just
trying to take one building, and in some extreme cases, trying to take one floor of one building.8

7

Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 293.
8
Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, a New History, (Continuum, New York, 1995) 522.

XII

The Soviet strategy was also unique; which was to “hug” the enemy. This meant holding
positions as close as possible to the Germans to prevent any sort of large-scale artillery barrage
or bombing raid. Additionally, Soviet
Field Marshal Vasily Ivanovich
Chuikov, commander of the 62nd
Army, realized the Germans did not
typically fight at night. In order to
expose this weakness, he changed
tactics to launch small attacks and
reinforce at night. He wanted to slowly
break down the German army mentally
and physically by launching constant
attacks on their positions. Moreover,
across the Volga River bank on the
Soviets’ side, a large brigade of
Katyusha rocket-launching trucks would
constantly launch hell storms of
firepower on the Germans positions.
Once they were done, they would
quickly retreat to the safety of the
riverbank, resulting in the German

Source found at: https://facingstalingrad.com/battle-stalingrad/

army incapable of knocking them out. This sort of constant attacking would wear down the
Germans morale, along with their physical and mental ability to launch decisive attacks against

XIII

the Soviets.9 These battle tactics would lead the Soviet troops to earn a subhuman-like reputation
among the German forces, as Wilhelm Hoffman, soldier in the 267th Infantry Regiment of the
German 6th Army wrote in his diary about his experience fighting while trying to take the
Barrikady factory: “The Russians are not men, but some kind of cast-iron creatures; they never
get tired and are not afraid of fire.”10
The Battle of Stalingrad would enter its final stage on November 19th, 1942 when the Red
Army counterattacked. Focusing their attack North and South of the German lines, within four
days the Red Army cut off the entire German Sixth Army under “Operation Uranus.” Under this
plan, Soviet forces would launch attacks to the most Northern, and Southern parts of the city.
This would result in the Sixth Army getting flanked, crushing the rear troops, and surrounding
them within Stalingrad. Since the German Army had advanced so quickly into the Soviet Union
under Barbarossa, their supply lines were already stretched thin. After successfully surrounding
the German forces, the Soviets would bombard them with artillery, and starve them of all
supplies and communication. With the rapid and successful execution of “Operation Uranus'' the
Red Army was able to change the tides of battle, now putting intense pressure on The German
Field Marshal of the Sixth army, Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus. With them surrounded, the
Germans within the Soviet blockade could do nothing but try and fight their way out, or wait for
an outside force to rescue them. And so concluded that he would need roughly 600 tons of
supplies per day in order to keep his men alive. The Luftwaffe, already starting to weaken due to
poor leadership and a lack of long-distance bombers, could not keep up with this demand. There
was no way to achieve the requirements for food, ammunition and fuel. Making matters worse,

9

Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 292-293.
10
Quoted in: Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, 299.

XIV

the Soviet air force and anti-aircraft abilities severely reduced the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe
support.11
Moral for the soldiers
trapped within the city quickly fell,
and by the end of December of 1942
the hope of a relief attack had been
forgotten. By January of 1943 the
situation of the encircled men had
deteriorated sharply, and they had
been encircled to a very tight circle
that could have been completely
covered by Soviet artillery.
Additional fighting in December
forced soldiers that were still alive to

Source found at: https://www.stalingrad.net/russianhq/operation-uranus/rusopuranus.html

deplete all of their reserves to stop the attacks. Stocks of ammunition, fuel and food were coming
to an end, and the Wehrmacht’s primary food supply by this time was horse meat. By January of
1943 the ration for a German soldier in the encirclement was 75g of bread, supplemented by
200g of horse meat.12 Making matters worse for the entrapped Germans, Red Army propaganda
constantly reminded the men of the hopeless situation by playing on loudspeakers: “Every seven
seconds a German soldier dies at Stalingrad… Stalingrad is a mass grave…”13

11

Alexy V. Isaev, translated by Richard Harrison, Stalingrad: City on Fire. (Pen and Sword, Lexington, 2019), 278.
Alexy V. Isaev, translated by Richard Harrison, Stalingrad: City on Fire. (Pen and Sword, Lexington, 2019), 277.
13
Jonathan Bastable, Voices From Stalingrad: First-hand Accounts From World War II's Cruelest Battle. (Greenhill
Books, Yorkshire, 2019), 238.
12

XV

As the winter went on, the harsh Russian winter set in. Field Marshal von Bock’s Army
Group B, which consisted of the German 6th Army, 4th Panzer Army and Italian 8th Army, had
100,000 cases of frostbite by Christmas. To protect their faces from the relentless brutal wind,
many had to wear gas masks. Temperature was usually so low that fuel froze inside machines.
Fires had to be lit underneath engines but even this measure didn’t always work and tank, truck
and aircraft engines simply refused to start. Ice also tore up engines and immobilized planes for
weeks. Repair work that required delicate adjustments could not be done because as soon as
mechanics removed their gloves, their fingers became frozen and glued to the cold metal surface.
Many transport aircraft were grounded due to this lack of maintenance, which had catastrophic
consequences on the aerial resupply of the encircled 6th Army. It is recorded that the average
temperature for the Winter of 1942 in Stalingrad averaged at -30 degrees Fahrenheit.14
Any aircraft that was able to get through the stiff Soviet defense, often had little to no
effect on the German troops on the ground. Just six weeks after the encirclement the Luftwaffe
sent an officer in to see how well the air support was helping the soldiers on the ground, and
reported the following: “Dropping supplies doesn’t help at all. Many of the canisters aren’t
recovered, we don’t have the fuel to collect them. The men are too weak to go searching. It’s
now four days since they’ve had anything to eat. The last of the horses have been eaten.”15
The hardship that the German army faced is another reason why Stalingrad is studied and
written about so extensively. It is unlike Kursk in that the Stalingrad is a struggle for both sides,
trying to stop the German advance or break out of the Soviet encirclement. The ensuing six
months would entail some of the worst conditions ever experienced by an army during World

14

Jonathan Bastable, Voices From Stalingrad: First-hand Accounts From World War II's Cruelest Battle. (Greenhill
Books, Yorkshire, 2019), 237.
15
Alexy V. Isaev, translated by Richard Harrison, Stalingrad: City on Fire. (Pen and Sword, Lexington, 2019), 244.

XVI

War Two. The Germans, mostly in their summer or fall gear had to try and stave off Soviet
attacks and the harsh Russian winter. Six months of starvation and combat, compared to the swift
12 days of the Kursk offensive. Kursk had no dramatic ending or singular turning point like that
of “Operation Uranus''. It was just poor German planning mixed with the countless amounts of
manpower and Soviet equipment that would overrun the Germans and forced them once again to
go on the defensive. The Battle of Stalingrad is drawn out, debated back in Germany for months,
fought in the city that bears the name of the Supreme of the Soviet Union, and allowed for
soldiers to write home or communicate back to Berlin. Stalingrad was so controversial that back
in Berlin the German Army Chief of Staff General Kurt Zeitzler put himself on what he called
the Stalingrad diet. He refused to eat any more than what the men received at Stalingrad, and
within two weeks lost so much weight that Hitler had to give him a direct order to consume a
healthier diet, otherwise be relieved of his duties as Army Chief of Staff.16
Not only were the men trapped and experiencing unbearable living conditions, but they
also had time to write home, or write to Berlin. Aircraft were able to break the Soviet blockade,
allowing for mail and some supplies to get through. But this also spread the word about the
horrendous living conditions that were in Stalingrad. Meanwhile, during the Battle of Kursk,
there was no down time for the soldiers to write home about. Many soldiers fought for days on
end. If a soldier was not killed in the vicious combat, they spent their down time cleaning or
repairing weapons, finding ammunition, repairing vehicles, and most notably sleeping. The
soldiers at Stalingrad spent most of their time writing, sleeping, scavenging for anything to eat,
and making trench art to pass the time and try to keep their minds off the hopelessness of the

16

Alexy V. Isaev, translated by Richard Harrison, Stalingrad: City on Fire. (Pen and Sword, Lexington, 2019), 241.

XVII

situation. Meaning the stories of Stalingrad are much more alive and better circulated than
Kursk.
Field Marshal Paulus, pleaded Hitler to let him surrender his forces in order to save his
men from certain death, but instead Hitler promoted him to Field Marshal. In the German army,
no field marshal had ever surrendered. The German Sixth Army waited to be rescued. After
freezing in subhuman temperatures of the particularly brutal Russian winter for several months,
the German Army surrendered to the Russians in early February.17 The reason why many
historians consider the Battle of Stalingrad the most important battle in the Second World War is
due to the fact that this battle completely stopped the German advance into the Soviet Union:
“[Stalingrad] is one of greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War.”18 When the Wehrmacht lost
the Sixth Army, they were unable to absorb such large losses, and were forced to pull back
across the Russian front.
Over 250,000 Germans would be trapped in the Russian blockade around the city that
was completed by the start of November 1942. By February 2nd 1943, 24 generals, 2,500
officers, and 90,000 troops would be all that remained. They were finally forced to surrender to
the Red Army.19 This officially ended the German advance into the Soviet Union, and would
start the Russian counterattack back through Soviet territory. While the initial stages of
“Operation Barbarossa” were successful, and opening the several thousand-mile front worked for
a few months, this had suddenly turned against the Wehrmacht.

17

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, a New History, (Continuum, New York, 1995) 524.
Raymond Limbach, Battle of Stalingrad. (Britannica, New York, New York, 2015).
http://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Stalingrad
19
Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 321.
18

XVIII

When the hole opened up in the Southern part of the Soviet Union with the collapse of
the Sixth army, this allowed the Red Army to flood through, and force the Germans to pull back
across all fronts. With so much of their manpower spread out so thin, the Wehrmacht’s had to
recede and recuperate from this defeat. As historian Klaus P. Fischer supports: “The German
army was still a formidable fighting machine.”20 For that reason, this turn of events causes most
historians to call the Battle of Stalingrad the most important and decisive Battle of the Second
World War.21 Most scholars talk about Stalingrad being the single point in World War Two
where the momentum shifts to the Soviets favor. For example, A.J Taylor, in his 1998 article:
The Second World War and its Aftermath claims “[Stalingrad] is arguably the most strategically
decisive battles of the Second World War, and definitely turning the tides in the European
Theater.”22 Taylor is one of countless history scholars who make this claim.
The 2019 Netflix documentary, Greatest Events of World War Two in Colour is a series
of colorized films, mixed with historians who discuss what that show deems as the great events
of World War Two. Major events like invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad, Midway,
Dresden Fire bombings, the Battle of Britain, D-Day, Pearl Harbor, Liberation of Dachau,
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Battle of Berlin are all discussed. However, the
Battle of Kursk is completely forgotten. A show dedicated to the “Greatest Events of World War
Two” did not even mention Kursk once. In regards to the Eastern Front, the only events
mentioned are the initial invasion of the Soviet Union, Battle of Stalingrad, and Berlin. Most of

20

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, a New History, (Continuum, New York, 1995) 524.
Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany, 524-525.
22
A.J Taylor, The Second World War and its Aftermath. (Folio Society, 1998, Vol 4 of 4).
21

XIX

1943, and all of 1944 are simply cut from the series. Further proving that Kursk is overshadowed
by the same series of events.23
Another interesting interpretation about the Battle of Stalingrad is from military historian
Antony Beevor. He claims that the Stalingrad was the greatest psychological battle of the war.
With the German Army going undefeated from 1939-1942, the morale and hopes of the Soviet
Union were starting to break apart. This Soviet victory proved to the Russian people and military
that it was possible to stop the Wehrmacht. However, while Stalingrad is important, Kursk is the
turning point during the Second World War in the Eastern Front.24
The Battle of Stalingrad ended the German advance in Russia, and started to push them
back to Germany, ultimately leading to their final defeat in Berlin on May 5th, 1945. It is due to
the Soviet steamroller constantly pushing to Berlin that many smaller battles are dropped from
history, and are often overlooked. The Battle of Kursk is a pivotal and crucial incident during the
war that has to be looked into, because it is the true turning point of the Nazi juggernaut. The
Battle of Kursk was Nazi Germany’s attempt to turn the war back into their favor, and they put
everything they had against the Soviets at Kursk; taking up 70% of all the equipment and
manpower that the Germany army had in the Eastern front.25

23

Greatest Events of World War Two in Colour, Season 1, Episode 1-10, “Siege of Stalingrad,” directed by Ailsa
Fereday, Aired 2019, on Netflix, accessed January 22nd, 2021.
24
Quoted in: Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. (Random House Co., New York City, 2005), 228.
25
Lloyd Clark, Kursk The Greatest Battle, (Headline Review, Buckingham, May 24th, 2012) 47.

XX

CHAPTER ONE:
KURSK TRIUMPHS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KURSK OVER STALINGRAD
Over 3.5 million men, 10,000 tanks, 17,000 guns and mortars, and 3,600 airplanes
between the Soviet Union and German Military would clash on a battlefield less than 30 miles
wide, with one objective: to seize railhead at Kursk.1 The fighting would be brutal, and none
stop. One contemporary account from German infantryman, Raimund Ruffer illustrates the first
day of battle against the Soviet Union, or “Ivan,” during the opening hours for the Battle of
Kursk:
Ivan bullets zipped around us; I could hear them flying past my ears. I expected to
be cut down any moment or blow to smithereens by the shells that slammed about… I
heard my old friend Ernst panting seconds before his right arm was torn from his body by
an explosion that flung his rifle at my feet… he was silent by-time I got to him… I
twisted to see a camouflaged cover being thrown off a trench. I instinctively… dropped to
one knee and squeezed the trigger of my rifle. The butt kicked and a round was sent
hurtling towards a faceless Soviet Soldier. In that same instant I was knocked off my feet
as though hit by a heavyweight boxer. A Soviet round had struck me in the shoulder,
shattering the bone and leaving me gasping for air.2
After conducting extensive research, the conclusion can be made that after the Battle of Kursk,
the German Army is not able to mount a large counteroffensive for the remainder of the war on
the Eastern Front. While the fighting continued to get more ferocious as the Soviets closed in on
1
2

Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. (Pearson Longman, London England, 1997) 235.
Quoted in: Lloyd Clark, Kursk The Greatest Battle, (Headline Review, Buckingham, May 24th, 2012) 45.

the capital city of Berlin, the German army would not be able to turn the tides of the war. There
is no single battle where the Nazis saw a chance to turn the tide of the war back in the favor of
the Germany army after the failure at Kursk.
This chapter will argue that the Battle of Kursk is the most influential Battle of the
Eastern Front in the Second World War. Before this battle, the German army had the ability to
counter attack and start to push back the Soviet military; it was a matter of time, organization,
and coordination to do so. Even as the battle unfolded, many Soviet and German military officers
knew that this was a critical battle to change the tide of war. As Soviet General Andrey
Yeremenko, who would later become Marshal of the Soviet Union, noted: “The Kursk operation
is more sophisticated than the Stalingrad one. In Stalingrad, the beast was beaten in its lair. In
Kursk, the artillery shield resisted the enemy’s attack and the artillery sword started crushing
them during the [counter-attack]… it was enough to smash the last great effort of the
Wehrmacht’s panzer arm.”3 The massive amount of force that the Nazis put into this battle would
never be able to be repeated. The Nazi war machine and manpower would never again be able to
reproduce such an effort.
Historian Stephen G. Fritz further backs this claim: “Stalingrad was not the turning point
in the larger conflict, in the sense that a still-winnable war had suddenly turned into a losing
one.”4 Further proving this point, military historian David M. Humpert writes: “The Battle of
Kursk would rank among history’s significant turning points.” Humpert, who focuses primarily
on the mechanized aspect of the battle, concludes that the Nazi Army lost roughly one third of

3

Quoted in: Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. (Random House Co., New York City, 2005) 231.
Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 326.
4

2

their entire Eastern front strength within the span of 12 days.5 Historian Dennis E. Showalter
confirms this, when he concludes his book on the Battle of Kursk with: “The Battle of Kursk was
the Eastern Front’s transition point… it’s point of no return.”6 Recently, when addressing the 60th
anniversary of the battle in 2003 President of Russia Vladimir Putin made the claim: “Kursk
marks a turning point in the Great Patriotic War… As a result of the Battle of Kursk, the course
of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War changed for good.”7 The narrative of the
Eastern Front in World War Two is slowly changing, but regardless of how much research is
done, and evidence is provided, Stalingrad always seems to be favored as the ultimate turning
point.
Within the 12 days of the attack at Kursk, roughly 200,000 Germans died; 800 tanks and
assault guns destroyed, and 159 aircraft were lost.8 The lull in fighting between January and June
of 1943 was the time for the German army to reorganize and plan an attack, and the Germans
would focus all of their reserves on the Eastern front at the Kursk salient. The Nazi failure to
take their objective at Kursk, and the crushing defeat of their reserves would officially mark the
end of the German offensive, and the Soviets would go on a practically non-stop offensive until
they reached Berlin in 1945. The Battle of Stalingrad proved that the Russian will-power and
man-power would be enough to halt the German advance, and would stop the German
steamroller into Russia, but the Battle of Kursk would officially mark the end of the advance,
shatter the morale of the German Army, and end the depiction of a Nazi juggernaut.

5

David M. Humpert, Swan Songs of the Panzers, (World War Two, Germany, February 2004), 13.
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013) 279.
7
Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. August 19 th, 2003, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number
22088. Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22088
8
David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Strategy, 139-140.
6

3

To better understand the battle, it is important to indulge in the specifics of the most
prominent fighting vehicles used at Kursk. The backbone of the Red Army’s armored forces was
the T-34. The 1943 variant of the T-34 had a darker green paint to it to better fit into the
surrounding fields. Additionally, by 1943 there were some advances in the design. Some changes
included additional external fuel tanks, a radio, and a 360-degree vision cupola for the
commander to get a better view of the
surrounding battlefield. Armed with the
versatile 76mm gun, a maximum speed of
33 mph, the T-34 was a well-balanced tank
for various roles throughout Eastern Front.
Additionally, its 47mm 60-degree slanted
armor and two 7.62x54r DT machine guns
made it even more suited for tank combat along with suppressing rushing infantry.9 The T-34
would see action from Barbarossa to the streets of Berlin, more than 34,000 would be produced
from 1941-45.10
The KV1 and KV2 tanks, despite being outdated by 1943, made a presence at Kursk. In
the early stages of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany the KV1 and KV2 were
formidable fighting machines. Bearing a 76mm main gun and three 7.62x54r DT machine guns,
the KV1 was a heavy tank by 1941 standards. Its 90mm frontal armor had a much steeper slope
to it, not making it as effective as the T-34s armor. Despite its steeper armor, the KV1 with its 3.5
inches of armor could stop just about any anti-tank gun that was tasked with knocking it out.

9

David Porter, Soviet Tank Units 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, 2009), 85.
Ibid, 186.

10

4

However, by 1943 the German’s
had introduced the Tiger, Panther,
and 88mm anti-tank gun, which
made quick work out of the KV1s.
Additionally, the KV1s
twelve-cylinder diesel engine only
had a maximum speed of 22mph. Making it substantially slower than most other vehicles in the
Red Army and Wehrmacht.
The KV2 was even more outdated. Utilizing the same chassis as the KV1, the KV2 was
designed during the Winter War of 1939. Its massive 152mm main gun was designed to destroy
bunkers, and any obstacle that might come in the way of an armored unit. However, with only
one hull mounted 7.62x54r DT machine
gun, it was prone to infantry rushing and
disabling. Additionally, its enormous
profile at 10 feet 10 inches tall, 22 feet
long, 10 feet 10 inches wide, and
weighing in at 51.1 tons, made it an easy
target in combat. To matters worse, its
maximum speed of 17mph and a lack of a
radio made it impossible for KV2 crews to keep up with the Blitzkrieg tactics of 1941, and most
of the 334 examples would be lost during operation Barbarossa.11

11

David Porter, Soviet Tank Units 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, 2009) 28-19.

5

With the KV1 and KV2 proving to be obsolete by 1943, there was an innovative program
installed to develop an improved tank
destroyer to tackle the larger vehicles
being fielded by the German’s panzer
armies. The SU-152 heavy self-propelled
gun would be the result of this program.
Utilizing the KV1 chassis, engine, and
hull mounted machine gun, the SU-152
had a much lower profile and a fixed cannon. As a result, it had a much lower profile than the
KV2, but utilized the same 152mm howitzer. When loaded with new armor piercing ammunition,
the SU-152 was tested for the first time at Kursk, and proved to be sufficient at knocking out
newer and heavier German tanks at normal battle ranges.12
Another vehicle that made a presence throughout the Second World War on Russia’s side
was the infamous Zis-6 BM-13-16
“Katyusha” salvo rocket launcher.
Usually mounted to a Zis-6 cargo truck,
or a lend-lease Studebaker, the Katyusha
rocket launchers were capable of
delivering a devastating salvo of 16
different 132mm rockets to a target within 7-10 seconds. While these salvo weapons were less
accurate than artillery, they were very effective in that they covered roughly 100,000 square feet

12

Ibid, 85.

6

of the battlefield with their payload of roughly one ton of high explosive materials. With an
experienced crew, a Katyusha unit could relocate after a salvo nearly immediately after firing,
denying the German’s a chance to locate and launch a counter barrage. For this reason, the Zis-6
rocket artillery was especially bothersome to German troops, and due to their distinct sound
when firing, quickly earned the nickname “Stalin’s Organs.”13
The battle of Kursk is also interesting for the Red Army since a handful of lend-lease
units made their way to the front lines and took on the German’s head on. Composed of M4A1
Sherman’s, Infantry Tank Mark IV Churchill MKIIIs, Universal carrier Mark 1 with a Boys .55
anti-tank rifle, and numerous Mark III Valentines, the allied vehicles made most of their
contributions at Prokhorovka and the counter
offensive “Operation Kutuzov.” These Allied
vehicles were not as favored as other Red
Army tanks mainly due to their difference in
ammunition. The Churchill especially was
disliked due to its slow speed, only
15mph, and a short barreled 75mm
gun. The Sherman and Valentines however, were well liked due to their reliability. Despite their
resiliency, both were usually placed in reserve units to avoid confusion with armament, and the
overall high profile of the Sherman, at nine feet made it unfavorable for the open fields of the
Eastern front.14

13
14

Ibid, 42.
David Porter, Soviet Tank Units 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, 2009), 92-95.

7

The German Panzer Army had numerous vehicles at their disposal, from the
Czechoslovakian 38(t), to the Panzerkampfwagen 1 Ausf. F, and many others. This section will
focus on the more prominent vehicles used, the Panzer III, Panzer IV, Sturmgeschütz III, Tiger
and Panther. The Panzer III was hardly
suited for combat against tanks with the
introduction of the Soviet T-34. Utilizing a
small two-inch main gun, neither the short
or long barreled versions could penetrate
the sloped armor of a T-34 even at point
blank range. A trained crew would instead aim for various weak points such as the tracks, barrel,
hull ring, or any periscope to try and disable a Soviet tank. However, with a maximum speed of
25mph it was fast, and versatile on the battlefield.15
By 1943 the Panzer IV composed much of the Panzer Armies power. Armed with a
three-inch-high velocity long barreled gun, the IV with a maximum speed of 25mph leveled the
playing field between the new Soviet T34.
Capable of carrying 87 rounds of
ammunition, the Panzer IV performed well
on all fronts, and would soon make up the
bulk of the Panzer army with over 8,500
being made throughout the duration of the
war. All these units were not the long barrel

15

Michael Spilling, Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, United Kingdom, 2005), 199.

8

version, some included recovery tanks, anti-aircraft tanks, and other variants that could be
intended for other non-combat roles.
Arguably the most successful tank of the Second World War, the Sturmgeschütz III, made
a huge presence at the Kursk battlefield. Originally designed as a mobile assault gun for infantry
support, the StuG III, with its low profile at only seven feet, and versatile 75mm gun, quickly
made it an effective tank killer on the field.
The StuG was not only the second most
produced tracked vehicle of the German
Army in World War Two with over 10,000
units being produced, but also has the most
number of confirmed tank kills. With rotating
periscopes used for vision, one coaxial
machine gun in the hull and an option for a shield and machine gun mounted to the top, the StuG
III performed well in nearly all combat scenarios and was well liked by the German army.
However, by 1943, when the Battle of Kursk took place, many StuGs were starting to fall victim
to the Soviet PTRS and PTRD anti-tank rifles with their new ammunition. These two anti-tank
rifles were the most common Red Army infantry anti-tank rifles of the war. Utilizing the
14.5×114mm bullet traveling at more than 1,013fps, some older vehicles from earlier in the war
were falling victim to this potent bullet.16 Notably, StuGs weaker side armor proved to be no
match for this devastating bullet. At the Battle of Kursk, to try and save crews and tanks, metal
side skirts were added. Some side plates were retro-fitted since there was an official order for

Martin J. Dougherty, and Michael E. Haskew, Small Arms 1914-Present, The world’s Greatest Weapons, (Metro
Books, New York, 2013), 148.
16

9

them to fitted all front line StuGs and other
tanks by June 1943 in preparation for the Battle
of Kursk. It was found that these side skirts,
while effective, were not mounted properly and
ended up falling off or were knocked off in
combat easily. The StuG and all its variants saw
service throughout most of the war and even
well after the war in various roles and countries.17
The Tiger tank also made a prominent appearance on the battlefield. Boasting the 88mm
anti-tank gun as its main armament, two MG34s, 4.75 inches of frontal armor, and weighing over
62 tons, the lumbering Tiger was a formidable fighting machine that would not fail to uphold its
reputation. Additionally, due to its weight the Tiger had a relatively new feature in the Germany
army; it was the first
tank to have a steering
wheel with hydraulic
assistance so it could be
easily turned. When
compared to other
tanks like the KV1, T34,

Michael Spilling, Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, United Kingdom, 2005),
199-201.
17

10

and even most Panzers, which relied on a traditional lever system to make turns, the Tiger was
exceptionally easy to maneuver from a steering perspective.18
Stories of the Tiger’s fighting capabilities quickly circulated, and on the first day of battle
during Prokhorovka, “stories about 45mm cannons firing at [Tiger] tanks… shells hit them, but
bounced off like peas. There have been cases when artillerists went insane after seeing this.”19
T-34s and KV1s were not able to knock out this tank from the front, and had to be closer than
100 meters to disable it from the side. The rear was the only way to eliminate a Tiger, and even
then, the T-34 would have to be within 300 meters from the rear to get a kill.20
Meanwhile, the 88mm high velocity cannon was able to knock out a T-34 at a range of
1,500 meters from the front, in addition to disabling the Soviet heavy KV1 at a range of 3,500
meters.21 In one astonishing story, a Tiger tank in a workshop, not entirely fixed, was able to
repel an attack of some 50 to 60 T-34s. It knocked out 22 T34s, with the remaining tanks fleeing
in fright.22 Another nearly unbelievable account about the Tiger and its durability comes from
Leutnant Zabel’s report about his attack near Ssemernikovo Kolkhoz:
We counted 227 hits by AT rifles, 14 hits by 5.7cm AT guns and 11 hits by
7.62cm AT guns. The right suspension was heavily damaged by shelling. The connecting
pieces for several running wheels were ruined, two torsion bars were broken. A rear idler
wheel bearing was damaged. In spite of this damage the Tiger was able to be driven for
further 60km. The hits inflicted cracks to some weld seams. A fuel tank began leaking
due to the heavy shocks. We noticed a number of impacts in the track links, which
however did not particularly impair mobility. Subsequently, it can be said that the armour
on the Tiger had come up to our expectations…23

18

Ibid, 126.
Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. (Random House Co., New York City, 2005) 230-231.
20
Kill can be used interchangeably with disabling a tank.
21
Michael Spilling, Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, United Kingdom, 2005), 105.
22
Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 347.
23
Eric Vahan Muirhead, The Tiger Gap: Culture, Contradiction, and Clausewitz in German Armored Warfare in
World War II, (University of Tennessee, 5-2019), 56. The author was unable to find a first name for Lt. Zabel.
19

11

However, despite how strong the Tiger was on the battlefield, it had its drawbacks. First, since
the Tiger weighed over 57-tons it could only cross over certain bridges that were strong enough
to support its weight. Most of the time, Tiger commanders, or tank units that had Tiger support
would have to follow train tracks and use railroad bridges to cross rivers and valleys. This would
prove to be troublesome later in the Battle of Kursk, leading to the culmination at Prokhorovka.
Most bridges in the countryside were never built to be able to support the massive weight of a
57-ton tank. Also, the Tiger tank was expensive, and time consuming to build.24
The new Panzer V “Panther” was introduced during the Battle of Kursk, and despite its
flaws during its first time in combat,
would prove to be the most balanced
tank of the war. The Panther was
Germany’s newest tank design, and
one of the reasons why the attack on
Kursk was delayed for a few months. The Panther had a high velocity multiple purpose
three-inch cannon, along with frontal armor that was 80mm thick and sloped at 55 degrees. This
armor was impenetrable by the T-34 and KV1. The side armor was the weak spot, but T-34s had
to get within 400 meters of the side to get a kill.
Featuring a radio, maximum speed of 29mph, and
weighing 45 tons, the Panther was well balanced.
However, since the tank was rushed into
production the first series suffered from

24

Michael Spilling, Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, United Kingdom, 2005), 126.

12

transmission issues, faulty radios, and numerous optic failures. Finally, since they were so
cutting edge and expensive, substantially less were made when compared to the Panzer IV,
Sherman and T34 with only about 6000 units being made from 1942-1945.25
Finally, the steering of the Panther went back to the traditional gear and lever system,
which was not as easy as the Tiger to use, but the preferred way for tank crews since it was more
reliable.26 The Panthers were capable of engaging and successfully destroying the Soviet main
battle tank, the T-34, upwards of 1000 meters from the side, and 750 meters from the front. The
older Panzer IV model was only capable of knocking out a Soviet T-34 at 700 meters from the
side, and less than 100 meters from the front.27 This new change left the German high command
feeling optimistic about the attack, but it took longer to prepare for the initial offensive than what
they had planned. Therefore, the Werchmcaht was forced to reschedule the attack further back
from May 3rd in order to get the appropriate amount of supplies that they needed for the assault.28
Early March of 1943 was when the Red Army retook the town of Kursk. Realizing Kursk
was an important railroad hub, which was a main point of interest for the Soviets, General Erich
von Manstein moved south to capture Kharkov, and took a stand to stop the Soviet advance. A
heavy rainfall, followed by the muddy spring, would help General Manstein stop the Soviet
Advance.29 Both sides would have to stop due to the mud from the melting winter, and wait until
the ground solidified to start moving heavy vehicles. Manstein put up a stronghold in a small
town south of Kursk, and formed a 30-mile long perimeter along the eastern side of the town.
25

Klaus P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History. (Continuum, New York, 1995), 478.
Nicholas Moran, “Inside the Chieftain's Hatch: Panther. Part 3” (World of Tanks North America, August 4th,
2016), Accessed February 12th, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXYRQjzZZbk: 13:30-15:30.
27
Pier Paolo Battistelli, Panzer divisions, The Eastern Front, (Osprey Publishing, Oxford UK, 2008), pg 63-64
28
Quoted in: David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Strategy, 139-140.
29
While Kharkov is over 200 Kilometers away, it is also a major railroad hub supplying Ukraine and Eastern
Europe.
26

13

However, he carefully allowed an opening through his line, allowing Soviet forces to advance,
forming a bulge consisting of over five Red Army groups. 30 Later in 1943, during the several
month lull in the fighting, the German army would organize an attack that would involve the
largest mass of ground forces the world has ever seen.31
The first engagement at the railhead of Kursk started in 1941 shortly after “Operation
Barbarossa” initiated. According to the invasion plans, the Wehrmacht and other German units
invaded the Soviet Union across a several thousand mile wide front. Amongst this Nazi
juggernaut seemingly unimportant towns of Kursk and Orel were taken from the Soviet Union,
without much resistance. The two towns would prove to be a major supply route for the
Wehrmacht since they had major railheads that had access to several different parts to the Soviet
Union stretching from Leningrad through Moscow to Stalingrad. 32 The two towns, Orel and
Kursk, would remain in Nazi Occupation until 1943, when the Red Army managed to take them
back with little opposition from the Wehrmacht after the crushing defeat at Stalingrad. A sudden
pause in the fighting due to the winter and mud season starting in January of 1943 would give
both sides time to recuperate. This lull in fighting is when the German higher command chose to
attack Kursk.33
Kursk was the designated the main attack point due to a bulge in the front lines of the
Soviet army consisting of five Soviet Armies. The German objective at Kursk was to destroy the
five Soviet army groups in the bulge. The concept was to mimic what was witnessed from the
German perspective at Stalingrad and crush the Soviet army groups in the area. By capturing this
Peter Chen, Battle of Kursk: 4 Jul 1943 - 13 Jul 1943, (World War II Database, Online, April 25 th, 2005).
http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=40
31
M. Nikalaieff, The Red Army in the Second World War, (Russian Review, Vol. 7, Moscow, Autumn 1947) 54.
32
Ibid, 54.
33
M. Nikalaieff, The Red Army in the Second World War, (Russian Review, Vol. 7, Moscow, Autumn 1947), 54.
30

14

amount of men and armor, the German army would force the Soviets to redistribute their forces
across the front line. Ultimately thinning out all their man power, and allowing the Wehrmacht to
counter-attack on several fronts
to push back into the Soviet
Union.34
On July 5th, 1943 the
fighting commenced with the
German 9th army pushing
through the north near Orel, and
the Fourth Panzer army pushing
through the south near
Medvenskly. The attack from the
German side consisted of three
parts: There was the Army Group
Center, Second Army Group, and
Army Group South. Army Group
center was located north of
Kursk by about 50 miles. This
army group’s objective was to
use the town of Orel as a

34

Five Soviet Armies is roughly 500,000 men with the support or armor, transportation, and munitions.
Thomas Parish, S. I. Marshall, The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War Two, (Murray Printing Co, New
York, 1978), 549.

15

launching point, pass through Olkhovatka, crush the Soviet Defenses with the support of the
Luftwaffe, and make their way to Kursk. The Second Army Group was there as support for both
the Army Group Center and Army Group North. The attack forces’ reserves were also located in
the area, which consisted of the 7th Panzer army, along with several other detachments that had
been hastily put together. Finally, Army Group South was to use Kharkov as a launching point to
attack several smaller objectives, the 106 division was to go south and help the 320 division
attack Schehetzno, mostly as a diversion to try and confuse the Soviet Forces. In short, the
assault at the Kursk salient was a pincer movement spread over 60 miles, and targeting 5 Soviet
Army Groups. The main attack from the south was coming from the 4th Panzer army, the
167/168th infantry divisions, the 6th and 7th armored divisions, and the 3rd Panzer army35. The
Army group in the South had a main objective to get to open ground to allow for their tanks to
have total supremacy on the battlefield and full potential with the attack.36
Despite the meticulous planning, multiple issues immediately surfaced when the northern
German sector started their advance. The Red Army used civilian labor to assist in building and
strengthening fortifications and defensive structures around the bulge at Kursk, resulting in the
German offensive instantly colliding with resistance. The town at Olkhovatka had a well
defended ridge that overlooked the German advance as they attempted to take the town. These
fortifications made the area a killing zone. Soviet tank commanders already understood the
superiority of the German armor, to compensate for this some of the armor in the area was buried
in the dirt, only exposing their turret. This resulted in German tank commanders creeping slowly

35

Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945, (Perseus Book Group,
Cambridge MA, 2003), 198-199; See map for clarification.
36
Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 199

16

towards the entrenched enemy to take carefully placed shots. Ultimately slowing down the
German army, which only made about six miles of progress within the first day of fighting, when
they planned to make upwards of 20 miles.37
Since the German army delayed their attack, this allowed the Red Army to take defensive
actions. The Soviet forces were able to coordinate high concentrated artillery zones, machine gun
crossfires, minefields, and mortar zones. Over the course of two days, however, the Wehrmacht
would suffer over 25,000 casualties, and lose 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.38 This would
force them to go on the defensive to try and stop the Soviet counterattack.39 The operation in
charge of stopping the German advance in the Orel sector was called “Operation Kutuzov”. This
operation consisted of over a million Soviet soldiers defending the area, giving them a
superiority of more than two to one. Both German and Soviet commanders called this “the most
effective defense lines ever undertaken on the Eastern front.” Finally, a half million strong
reserve called, The Steppe-Front, was deployed in the rear, ready to counter-attack where the
German army might have pushed through. Despite the German army having superior weapons
and machines, the Soviet army was able to crush them with sheer numbers that the German army
could not fight against. No matter how well the German Army was able to fight, the Soviets put
up more than two times the amount of men and machines. The Red Army could afford to lose
massive amounts of men and machines, and still have a formidable fighting force to take on the
German Army with. 40

37

David M. Humpert, Swan Songs of the Panzers, (World War Two, Germany, February 2004), 9.
David M. Humpert, Swan Songs of the Panzers, 9.
39
Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. (Random House Co., New York City, 2005) 227-228
40
Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. 228.
38

17

Meanwhile in the South, a part of the German Fourth Panzer army demolished two lines
of Soviet defenses and was already ten miles ahead of their objective within the first 48 hours of
fighting.41 However, this victory was short-lived when the Luftwaffe stopped providing support.
Running low on aircraft, the bulk of the Luftwaffe present at Kursk was concentrated in the
northern sector, where the highest amount of resistance was being reported. Therefore, the entire
Fourth Panzers army in the Southern sector had to attack with minimal support from the
Luftwaffe. Additionally, the Southern army groups were short-handed on supplies and
machinery. As Erhard Raus, commander of the Armeeabteilung Kampf South sector put it: “Flak
units had a dual mission of fire support and air defense… operation [Zitadelle] was repeatedly
postponed. The reason given for this action was the fact that the new weapons (above all the
Panther and Tiger Battalions) would so reinforce our offensive power… [but we] received no
such weapons of units.”42 On top of the poorly equipped and supported German advance,
halfway to Kursk was a third line of defense. This was where the XLVIII Panzer Corps ran into a
high-density minefield, and an entire Soviet tank division which immobilized upwards of 36
panthers in one day.43 Shortly following the advance into the minefield, an intense and highly
concentrated artillery barrage crushed them, officially stopping the advance from the South. The
next few days of fighting, the German army would make little to no advancements. The German
army in the North would not push from their position outside of Olkhovatka, and would settle

41

Valery N. Zamulin, Could Germany Have Won the Battle of Kursk if it had Started in Late May or the Beginning
of June 1943? (The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Routledge, 2014).
42
Quoted in: Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945, (Perseus
Book Group, Cambridge MA, 2003), 200, 211.
43
Records are unclear during this stage of the battle, so it is impossible to tell exactly how many tanks were present
from the Soviet side.

18

down to try and fight off the Soviet defenses and counter-attacks. Meanwhile, the army groups in
the South would not be able to cross the Psel River.44
On July 7th and 8th, the Soviet high command attempted to counterattack the German
positions since they had now been bogged down in high density minefields, anti-tank ditches,
and various other traps that had been put into place. Leader of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Nikolai
Fyodorovich Vatutin, attempted to organize an attack on the 6th of July, but backed out of his plan
at the last minute since he had little respect for and confidence in his commanding officers. His
leadership was relatively new to the battlefield, and had never had extensive training with tanks.
Vatutin’s field command was not aware of the role that tanks could play, along with what they
were capable of doing. Additionally, the officers did not fully understand different logistics that
are needed when using tanks on the battlefield: terrain, weather, communications, fuel, and
overall room to operate the large vehicles. Due to this poor leadership, Vatutin’s decisions were
often described as “jittery” and not well thought out. The attack that was initially planned for the
6th of July was called off, however he was forced to attempt to counter-attack on the 7th, and
again on the 8th. The attempted spearhead of the German Southern Fourth Panzer army would
fail miserably when Vatutin’s field officers used tanks like soldiers, not accounting for speed,
mobility, and gasoline. This planning would leave their flanks wide open, and many unnecessary
casualties would take place throughout the southern flanks.45 The Fourth Panzer army would
soon be stopped outside the small town of Prokhorovka, when they ran into heavy Soviet
resistance: this set the stage for the largest armored battle in world history.

44

Valery N. Zamulin, Could Germany Have Won the Battle of Kursk if it had Started in Late May or the Beginning
of June 1943? (The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Routledge, 2014).
45
Valery N. Zamulin, The Battle of Kursk, New Findings, (The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Routledge, 2012).

19

With the sudden changes in the Soviet high command, the Prokhorovka sector of the
Kursk battlefield had been divided into several sectors, making it impossible to clearly command
in an organized fashion. With so many sectors dividing this particular area of the battlefield,
maps available did not show the position of the 1st Tank army. Therefore, an entire Guards Tank
army and the 6th Guards army were heading directly for the Fourth Panzer army right outside the
seemingly insignificant town of Prokhorovka.46 As Panzer commander Hermann Hoth wrote in
his autobiography: “What I saw left me speechless. From beyond the shallow rise in front of me
appeared fifteen, then thirty, then forty tanks. Finally there were too many to count. The T-34s
were rolling forward toward us at high speed, carrying mounted infantry.”47 This monumental
clash of armor was a result of German commander Hoth trying to avoid the 1st Royal Guard Tank
army, hearing reports of heavy resistance from his XLVIII Panzer Corps outside Prokhorovka.
Additionally, Hoth was honored with commanding a prestigious heavy tank unit composed of
several Tiger 1s. However, with this honor comes numerous issues, such as building and crossing
bridges. The bridge building equipment Hoth had at his disposal could not support the weight of
the lumbering 63 ton Tiger.48 This resulted in Hoth using established railroad bridges to cross
rivers and gullies due to the inability for him to build his own, forcing him to follow a railroad
bridge that ran through the town of Prokhorovka. Expecting this decision, the Red Army
responded by sending in the Steppe Front, which consisted of 616 tanks, to guard the bridges and
rail lines. This turn of events would later be called “the most fateful decision of the Eastern
Front.”49

46

Valery N. Zamulin, The Battle of Kursk, New Findings.
Lloyd Clark, Kursk The Greatest Battle, (Headline Review, Buckingham, May 24th, 2012), 47.
48
Michael Spilling, Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, United Kingdom, 2005), 105.
49
Quoted in: David M. Humpert, Swan Songs of the Panzers, (World War Two, Germany, February 2004), 11.
47

20

This particular battlefield around the town of Prokhorovka would see some of the most
ferocious and desperate fighting of the Second World War. T-34 tank commander Vasili
Bryukhov recalls this in his interview with historian Lloyd Clark:
The distance between the tanks was below 100 meters—it was impossible to
maneuver a tank, one could just jerk it back and forth a bit. It wasn’t a battle; it was a
slaughterhouse of tanks. We crawled back and forth and fired. Everything was burning.
An indescribable stench hung in the air over the battlefield. Everything was enveloped in
smoke, dust and fire, so it looked as if it was twilight… tanks were burning, trucks were
burning.50
Tanks were smashing into each other, trucks were burning, soldiers were screaming, the smoke
was so thick from the fighting that the sun was blocked out making it even harder to see and
maneuver. Adding to the chaos, Red Army armored units were instructed to ram German
vehicles if they depleted ammo or lost too many crew members to operate. If they survived the
collision, they would evacuate and continue the fighting on foot.
With the chaos and poor visibility taking its toll on the tankers in the area, intelligence
operatives made their way to the Red Army headquarters and reported a large number of
valuable Tigers on the battlefield. It was common amongst the Red Army to mistake the Panzer
IV “special” as the Tiger. The “Special” is a slight variation of the traditional Panzer IV that
incorporates the addition of metal side skirts. This resulted in Red Army tankers to utilize
different tactics, such as closing the gap to get as close as possible to the superior Tigers. This
was intended to close the distance between the tanks to out maneuver the superior tiger, however
with so many armored units on the battlefield, it resulted in even more confusion. Furthermore,
additional armored units were released to the area, once the T-34’s cleared Hill 252.2, they

50

Quoted in: Lloyd Clark, Kursk The Greatest Battle, (Headline Review, Buckingham, May 24th, 2012) 52-53.

21

quickly came down the other side and right into their own fourteen-foot deep anti-tank ditch.51
Tanks went headlong into the ditch and combust into flames, adding to the lack of visibility and
confusion. Other tank crews tried turning to avoid the ditch resulting in colliding into other
Soviet units due to the difficult
steering mechanism within T34s.
Amongst the confusion, the Second SS
Panzer Corps continued to sit back and
knock out over 180 additional Soviet
tanks. The fighting would continue,
but with the Soviets losing around 334
tanks over the course of a few hours,
the Red Army had to call off the
attack. leaving the Germans victorious
for the first night.52
The Soviet counter attacks
started on July 11th. There were two
fronts to these attacks, the north code
named “Operation Kutuzov” and south
code named “Operation Rumyantsev”. Soviet commanders in charge understood that attacking
too late would result in the German army cutting their losses, and either retreating, or reinforcing

51

Hill 252.2 was seen as strategically important because it was a hilltop less than a mile away from the town of
Prokhorovka, and the German army managed to capture it on July 11th.
52
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 225.

22

and counter-attacking the Soviets.53 The counter attack operations would be a monumental
success due to exceptional timing, and overall German mechanical failure. The objective of
“Operation Kutuzov” was to attack just north of the Orel salient. This area was a low-action area,
and the German army was still trying to launch their assault against Kursk. Since the German
army was focused on the attack, the area immediately north of Orel was terribly supplied. On
paper, a 30-mile stretch with continuous troops and strong points was, in reality, several strong
points connected by routine patrols.54 The troops in this area consisted of 14 ragged infantry
divisions who were exhausted or replacements with little experience, and only one panzer army.
This was an ideal location for the Soviets to attack.
“Operation Rumyantsev” was very dependent on the outcome at the battle at
Prokhorovka. This battle had the vast majority of the Soviet tankers occupied. After the fighting,
on July 11th, the Soviet counter-attack would start. The Soviet Strategy around Kursk was for the
Soviets to take the first hit and exhaust the Germans forces. Which is exactly what happened,
once the German forces were halted, then the counter attack would commence. It was a two part
strategy, that required trust in the Soviets ability to take the main frontal assault of the German
advance. Starting at the closing of Prokhorovka, fresh Red Army troops would be poured into
both the northern and southern sections of the Kursk battlefields. At approximately 3:30am on
July 11th, the Soviets unleashed a terrifying and high concentrated artillery barrage that was “the
heaviest and best coordinated [artillery barrage] in the history of the Eastern front.” Two and
half-hours later, at approximately 6:00am, the Soviet attack began. An all out assault on several
fronts throughout the German line caught the Werchmanct completely off guard. However, in the

53
54

Ibid, 226.
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 227.

23

Northern sector German General Lothar Rendulic tied up the Soviet attack advance, and by the
end of the first day the Red Army only advanced six miles: “Making [the Soviets] pay yard by
yard for its gains.” Additionally, the Russian tankers in the north were equipped with KV2 tanks.
A prewar design that was terribly obsolete; however had over three inches of armor that was
impermeable to guns smaller than three inches. These tanks would help the advance, but since
they moved slow, and had a large profile, they were easy targets for anti-tank gunners and
German spotters. By the end of the first day of the advance, the Soviets lost over sixty tanks.55
The next day would also go in the favor of the German Army. On July 11th the skies were
covered with clouds and strong winds, making dive-bombing runs useless, due to low visibility.
On the 12th, the weather cleared and the Luftwaffe would start sorties on known Soviet positions.
However, with the German army losing the vast majority of their tankers in the south near
Prokhorovka, the Luftwaffe was occupied helping the remainder of the German forces retreat. In
the north, the few Luftwaffe remaining would do their best to help the Germans. These bombing
runs would help the Germans by blocking roads, slowing down the Soviet advances, and
separating the Red Army Air Corps from ground units they were protecting.56
By July 13th, General Otto Moritz Model of the German army would officially call off the
assault at Kursk, and would change to a defensive approach. This defensive change would call
for all available German infantry and tankers to draw back from every front. During this retreat,
poor weather conditions and even worse repair facilities would prove to be hindersome.
Extremely dry and dusty roads made the air virtually unbreathable, and visibility at a minimum.
Additionally, the dust would make communications difficult, and more than half of the tanks that

55
56

Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 228-230.
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 230.

24

would be involved in this retreat would get lost and end up in a different location than they were
assigned too.
Additionally, along with the poor visibility and communication, new tanks in the German
army were plagued with mechanical issues. Several months previously, the German army waited
to reinforce their troops and tankers with the new Panzer V “Panther”. However these new
Panthers experienced transmission failures, optic issues, and radio failures making the retreat
next to impossible to execute properly.57 Typically, the German army had forward and rear
recovery and breakdown units, however since so many tanks failed and were involved with the
battle, most of the recovery units had been wiped out or dispersed across several divisions.
Therefore, workers from tank factories in Germany would be called up to the front lines to be
mechanics. On top of the lack of spare parts and welding equipment, the mechanics would work
under battle conditions, often under small arms fire and highly stressful conditions, something
they were not used to in the factories. With inexperienced mechanics working on broken
vehicles, the retreat would slow down to nearly a halt. In one night, due to the lack of proper
equipment, the 29th Tank corps was only able to repair four of its 55 knocked out tanks and
assault guns.58
Despite the Red Army gaining ground and taking victories, Stalin was not impressed with
the performance at Kursk. With forces and supplies being poured into the sector for months,
Stalin had expected some sort of major breakthrough. Additionally, reports from the front were
misleading to Stalin, giving him a strong misconception on how the fighting was going. In one
report from Soviet tankers, 33 Tiger tanks would be knocked out in a day; this would be more

57
58

Ibid, 232.
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 235-241.

25

than the entire Army group center could field by July 10th. These reports would be used to hide
the struggle that the Soviet Union was going through. In all, with pressure coming from the very
top of the Soviet command, General Zhukov ordered an energetic counterattack to keep the
Germans off balance. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring would send in a report to Hitler by the end
of July 12th. In his message, he would report, “The Situation is hopeless” and would request a
tactical withdrawal. Hitler responded by sending in the 29th Panzer Grenadier to Kesselring, and
would practically leave the Reich’s panzers reserves empty across all fronts. Germany was being
stretched to its maximum breaking point.59
All reports from Kursk reported that they were holding, but desperately needed
reinforcements to hold off the Red Army. Unable to send these reinforcements, the remainder of
any units available were sent north, to protect the Orel sector, but Army groups Center and South
both had crumbling fronts. The reserves sent to the Orel sector would be used and relied on so
heavily that any success against the Soviets would result in them being instantly withdrawn, and
reassigned to other sectors to deal with the advancing Soviet forces.
By 8:00am on July 13th, the final Russian advance would commence. By this time, the
last of the heavy panzers in the Prokhorovka sector would be either bogged down or disabled.
Additionally, throughout the entire night of the 12th, Red Army air support and artillery was
nonstop and spread throughout the entirety of German lines. In a desperate attempt to stop the
Soviet advance, Hitler would issue a direct attack order to an SS group in the Orel sector; but
their commander declared himself “unwilling to order full-scale attack without appropriate

59

Ibid, 235-240.

26

preparation and air support,” a report that was unheard of from an SS unit. The men in this area
were exhausted, under-supplied, and needed a break from 11 days of constant fighting.60
By the end of the 13th, the northern sector managed to muster together sixty-two tanks,
including around six Tigers. Meanwhile, near Prokhorovka the entire III panzer Corps was no
were to be seen, and the 10th SS Tank Corps was stuck in the middle of a high density minefield,
where they were receiving heavy artillery and small arms fire. During the morning of the 14th, the
Soviets would utilize their Katyusha multiple rocket launchers to deliver a massive and
devastating attack on the newly regrouped XLVIII Panzer Corps. The XLVIII Panzer Corps
would attempt to counterattack, but would fail terribly. All that would remain in the north sector
of the Kursk battlefields would be the 3rd Panzer Corps, a spent force composed of exhausted
troops, and a small handful of operational panthers. By the end of the 14th day, both sides had
taken extensive losses. The Soviets lost roughly 2,000 tanks and other fighting vehicles while
defending against “Operation Citadel”. Even for the Soviet Union, losing roughly 5,000 tanks
over the timespan of two week cannot be sustained. However, these losses were subsided with
the aid of the Lend Lease Act. With new and unused American trucks, along with a handful of
British and American armor present, the Red Army was able to send in other allied supplies. This
would allow them to keep moving when the German army started to withdraw from the area. The
Wehrmacht on the other hand lost roughly 3,000 tanks, and had little to no repair facilities or
spare parts. The 14th day would be the last day the German army put up a formidable offensive,
and they commenced a tactical withdrawal from that point on in the sector.61

Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 245.
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 92-248.

60
61

27

The Battle of Kursk would solidify that the Soviet Army was capable of winning the war
through sheer numbers and production rates, but were losing the battle in technological
advancements. While the T-34 and KV series could be mass-produced, they were obsolete. They
were terribly outgunned by the Tiger and Panther tanks, and their standard velocity 76mm main
guns were proving to be ineffective against most German armored units unless at suicidal short
ranges. However, at such short distances the protective armor of the KV1, KV2, and T-34 proved
to be nearly useless against the Tiger and Panthers main high velocity armament.62 The Soviet
Union would respond to the heavy losses from the battle, by developing numerous other armored
units that would be used for the remainder of the war to deal with the more advanced German
armor. Such examples of improved Soviet armor include: T34/85, IS1, IS2, SU85, SU152, and
numerous others.
After analyzing the data, stories, and multiple different accounts that have been gathered,
there are several main reasons for the direct downfall of the German army around “Operation
Zitadelle”. The most interesting part of the multiple different issues that are presented in this
debate is the fact that they are all interconnected in some way. The overarching theme as to why
the German army failed was due to their lack of ability to mobilize their troops and forces
quickly during the organization process in the few months leading up to the attack. In the time it
took for the German army to mobilize, organize, and reinforce, the Soviet Union was able to
field over twice the number of men and machines that Germany was able to. Going into the

62

Ibid, 94.

28

battle, the Germans faced manpower disadvantages as high as 5:1. The delay in the attack had
turned the outcome of the battle in the hands of the Soviets before it even began.63
The second cause of the German defeat was the intelligence operations that the
Wehrmacht attempted to carry out in the vicinity. The Luftwaffe carried out several sorties a day,
all in the Kursk salient, to try and get an accurate estimate of the amount of Soviet strength that
was present in the area. Not only would the low flying reconnaissance aircraft illustrate where
the attack was going to take place, but also the Soviets were also able to reinforce areas that
Luftwaffe was focusing on. Interestingly, one of the most convincing pieces of evidence for the
Soviet Union illustrating where the attack would commence was an abnormally large shipment
of Schnapps to the Kursk salient. The German army resulted in utilizing alcohol as an
antidepressant, and in some cases, a pain killer for wounded soldiers.64 Also, alcohol was used
extensively throughout the Eastern front for both sides as a way for soldiers to settle nerves
before and after battles. Once the Soviet Union discovered this large shipment of peach Schnapps
to the soldiers stationed outside Kursk, the Red Army was able to pinpoint Kursk. As Soviet
journalist Vasily Grossman wrote in his notes: “The major German summer offensive,
“Operation Zitadelle”, as it was called, probably achieved less surprise than any other offensive
in the whole war.”65
The third cause of the German defeat at Kursk was the size of the armies present at the
battle. The German army was able to put together 625,271 combat troops, 2,699 armored
vehicles, 9,467 artillery units of all types, and 1,372 aircraft. Soviet military muscle would dwarf

63

Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 337.
64
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013), 242.
65
Antony Beevor, A Writer at War. (Random House Co., New York City, 2005) 227-228.

29

these numbers. The Red Army was able to field 1,987,463 combat troops, 8,200 armored
vehicles, 47,416 artillery units of all types, and 5,965 aircraft. Additionally, the Soviet high
command had little respect for human life, and would send waves of troops and armor towards
certain death to purely overwhelm the enemy. 66 While the Soviet Union was able to make up for
these losses, this was not something Germany was able to replace with ease. Already struggling
to keep their forces well fed and supplied, losing this many vehicles and men within such a short
amount of time would prove to be devastating to the Werchmacht. Furthermore, by 1942 the
Soviet Union was able to produce 2000 tanks and 3000 aircraft per month for the Red Army.
Numbers that Germany would never come close too. From 1936-1945 Germany was only able to
produce 1,347 Tiger 1 tanks, and only 8,553 Panzer IVs.67
Despite the crushing defeat at Kursk, this did not crush the morale of the men fighting for
the German army. With the Soviet Union now threatening to invade their home territory, fighting
would be fiercer than ever. Diehard SS units would fight to the last man, and the German army
would pick up a new scorched earth policy to try and stop or slow down the Soviets at all costs.
An overall fear from German men would add to the sheer ferocity of the fighting. When the
Germans first invaded the Soviet Union during “Operation Barbarossa”, the atrocities committed
against the Soviet, Ukraine, Belarusian, and other people would shake the world, and, with the
Red Army advance back into Germany, it was time for the Soviets to take their vengeance
against the Germans.

66

Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg, Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington,
2011), 343.
67
Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. (Pearson Longman, London England, 1997), 478.

30

Finally, the Nazi collapse at Kursk would demolish the reputation of the fierce
Juggernaut. The once mighty and seemingly unstoppable German army was defeated twice in
less than a year, Stalingrad, and Kursk. Shortly following the Battle of Stalingrad, the reputation
of the German war machine was still high due to their still massive amount of firepower and
availability throughout the Eastern Front. After the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet Army would be at
the gates of Berlin less than two years later.
In all, the Battle of Kursk would be the last of large-scale armored offensives from the
German Army on the Eastern front. In the aftermath of the battle of Stalingrad, which most
historians pinpoint as the most influential and important clash of the Eastern Front, the Battle of
Kursk would break the mechanized portion of the Wehrmacht. Stalingrad, while undoubtedly
crucial to the war, cannot be deemed as more influential or decisive as the Battle of Kursk. The
amount of material and manpower that the German army lost in and around Kursk would be
irreplaceable, and the sheer Soviet military muscle would prove to be too much for the German
army to handle. Historian Howard Grier solidifies this claim in his 2014 article, The Eastern
Front in World War II:
The Wehrmacht’s last chance was the Kursk offensive in the summer of 1943, but
the Red Army turned the tide for good at the colossal tank battle at Prokhorovka.
Following Kursk, Hitler’s refusal to permit retreats and to allow German generals to
conduct a flexible defense, coupled with the Soviets’ inexhaustible supply of men and
materiel, doomed Germany. The Russians slowly but surely, although rather
incompetently, pounded their way to Berlin.68
Through Nazi Germany’s sluggish movement through a series of decisions to try and
reinforce their troops, they actually ended up sealing their fate when they tried taking on the

68

Grier, Howard D. “The Eastern Front in World War II.” European History Quarterly 44, no. 1 (January 2014):
103–12.

31

entirety of the Soviet forces located at the Kursk salient. The delay in the attack would allow the
Soviet army to reinforce their positions, and at the same allow the Soviets to gather vital
intelligence that would help them to defeat the German army located at the Kursk Salient.
Shortly after the initial attack countless mechanical failures within the mechanized corps would
arise and field mechanics would be needed at rates that were never seen before. Since many of
the Wehrmacht mechanics and recovery teams were killed in action or being pulled to numerous
fronts, the Wehrmacht would have to bring in workers from tank factories in Germany. These
workers were inexperienced and not trained for military fieldwork, and also further hindered tank
development and production. An overall lack for spare parts and welding materials also made
field repairs slow and nearly impossible.
The overall sloppiness of the Wehrmacht with their reconnaissance missions, and radio
silence leading up to the battle would allow the Soviet military to have easy access to dates,
times and locations where the attack was preparing to be. This would allow the Red Army to be
prepared for German attacks, and have the ability stockpile supplies and defensive fortifications
around the Kursk salient. The amount of machines and manpower the Soviet Army put on the
battlefield would horribly outnumber anything that the German army was able to produce.
Despite the German army having superior weapons, the amount of material the Soviets were able
to field against the Germans would prove to be too overwhelming. However, since the German
materials and machines were of higher quality, the Soviets still took heavy losses. So many
losses were reported at Kursk that even Stalin would be alarmed. However, unlike the German
army, the Soviet Union was able to replace the units that were lost with relative ease. The
number of machines and men lost for Germany would forever break the spine of the Wehrmacht

32

mechanized divisions. And due to the low production numbers, high cost and high material
usage, the machines would not be replaced with ease when compared to the Soviet Union.
During the attack, and following the attack, the panzer reserves of Germany would be at
dangerously low levels, often leaving the bare minimal or no reserves at all. The Battle of Kursk
would be the Second World War’s turning point because it would destroy the Panzer power of
Nazi Germany.

33

CHAPTER TWO:
KURSK IN MEMORY AND MIND: MONUMENTATION, SPEECHES, MOVIES, AND
POPULAR CULTURE
Historical memory can be tied back to multiple aspects of daily life for distinctive parts
of society. Stalingrad and Kursk had colossal effects on the Russian population, however Kursk
was woefully overshadowed by Stalingrad in terms of memorials and historical memory.
Throughout this thesis, the argument is being made that the battle of Kursk is more influential on
the Eastern front than the battle of Stalingrad. This claim can be verified when looking at the
numbers of men and machines lost during Kursk and Stalingrad, along with the morale of the
Wehrmacht soldiers. Despite the crushing defeat at Kursk, scholars and society alike have kept
the sentiment that Stalingrad is more influential in helping win World War Two. As society
progresses, more memorials, ceremonies, and writings have continued to proliferate this false
narrative of Stalingrad winning out over Kursk.
For instance, the most recent event deals in the naming of Volgograd. In 1962, the city of
Stalingrad had its name altered to Volgograd when former Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita
Khrushchev, “fought” against the “Stalin cult.”1 Khrushchev wanted to dismantle the old
dictator’s memory, so he demanded that any city name with links to Stalin were to be wiped
away. Khrushchev spent over six months at Stalingrad viciously fighting the Nazi army during
World War Two, and helped to squash them under the force of the Soviet military. Local
1

Lloyd Clark, Kursk, 49.

authorities tried to explain to him that residents did not look upon the city’s name as a memorial
to Stalin, but saw it as a symbol of victory and the state’s power. However Khrushchev could not
be persuaded, and in 1962 Volgograd first appeared on the map.2
In 2013, the leader of the Volgograd Oblast Duma, Vladimir Efimov, allowed for a law
to be passed in the city of Volgograd by “request of the
veterans.”3 It stated that the city of Volgograd would change
its name to the older name from the time of the Soviet
Union— Stalingrad. Officially, the city will be called “The
Hero City of Stalingrad” on several dates: February 2, the
day the Soviet army defeated the Nazi troops in the Battle
of Stalingrad: May 9, also known as Victory Day across
Russia; June 22, a Day of “Remembrance and Sorrow,”
dedicated to those who lost their lives at the Battle of
Stalingrad; September 2, to remember the war itself;
August 23, a day dedicated to the memory of the victims
as a result of the massive bombardment of Stalingrad by the Luftwaffe; and finally on November
19, the day that marks the beginning of the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. Kursk has no
such name change, as the name remains. Moreover, Kursk’s memorial landscape is still as it was
before the war, a quiet farming town in the middle of the Russian countryside.4

2

Oksana Zagrebnyeva, “Volgograd: what’s in a name?”, Open Democracy and Beyond Russia, April 12th, 2011.
Accessed Oct. 5th, 2017.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/oksana-zagrebnyeva/volgograd-what%E2%80%99s-in-name
3
Society News, In days of celebrations dedicated to military memorable dates, Volgograd will be called Stalingrad,
Interfax Russia. January 31st, 2013. Accessed on Oct. 5th, 2017.
http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/news.asp?id=377730&sec=1671
4
Society News, In days of celebrations dedicated to military memorable dates, Volgograd will be called Stalingrad,
Interfax Russia. January 31st, 2013. Oct. 12th, 2017.
http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/news.asp?id=377730&sec=1671

35

In the central most area of Stalingrad is a place called The Mamayev Kurgan that
brandishes the “Motherland Calls” statue (figure 2).5 During the Battle of Stalingrad, this was the
highest point of the city. As a result, whichever army occupied this territory would control the
entire battlefield. It had been the scene of some of the most ferocious fighting, where bodies
could be found stacked several men deep. Consequently, memorialization of the fighting that
took place at this spot in Stalingrad, the statue “The Motherland Calls” was erected. Standing at
an impressive 52 meters tall, with a nine meter stainless steel sword, and weighing in at eight
thousand tons of this representation, “Mother Russia,” is visible from most places throughout the
city. When it was first built, it was the largest free standing sculpture in the world.6 Additionally,
to pay their respects, it is a tradition that newly-weds visit these historic places after the marriage
ceremony to lay flowers at the monuments. Newspaper journalist Oksana Zagrebnyeva discussed
the statue in an article, and writes about the years following World War Two, which was
interpreted as a way to respect relatives who were lost in the fighting. As the generations passed,
visitors are honoring the tradition.7
Another memorial in Stalingrad is the Pavlov House. During the battle, Sergeant Yakov
Pavlov and two other men were sent to secure the building. Due to its location, the house served
as a great observation post to overlook a wide stretch of Volga River. During this stage during the
battle of Stalingrad, this was crucial since the Soviet Union needed to send fresh troops across
the Volga River in order to stay in the city. However, when Pavlov arrived he found wounded
soldiers and civilians. The Sergeant realized that they could be overrun at any moment, so he

This literally means Mamai’s burial ground, due to the amount of soldiers that died in the fighting.
Anton Denisenko, “Mamayev Kurgan - Soviet World War II Memorial”, The Polynational War Memorial.
Accessed Oct. 20th, 2017. http://www.war-memorial.net/Mamayev-Kurgan---Soviet-World-War-II-Memorial--1.93
7
Oksana Zagrebnyeva, “Volgograd: what’s in a name?”, Open Democracy and Beyond Russia, April 12th, 2011.
Accessed Oct. 5th, 2017.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/oksana-zagrebnyeva/volgograd-what%E2%80%99s-in-name
5
6

36

asked for reinforcements but only received around 24 men.8 Those 24 men were credited with
taking the house, and held it from September 27th to November 25th when they were relieved by a
Soviet counter attack.9 It was rumored that these 24 men took more German lives in the duration
of their battle than the Germans lost during the entire campaign to take over France. While it is
unclear how many men were in the building, and also debatable what the casualty rate for
Germany truly was, it is still a powerful symbol left standing for the world to see. This landmark
cost the lives of hundreds of Germans, and grew to symbolize the struggle of the Soviet Union at
the time of the battle won by a handful of ill-equipped Soviets that dug in for a stubborn and
brawling fight against a superior and well-organized Nazi. The remainders of the house are still
standing, with the phrase “In this building fused together heroic feats of warfare and of labor. We
will defend / rebuild you, dear Stalingrad!”10
The flour mill at
Volgograd is one of the final
buildings that reminds the
public of the fighting that took
place in Stalingrad (Figure 4).
The mill did not play a
significant role in the battle,
however it was left alone to
serve as a remembrance for “the day the fighting stopped.” The building was left as a memorial
to elucidate, if not remind the public of the horrors of war at Stalingrad.11
8

Zinaida Andreeva, “The Pavlov House”. May 8th, 2013. Accssed: Oct. 5th, 2017. https://on.rt.com/22hqk3
It is hard to justify this claim, but this is what the Red Army claimed after the battle took place.
10
Zinaida Andreeva, “The Pavlov House”, May 8th, 2013. https://on.rt.com/22hqk3
11
Mikhail Shuvarikov, “The Flour Mill at Stalingrad”, Stalingrad Heritage.
http://www.stalingradheritage.com/flour-mill/4587503156
9

37

The monuments at Kursk are dramatically different and pale in comparison to Stalingrad.
It is worth mentioning when one simply refers to a search engine with the keyword “Kursk
Monument” the results are more about the K-141 Oscar II class submarine that suffered a terrible
accident while at sea, known as Kursk.12 This may be interpreted as the memorial landscape in
this region has been neglected. It becomes more crystallized when one takes a look at the number
of memorials at Kursk, or lack thereof; they are fewer and are not nearly as extravagant as at
Volgograd. Indeed, it took as long as 1995, nearly 50 years after the battle, for a monument to be
erected in remembrance of this battle. In 1995, the memorial was revealed at the battle site of
Prokhorovka, where the largest clash of men and vehicles took place. Furthermore, the
monuments are not as impressive as the one surrounding the battlefield of Stalingrad.
The centerpiece of the Kursk memorial is “the monument to Soviet tank crews at
Prokhorovka field after
the tank Battle of
Kursk.” The “tank
statue” features a Tiger
being crushed by two
T-34 (figure 5). A
powerful image that
depicts what tankers had
to do in order to try and stay one step ahead of the enemy. If a Soviet tanker lost their crew,
depleted ammunition, or if their tank was on the verge of malfunctioning where it could not be
used anymore, they were ordered to ram their tanks into the Nazi tanks, with the hopes of

12

The Oscar II class Submarine “Kursk” is indeed named after the battle of Kursk.

38

knocking out one more Nazi armored unit. This memorial indeed accurately depicts the chaos
that ensued during the battle.13
Near to the tank memorial is the victory bell. A bell tower that holds a golden bell at the
top, and stands roughly 50 meters tall; additionally, there is a church and a mass grave
surrounding the bell. These structures are all in memory of the lives that were taken during the
Battle of Kursk.14
Surrounding the area are various vehicles from the Red Army. However, many of these
vehicles never saw combat in Kursk. There is representation of a Katyusha rocket launching
truck, and several SU series tank destroyers which would have been present at Kursk. However,
many of the tanks that were at the battlefield are JS-II and JS-III, which were produced later and
after the battle. (figure 6).15
There are also several armored personnel carriers and small scout vehicles that were
produced years after World War Two. The tanks that the Russian government chose to put on
display at the Kursk monument, where the largest tank battle the world has ever seen, and where
several hundred thousand men lost their lives, are not even vehicles that are from World War
Two or the Battle of Kursk itself.16 The last part of the Kursk memorial has an element of
tourism— visitors can still see the exposed trenches left from the battle, and also be offered to
take Red Army vehicle rides. After paying a fee, riders traverse the landscape (although these
were not even used at the Battle of Kursk, but rather the Cold War) and then see the few trenches
that were left untouched and exposed for the onlooker. With all things considered, from the
13

Adam Jones, “The Memorial at Prokhorovka”, European Sites of Remembrance. 2008.
https://www.memorialmuseums.org/eng/denkmaeler/view/1505/Memorial-to-the-Battle-of-Kursk
14
Adam Jones, “The Memorial at Prokhorovka”, European Sites of Remembrance. 2008. Accessed Sept. 5th, 2017.
https://www.memorialmuseums.org/eng/denkmaeler/view/1505/Memorial-to-the-Battle-of-Kursk
15
Steven Zaloga, Armored Champions: The Top Tanks of World War II (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
2015) 98-101.
16
Adam Jones, “The Memorial at Prokhorovka”, European Sites of Remembrance. 2008.

39

dearth in Kursk monumentation, coupled with some inaccuracies in interpretation at this site, it is
a travesty if not an indictment on the public history perception of the Battle of Kursk. 17
One of the most notable aspects of Russian historical memory are the yearly parades that
the military demonstrates in Red Square. Russia is not afraid to show off the military strength or
history of the Soviet Union. When examining the military parades and remembrance parades
there are a few that have distinguished themselves over others. Every year, on May 9th, the
Victory Day Parade is held. This is to celebrate and remember the Great Patriotic War.18
Additionally, Russia has several parts of this parade dedicated to veterans who can walk or ride
through the parade, along with the display of old military equipment that saw service in the
war.19
On the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, the entire military parade was moved
from Red Square to Volgograd. There was a special speech and memorial dedicated to the
fighting that took place. As these parades continue to be displayed year after year, less and less
veterans from “The Great Patriotic War” are alive to honor. During these parades, veterans from
the Battle of Stalingrad are remembered in a special section of the parades, meanwhile there is
no special area for the Kursk veterans to walk.20
When researching Kursk, the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversary of the battle went by with
little to no remembrance in parades, let alone memorials that were dedicated. Russian President
Vladimir Putin delivered a speech during the 60th anniversary, but as the 70th anniversary and
unveiling of the new museum at Prokhorovka came and went with little fanfare, Putin and the
17

This was discovered while exploring the Kursk Battlefield and the memorial site on “GoogleMaps”.
The Great Patriotic War is how the Russians and Soviets reference what Americans or British people call
World War Two.
19
Oksana Zagrebnyeva, “Volgograd: what’s in a name?”, Open Democracy and Beyond Russia, April 12th, 2011.
Accessed Oct. 5th, 2017.
20
Jennifer Wade, “Russia Remembers Stalingrad 70 Years on”, thejournal.ie, accessed on August 20th, 2017.
http://www.thejournal.ie/russia-remembers-stalingrad-70-years-on-780317-Feb2013/
18

40

general public of Russia expressed little interest. There were no speeches delivered, and no
parades assembled to celebrate the victory at the battle of Kursk. Oftentimes, the veterans who
fought at Kursk get assimilated with other veterans from every other battle during World War
Two; indeed, there is no honoring in any way like the veterans from Stalingrad receive.
Russian and America choose to remember the events at Kursk and Stalingrad through
different means of popular culture as well. Over the years, many movies have been made about
the fighting that took place in Stalingrad. There have been three different versions of the movie
Stalingrad in the past 20 years. Additionally, Jude Law’s 2001 movie Enemy at the Gates is an
American movie depicting the story of “The Hero of Stalingrad,” Sniper Vasily Zaytsev. These
are just a few examples given; many other movies have been produced about Stalingrad both
from Russian film teams, and American film teams dating as early as 1943, a few months after
the battle was over. 21 Even in the United States, where American civilians were not directly
affected by the battle, American film directors choose to make numerous movies about the Battle
of Stalingrad, and nothing about the Battle of Kursk. One movie was discovered to be in the
process of being made, and it is not about the Battle of Kursk, but the submarine disaster from
the year 2000. This helps demonstrate that the Russian population believe that the submarine
disaster is more important to remember than the battle itself. There has not been one movie about
the Battle of Kursk nor the surrounding area.
Another way that popular culture in America keeps the Battle of Stalingrad alive is
through numerous video games. Games like: Call of Duty: United Offensive, Red Orchestra, and
Company of Heroes 2 all have specific levels and challenges that surround the Battle of
Stalingrad or Kursk. These video games carry memory differently than the movies (Figure 7).

21

Graffy, Julian. 2001. "Stand until death." Sight & Sound 11, no. 4: 28-30. Academic Search Ultimate,
EBSCOhost (accessed September 26, 2017).

41

The video games have different challenges affiliated with both battles of Kursk and Stalingrad.
Even more so, they have somewhat accurate depictions of them. When in Stalingrad, the player
is depicted as a young Soviet
man, usually based on a
non-fictional character, such as
the famous and aforementioned
sniper, Vasily Zaytsev. When
the player reaches a level on
Kursk, the player is with a tank
crew, trying to take various
objectives like train stations or fighting off German counter attacks. In Call of Duty: United
Offensive the player of the game is a young tanker at Kursk, and the player's commanding officer
gives a small speech that the Battle of Prokhorovka is going to be the battle to break the back of
the German war machine.22
Speeches collected from the Kremlin website are the most solidifying factor in helping
prove the point that Kursk was the ultimate turning point during World War Two. The current
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, has given many speeches during his time in office since
2000, and has made numerous powerful claims regarding both battles at Kursk and Stalingrad. In
2015 Vladimir Putin delivered a speech to remember the fighting and sacrifices that were made
during World War Two. Putin described the horrors of the war, and credits several battles for the
victory of the war:
The Soviet Union bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks… And all major decisive
battles of World War II, in terms of military power and equipment involved, had
been waged there…. These parade ranks include grandsons and great-grandsons
22

Interview and quotes pulled by author. January, 2016. Arcadia University.

42

of the war generation. The Victory Day is our common holiday. The Great
Patriotic War was in fact the battle for the future of the entire humanity… They
worked till exhaustion, at the limit of human capacity. They fought even unto
death. They proved the example of honour and true patriotism. We pay tribute
to all those who fought to the bitter for every street, every house and every
frontier of our Motherland. We bow to those who perished in severe battles near
Moscow and Stalingrad, at the Kursk Bulge and on the Dnieper. 23
President Putin did an excellent job giving credit where it was needed. He did not make
the claim that Stalingrad was the turning point; he made effort to remember the fighting that took
place in other locations such as Kursk and even the Dnieper. Additionally, Putin thanked all the
other nations of the world that helped the Soviet Union defeat the Nazi war machine: “We are
grateful to the peoples of Great Britain, France and the United States of America for their
contribution to the victory. We are thankful to the anti-fascists of various countries who selflessly
fought the enemy as guerrillas and members of the underground resistance, including in
Germany itself.” 24 The historical memory of the Second World War is changing with Putin.
During the time of the Cold War the Soviet Union never credited the United States with helping
bring down the Nazi war machine. In the same speech that Putin gave in 2015, he recognized the
fighting that took place in other important and often forgotten battles. Putin also gave credit to
the victory of World War Two to other “Anti-Fascist” countries like Great Britain, the United
States, and German partisans who helped to bring down the Nazi Reich. Historical memory has
begun to transform over time.
Putin gave speeches around Russia to remember the 60th and 70th anniversary of multiple
battles that took place. He spoke in two main places: Volgograd and Kursk. While he did not
give a speech at Kursk during the 70th anniversary, he made an appearance and delivered a

Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. May 9th, 2015, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number 49438.
Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49438
24
Vladimir Putin. May 9th, 2015, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia.
23

43

powerful message during the 60th anniversary of Kursk. Putin agreed with the message that this
thesis is trying to prove:
Comrades and friends… Kursk marks a turning point in the Great Patriotic War.
Here in the summer of 1943, the Soviet army not only won a battle. It did not let
the enemy take revenge for its major defeats outside Moscow and Stalingrad. As a
result of the Battle of Kursk, the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Second
World War changed for good… In the battle of Kursk, a very rare military strategy
of premeditated defence was used. This strategy exhausted and wore out the strike
groups of Hitler’s troops. And the move of our army to an organised, prepared,
counter-offensive, which had been planned in advance, completed their final
defeat. After the Battle of Kursk, right up until the end of the war, the Germans
could never again move to a serious offensive… The Nazis were not saved by their
much-vaunted new technology, and they equipped their army excellently. They had
fearsome machines – ‘tigers” and “panthers”, but these did not help… From here –
from the Bryansk, Orlov, Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov and Sumy lands – the enemy
began to crawl back into his lair… Almost two years of heavy war lay ahead, but
our army was already advancing, towards Berlin.’25
This excerpt from Putin’s speech is crucial because it demonstrates that Kursk is more
important than Stalingrad through his admissions. Putin claimed the Nazi army was no longer
able fight, and Putin stated from Kursk forward the Nazi war machine was not able to stop the
Soviets. To even further solidify the point that Kursk should gain the same, if not even more
prominence than Stalingrad, Putin continues on: “It was with the Battle of Kursk that the
liberation of all of Europe began. It liberated towns and villages, opened the gates of
concentration camps, and brought life, freedom and hope.”26 Putin just bolstered the claim that
the Battle of Kursk marked the end of the Nazi Reich.
The Battle of Stalingrad is pivotal, and is without a doubt, one of the more important
battles that took place in the Eastern Front. However, after Stalingrad, the Nazis had the ability to
counter attack. They were not done fighting the war, and still had the ability to sway its course.
Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. August 19 th, 2003, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number
22088. Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22088
26
Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. August 19 th, 2003, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number
22088. Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22088
25

44

However, it was the blood-bath at Kursk, the residual of months of fighting at Stalingrad, that
Germany had time to coordinate an attack; but after the German army is broken at Kursk, with
the Nazi’s losing more than one third of their entire fighting force on the Eastern front, that it
was the beginning of the end.27
Tank commander Erhard Raus, who was present at the battle claimed the losses were
even worse: “During the Citadel Offensive, these divisions had all seen heavy fighting, which
continued for the better part of a month, and in which they had taken heavy losses. Combat
strengths had declined 40-50 percent… and in the case of some infantry regiments conditions
were even worse.”28 Following the engagement at Kursk, the German Army will have a steady
and tactical retreat across all of Russia, and far into Europe eventually leading to the downfall of
the Nazi Reich in 1945. 60 years after the Battle of Kursk, Putin claims: “You have saved it
[Russia], defended it and brought it to its feet. And this is a great example for all the generations
to come. It is an example that gives us strength and confidence in ourselves in the most difficult
times… I thank you for the enormous work in preserving the glorious traditions of our history,
for putting your hearts, and all your lives, into our future. I thank you for bringing up the
younger generation… Thank you for everything.” 29
Even with Putin making these astounding claims in the early 2000s that seem to solidify
that Kursk should be remembered as the turning point of the war, Putin delivered a speech during
the 70th anniversary of the victory at Stalingrad that counters his claims about the Battle of
Kursk. Putin goes as far as to mention historical memory, and how Stalingrad should be
remembered:
Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013) 279.
Erhard Raus, “Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945” (New York, New York,
Cape Press, 2005) 213.
29
Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. August 19 th, 2003, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number
22088. Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22088
27
28

45

In Stalingrad we [Russia] won not only the greatest military victory, but also a
great moral one. It was a victory of patriotism and love for our country, for our
Fatherland; a victory over evil, hatred and aggression. Stalingrad will undoubtedly
remain a symbol of the Russian people’s invincibility and unity. And as long as
we continue to respect ourselves, our history, and to respect and love our country,
language, culture, and historical memory, then Russia will always remain
invincible.30
Putin was undoubtedly “playing to his crowd,” drawing up a narrative that his audience
wanted to hear. But it seems clear that after deep research that has been conducted, and after no
scholar has ever explored this paradigm—this author has not found about the statues, traditions,
medals, or memorials that are in place at Kursk to that of Stalingrad. Additionally, this study
demonstrates, with a comparative methodology of the two battles. Ultimately, these findings
conclude that Stalingrad is more memorialized for three simple facts: people physically see it
more, the Soviet Union really utilized the victory at Stalingrad for propaganda purposes, and the
pointless loss of life at Kursk; so appalling that the author believes leaders of the Soviet Union
and modern Russia do not want to shed light on this.
Since Volgograd is currently one of the largest cities in Russia with over one million
people populating the city, tourists visit more. It was not uncommon for the Soviet Union to
dedicate statues to various people and events during the “Great Patriotic War.” During the
author’s time in Russia, numerous statues and memorials were observed and photographed that
were dedicated to many events and people that made it possible for the Soviet’s to claim victory
during the Great Patriotic War. Stalingrad, which happens to be the first victory and literal
turning point, is one of the reason why the author concludes that it has multiple statutes.31 The
Soviet Union would want to illustrate to the world that there was a pivotal victory there, and
Vladimir Putin to the people of Russia. February 2nd, 2013, The Kremlin, Moscow Russia. Document number
17416. Online publication and translation. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17416
31
Jennifer Wade, “Russia Remembers Stalingrad 70 Years on”, thejournal.ie, accessed on August 20th, 2017.
http://www.thejournal.ie/russia-remembers-stalingrad-70-years-on-780317-Feb2013/
30

46

there was a terrible fight to achieve their victory. This was extensively used for propaganda
reasons to ensure the public that the Red Army was achieving victory, and to solidify the
people’s trust in the government and military to win this war against the German army.
As for Kursk, it is a small railroad hub on the western side of Russia, close to Ukraine
and Eastern Europe. It is primarily a farming town that does not get much attention from tourists.
Due to this lack of attention from the public, this thesis concludes that is why it took so long for
monuments and museums to show up in Kursk, and why the Soviet Union or Russia never
bothered to put up a memorial or museum until much later. Interestingly enough, the K-141
Oscar II Class submarine named Kursk had a memorial constructed in its memory quicker than
the battle itself. The memorials for the battle took nearly 70 years for them to be made and
unveiled to the public. For the Submarine, it took less than nine years.32
The victory of Stalingrad was the first triumph that the Red Army achieved, as a result
the high command utilized the battle to its maximum potential.
For many months the Soviet army was being consistently pushed
back until the Wehrmacht reached major cities like Leningrad,
Stalingrad, and Moscow. Throughout, soldiers were forced to
fight, and had no choice but to overrun German positions to
ensure that the city did not fall in the hands of the Wehrmacht.
After the battle, numerous articles were published, posters were
made, and people would be awarded medals to help boost the
morale of civilians and members of the Red Army. One example
of such a poster is figure 8. This poster reads: “If you are

32

Martin Bayer, “‘Kursk’ Memorial Finally Unveiled”, (Wartist.org, August 9th, 2009) accessed December 7th,
2017. https://www.wartist.org/blog/?p=670&lang=en.

47

surrounded, fight till the last drop of your blood.” This poster depicts a rather heroic and brave
soldier who is willing to die for his country by using his Pistolet-Pulemyot Shpagina 41
submachine gun as a club to try and take down as many German soldiers as possible, despite
being surrounded and outnumbered.
Another example of a poster that depicts the victory after Stalingrad is seen in figure
nine. It pictures a Lion that is wearing a Swastika, but it has a M91/30 Mosin Nagant bayonet
through it, which was the standard infantry rifle of the Soviet soldier. The rifle was cheap and
easy to build, and it was proven in combat, as a result
millions of these rifles were issued and saw service during
the war. Furthermore, Stalin issued a proclamation in the
start of the war that claimed all soldiers must have the
bayonet of their rifle attached to the gun when attacking.
This poster illustrates that the Russian soldier was able to
defeat the “German Beast” using his standard issue rifle.
Also, the caption beneath the smoldering tanks says "Kill
the German Beast! Destroy Hitler's Army." 33
A major thread in this thesis punctuates that
Stalingrad has won the historical memory battle over Kursk
is due to the shear casualty numbers that occurred at the
latter—undoubtedly better left forgotten. However, over time, primary sources could not keep
this silenced. Erhard Raus published his memories in his book Panzer Operations. In Erhard
Raus' book, he discusses the astounding loss of life that the Soviets suffered during the entire
33

Larisa Epatko, “These Soviet propaganda posters once evoked heroism, pride and anxiety”, (PBS.org, July
11th, 2017) Accessed on August 29th, 2017.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/these-soviet-propaganda-posters-meant-to-evoke-heroism-pride

48

Battle of Kursk. He argues how the Red Army would send hundreds of men to charge at machine
gun emplacements, just for them to be cut down over and over again. Bodies would stack up on
one another, and some men would try crawling over fallen comrades: “For hours, the devastating
defensive fire of German machine guns thwarted every attempt to break over the edge of the
ravine…. Many brave Soviet Soldiers still held his rifle in the fire position, while his
head-pierced by bullets-rested on his weapon.”34 Raus alleges the only way that the Soviets
would take the machine gun emplacement would be due the machine gunners running out of
ammunition, or running out of fresh barrels to exchange with the nearly melted old ones.35 This
is just one example of many. that Raus discusses in his book.
Due to this tremendous loss of life, this thesis concludes the Russian government does
not want to bring too much light on this topic. General Raus’ testimony in his field memoir
discusses that “The Wehrmacht’s numerical inferiority and our loss of combat efficiency due to
extreme casualties, Hitler perhaps doubted its capability of conducting a flexible, active
defense… Despite the fact that the Red Army invariably suffered heavier casualties than those
they inflicted on our troops, or the reality that the fighting qualities of the individual Russian
soldier were vastly inferior to those of their opponents, we could never overcome the critical
problem of the Soviet superiority in men and equipment…”36 Even after the war, Soviet generals
and officers looked back on the battle, and questioned why there was so much pointless loss of
life. Due to this, the author closes this with the belief that Russia intentionally does not
memorialize this battle due to the immense loss of life that took place.

Erhard Raus, “Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945” (New York, New York,
Cape Press, 2005) 234.
35
Erhard Raus, “Panzer Operations”, 234.
36
Erhard Raus, “Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945” (New York, New York,
Cape Press, 2005) 275.
34

49

In all, there are many different ways that society chooses to remember the battles of
Kursk and Stalingrad. In the research gathered, it is more than conceivable to conclude that
Kursk was more influential in the Eastern Front during World War Two compared to Stalingrad.
Before Stalingrad, the war was moving from east to west, and after the battle the war was
moving from west to east. And after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazi army still had the ability
the counter attack and turn the war into the favor of the Nazi army. Kursk was that high-water
mark for the Nazi’s. Their failure after the Battle of Kursk saw the Nazi army lose one third of
the forces in their Eastern Front.37 This claim is solidified in Vladimir Putin’s speech during the
60th anniversary of the fighting at Kursk, yet another comes from the adversary. Joseph Goebbels
diary also highlighted the Battle of Kursk, dated July 26th, 1943:
The German Wehrmacht had not been able to make a decisive breakthrough [at
the Kursk bulge]. The Soviets were again in the positions in which they were
surprised by the German offensive. The German Wehrmacht no longer had the
power, as in previous summers, to compel the Soviets to yield sizable territory.
His [Stalin’s] claim that we lost rather than gained ground near Kursk is also in
keeping with the facts. This shows that we must make every effort on the Eastern
Front to hold our own even halfway against the advancing Soviets. I suppose we
can’t possibly change the situation…38
Just days after the fighting started for the German offensive, Goebbels had doubts about
the victory of the battle and even victory as a whole. He made some serious claims by concurring
with Stalin in regards to the German loss of territory, as well as the Wehrmacht’s ability to
counter attack and the prevention of the Soviets from pushing through the rest of Russia, Eastern
European states, and eventually to Berlin. When one looks at the statistics, renowned World War
Two historian Lloyd Clark lays out the numbers. The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than

Dennis E. Showalter, Armor and Blood, (Random House, New York, 2013) 279.
Louis P. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943. (Doubleday & Company Incorporated, Garden City, New
york, 1948) 405.
37

38

50

70% of Nazi Germany’s military force in the Eastern front.39 By the time the fighting at the
Kursk battlefield was complete, the Germans would lose more than 200,000 soldiers; around 800
tanks and assault guns, and 159 aircraft.40 These claims solidify and prove the claim that this
thesis is trying to make, and that Kursk needs to be remembered for what it really was: The
turning point of the war.
Until recently, many scholars and political figures have not looked at Kursk with such a
view. The Soviet Union spent minimal attention to detail surrounding the battlefield of Kursk.
Making memorials from vehicles that did not take part in the fighting at Kursk, and constructing
two buildings and one mass grave. Meanwhile, the City of Volgograd has its name changed
numerous times throughout the year to “Hero City of Stalingrad” has a colossal statue of “The
Motherland Calls” guarding it, two buildings, and had the Victory Day parade moved to the city
during the 70th anniversary of the war. All to remember the fighting that took place in Stalingrad.
This thesis has come to the conclusion that the reason why society tends to look at
Stalingrad with such a different outlook is due to three things. First, it was a battle that took place
in the early stages of the war, and it included as many civilians as it did military forces. The loss
of civilian life is going to be enormous during this battle. Most scholars agree that the casualties
surrounding the Soviet forces at Stalingrad are around 1.1 million. That is including missing,
wounded, and killed. A separate statistic done by Antony Beevor in his 2009 book Stalingrad:
The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 claims that there are an additional 955 civilian casualties due to
bombings done by the Luftwaffe in the days before the battle started.41

39

Lloyd Clark, Kursk The Greatest Battle, (Headline Review, Buckingham, May 24th, 2012) 49.
David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Strategy during the Second Period of the War (November 1942-December
1943), (Society for Military History, Jan, 1996) 139-140.
41
Antony Beevor, “Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943” (London England, Viking Press, Penguin Books,
2009) 110.
40

51

Another reason why the Battle of Stalingrad may be more remembered than Kursk has to
do with the fact that it was the first victory against the Nazi army for the Soviets in World War
Two. It was also the only victory, at that time, that the Soviet Union had to publish to boost the
morale of the soldiers and the civilians who were used to hearing about the Red Army being
constantly pushed from Poland to Stalingrad, and the gates of the Caucasus oil fields. This was
the only light of hope that had come from the Red Army and the government of the Soviet Union
thus far during the war. Due to this, the legend of Stalingrad is going to stay with society, due to
the large amount of propaganda that is going to come from it.
Finally, in the readings of memoirs and diaries that have been conducted, there seems to
be a common theme of an unnecessary loss of life and battlefield brutality being present at the
fighting at Kursk. The Soviet Union was never very cautious when it came to the lives of the
men in their army, and the Battle of Kursk is not going to be much different. It is for this
meaningless loss of life and lack of sympathy for these men that this thesis concludes why
Stalingrad will be remembered as a more influential battle over Kursk. There are going to be
instances at Kursk where Soviet soldiers are going to be viciously and pointlessly cut down by
machine gun fire, from German and Soviet weapons, but it will not be on the same level as one
will discover was present at Kursk. The following chapter will explore how mother nature has
saved relics and artifacts from the Second World War, ensuring the legacy and stories will never
be forgotten.

52

CHAPTER THREE:
MOTHER NATURE SUSTAINS: ENVIRONMENTAL MUSEUMS IN THE SWAMPS AND
BOGS OF RUSSIA THAT PRESERVE HISTORY

Nature has a way of restoring the world around it. After the carnage and destruction of
the First World War, nature restored the land by growing grass, and returning the landscape to a
beautiful and livable state. However, what if the environment had a way to preserve history, like
a natural museum for society to discover decades later? Russia’s various swamps and bogs
provide just that, a way for nature to preserve the artifacts that have found their way into their
grasp. As the Second World War falls further into posterity, more efforts are being made to
preserve the history. Chapter three had movies, interviews with veterans, monuments, museums,
guest speakers, posters and propaganda speeches. This epilogue is a conclusion as much as an
introduction, opening the eyes to fresh research that this scholar will plan on continuing in the
future—utilizing cultural resource management (CRM) as a way to study the past through the
preservation of artifacts that the environment had enveloped—only to be resurfaced my humans.
The global community is coming together in order to try and preserve what is left. Most notably,
the more widespread use of CRM has been profoundly helpful in identifying various relics from
the Second World War, and not only figuring out their significance in the war, but also how they
can be retrieved, restored, and put on display for onlookers to enjoy for years to come.

The Russian countryside has a unique advantage over other theaters of the war. Regions
like North Africa, the Pacific, western Europe and the China-Burma-India theaters all have
substantial weather conditions including exposure to the elements, high humidity, and multiple
seasons. However, Russian bogs and marshlands are unlike any other natural ecosystem in the
world. Recently, Russian bogs have been frequented by treasure hunters, history enthusiasts, and
construction crews. Artifacts from the Second World War are being discovered as people dig, use
metal detectors, or drag magnets through the bogs to bring up anything that may have been
otherwise left undiscovered. Due to their naturally low levels of oxygen, these sites have become
natural museums for future generations to look to preserve history.
A peat bog is a type of wetland whose soft, spongy ground is composed largely of living
and decaying Sphagnum moss. Decayed, compacted moss is known as peat, which can be
harvested to use for fuel or as a soil additive. Peat bogs are found throughout the world where
cool temperatures and adequate rainfall prevail. Bogs begin in a low area where groundwater is
close to or above the surface. This location also has to contain a wide mix of water-tolerant
plants, including grass-like plants and trees. Because water in such low spots is stagnant, oxygen
is not replenished quickly, and normal decomposition of dead plants is slowed somewhat by the
low oxygen content. Most plants cannot survive on the low mineral content of rainwater, but the
several dozen species of mosses of the genus Sphagnum can, and these come to dominate the
bog flora. Sphagnum removes positive ions from the water such as calcium and sodium, leaving
positive hydrogen ions, which are acidic. As a result, the pH of bog water may be as low as 3.5,
which allows for artifacts that are metal based to be very well preserved.1

1

Encyclopedia.com, s.v. “Peat Bogs,” accessed March 16th, 2021,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/peat-bogs.

54

Much like a bog, a marsh, which is a type of wetland ecosystem, is characterized by
poorly drained mineral soils and by plant life dominated by grasses. Marshes are common at the
mouths of rivers where flow is slow. Since sediment is settling from the river water, the land that
is built will be poorly drained and will often be underwater. A well-known example is the Pripet
Marshes and the surrounding fens that historically have served as the natural boundary between
Poland and Russia. These marshes, much like bogs, will also have little oxygen beneath the
surface, resulting in artifacts being preserved despite being submerged for decades.2
The Russian and Eastern European boglands, marshes, or peat marshes, are ideal
locations for this sort of phenomenon. The naturally low levels of oxygen present in these
marshes, in combination with the stagnant water allow for steel and organic matter to be
preserved. The average peat bog will have very low levels of oxygen due to thousands of years
of organic matter gathering. These conditions in conjunction with stagnant water prohibits
oxygen from penetrating the surface. Furthermore, oxygen that is somehow able to penetrate the
surface is very quickly used up due to the immense amount of organic material present in the
area, returning oxygen levels to low levels that are usually present. When this occurs over
hundreds and possibly thousands of years, several feet of peat can form.3 Since peat bogs are not
dense, and allow for heavier objects to sink, once an object with any weight lands in the bog, it
will sink and become submerged. During World War Two, items varying from K98s, to artillery
shells, helmets, hand grenades, or even entire tanks fell into these peat bogs, and are not only
hidden from view and protected from the ensuing battle, but naturally preserved. Since these
artifacts are so well preserved, relic hunters and history enthusiasts have begun to search these
locations to try and pull up artifacts from the past.
2

Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Marsh,” accessed March 16th, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/science/marsh.
Susan Priest, edited by Ronald B. Davis, Peatlands, (University of Maine, February 2012), accessed March 18th,
2021. https://umaine.edu/oronobogwalk/wp-content/uploads/sites/393/2015/03/What-is-a-Peatland.pdf
3

55

On September 14th, 2000 Russian historians hauled possibly one of the largest, and most
intact artifacts from a bog in the Estonian countryside (what battle): a German captured T-34.
The T-34 was the armored backbone of Soviet forces during the Great Patriotic War. The T34s
simple and versatile design was able to be refined continuously to meet the changing
requirements of the Eastern front. The slanted armor of the T34 made it fairly capable of
defecting German anti-tank support, and it earned a spot within the German armored divisions as
well. During the last years of the Second World War, German armored units started to utilize
Russian equipment on a more frequent basis, even creating a name for the T34 for official use:
the Panzerkampfwagen T-34(r).4
This specific vehicle-artifact, housed no corpses and was in an upright position in the
bottom of the lake with spring/summer green camouflage, was presumed to be driven into the

4

David Porter, Soviet Tank Units 1939-45, (Amber Books, London, 2009), 85.

56

lake by the German armored units to prevent it from falling back into the hands of the Soviets. It
settled in roughly 12 feet of water, where over the last 60 years, an additional six more feet of
peat and silt protected and masked it in this
bog. Once the tank was discovered by local
fishermen, for a two-week period, volunteers
from a local diving club washed the silt from
the tank (Figure One). Then the tank was
towed to the shore utilizing a construction
tractor, and the live ammunition, all 116
pieces, were removed with the brass still being
shiny (Figure Two). Shortly after, the T34 was taken to a local museum in Gorodenko, where
historians and
mechanics were able to clean out the tank, and incredibly start the engine with no replacement
parts. This vehicle was so well preserved, 61 years after it was abandoned in a bog, the engine
still worked after a thorough cleaning. The tank is currently on display for people to see in the
town of Gorodenko (Figure three).5

5

Joris Nieuwint, “WW2-Era T-34 Tank With German Markings Pulled From Bog After 60 years (Watch),” War
History Online, Aug 25, 2016, accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/whotube-2/2000-t-34-pulled-bog_watch.html.

57

Another tank, only 150 miles away from the German captured T34, was recovered just five years
later in the spring of 2005. Russian historians pulled a Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault gun
from a Russian bog just outside of the Poskov area. The Stug was Germany’s most produced
armoured fighting vehicle during World War II, and was by far the most successful with Stug
crews accumulating over 20,000 confirmed tank kills by 1944. The Stug was built on the chassis
of the proven Panzer III tank, just replacing the turret with a fixed and more powerful gun. This
allowed for a low profile, making it a very versatile fighting vehicle. Initially designed as mobile
fire support for infantry, it was continually modified by the German Army and employed as a
tank destroyer.6
The Stug III that was pulled out of the bog still had plenty of its winter camouflage intact,
and it is widely believed that Stug Brigade 226 as they reported “2 gun’s missing” reported with
their retreat from the Poskov area (figure four).7 Additionally, it was presumed that the vehicle
broke through
the ice on the
side of a small
lake during a
retreat, since the
vehicle was
found upside
down. It is
also presumed
6

Jack Beckett, “Battlefield Relics: The Stug III recovered in Russia (image heavy),” War History Online, May 20,
2015, accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/military-vehicle-news/battlefield-relics-the-stug-iii-recovered-in-russia.html
7
Jack Beckett, “Battlefield Relics: The Stug III recovered in Russia (image heavy),” War History Online, May 20,
2015, accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/military-vehicle-news/battlefield-relics-the-stug-iii-recovered-in-russia.html

58

the crew was killed after being struck with several armor piercing shells, explaining why it was
stuck on the frozen lake. After excavating and removing the vehicle, the following items were
found: Remains of the four crew members, dog tags, ammunition for the 75mm main gun, one
MP-40 submachine gun, ammunition for the MP-40, self-liquidator, three field bags, and
Personal belongings of the crew. After being pulled from the lake with a tractor, a quick wash
revealed that it had its winter camo still intact, and was in overall good condition (figure five).
Despite its immaculate condition and numerous possible ways to be easily restored and put on
display, the Stug III was later dismantled and sold for parts to other existing Stugs around the
world.8 While it is disheartening that this StuG was not put on display somewhere in Russia or
Poland, it is encouraging that the parts from this vehicle were distributed around the world to
finish other builds. Due to the naturally preserving environment of the bogs and swamps in the
area, the StuG parts were in good enough condition to be saved.

8

Apolon, “StuG III 40 has been found with a dead crew! Exclusive! UPD Aug. 2020,” Relics WW2, Aug 25, 2020,
accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.relicsww2.net/stug-40-has-been-found-with-a-dead-crew-exclusive-upd-aug-2020/

59

Another sullen aspect of searching the bogs are bodies that are discovered within. Boris
Lazarev was a 22 year old Soviet Pilot who was shot down in February, 1943 by the Luftwaffe.
His body and Lend-Lease Hawker
Hurricane were recovered in a
swamp in 1998 in a mummified
condition. While the Hawker
Hurricane was mangled from
impact, further examination of the
body found that he was still in a
brace for a crash landing with his arms
still clutching his parachute brace
probably in an attempt to bail out. He was unable to eject in time and crashed in the swamp
where his plane and body would be preserved for 55 years. Due to the remarkable preservative
elements of the swamps, it was easy to identify the body (Figure six).9
Records from the time period helped researches indicate roughly where Lazarev had been
shot down, his paperwork, medals, TT33,
clothing, money, and many other personal
artifacts were in immaculate condition and
easily legible (Figure seven and eight).
The bodies within these swamps are
so well preserved, they are fairly easy to
identify. In the case of Sergeant Lazarev, he

9

Pierre Kosmidis, “The Last Flight of Boris Lazarev,” ARGunners.com, March, 2020, accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.argunners.com/the-last-flight-of-boris-lazarev/.

60

was buried with proper honors in the memorial military cemetery in the village of Chupa in the
Louhi region of Karelia. As of 2019, the family of this downed pilot has not been found and
alerted of the discovery of the body, however it is possible for these types of discoveries to lead
to closure for families. Furthermore, the
Hurricane that was found is being used
in restoring another plane of the same
class found elsewhere in Russia. There
are plans to put it on exhibition at the
Central Military History Museum on
Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow.10
Another very similar event happened just ten years later near the small Russian town of
Sinjavino, Russia. Senior Lieutenant Philipp Costenko's aircraft was shot down during the
Ivanovo campaign on February 23, 1943, as his squad escorted bombers. Over 60 years later, in
2007, his lend-lease Kittyhawk
P-40 aircraft was found with his
body in over seven feet of bog
mud and sediment. A russian
priest was brought on sight to
bless the body, and Senior
Lieutenant Costenko was
presumably buried with military
honors in Russia. While Costenko’s body was severely mangled and not as well preserved as
10

“The body of the Soviet pilot Boris Lazarev 55 years after his death,” World War Two Photos in High Resolution,
accessed March 2nd, 2021,
https://albumwar2.com/the-body-of-the-soviet-pilot-boris-lazarev-55-years-after-his-death/.

61

Lazarev, the artifacts surrounding him were in immaculate condition due to the natural
preserving conditions of the Rusian bogs (figure nine and ten).11
In Poland, along the Vistula River, another tank was towed from a marshland. The Panzer
V “Panther” was not in excellent condition,
the turret had been blown apart by a high
caliber anti-tank projectile, meanwhile the
body of the tank was rusted after sitting on
the floor of a lake for over 40 years.
Nevertheless, tank collector Jacques M.
Littlefield from California purchased the
tank from a German collector, and spent
numerous years with a team of historians, metal workers and technicians to fully restore the
Panther. The Panther can currently be seen fully restored, operational and on display in the
American Heritage Museum in Massachusetts under their Clash of Iron exhibition; which
surprisingly discusses the battle of Kursk (Figure eleven, twelve and thirteen).12

11

Dimas, “P-40 Kitty Hawk, recovered near Sinjavino Russia,” War Relics Form, December 12, 2007, accessed
March 2nd, 2021,
https://www.warrelics.eu/forum/armour-weapons-aircraft-recovery/p-40-kitty-hawk-recovered-near-sinjavino-russia
-513/.
12
“Excavation Pz.Kpfw V Panther from Czarna Nida River, Bieleckie Mlyny, Poland -1990-XI-16” (Panzer
Archeology, August 20th, 2020), Accessed February 12th, 2021,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qq_s4dKZg5o&fbclid=IwAR1giazXtCxGHcHEHarzJ0LqTi8twKjgB5Ca_hcfqpFytlhIX4y4
C2YevCw.

62

63

Another example of the Russian Marsh lands preserving history is the KV1 that was
raised from the Neva River in 2003. The KV1 sank in January of 1943, while returning for
repairs after defending the
City of Leningrad when it
broke through the ice of the
frozen river. When it was
discovered, there were no
remains of a crew present,
however there was an
attempt to search in the
surrounding area to potentially find any crew members. It, along with several other tanks
discovered in the surrounding area can be seen at the museum of “Breakthrough” near modern
day St.Petersburg. This KV1 was beautifully restored, and while it does not run, is in amazing
shape for future generations of
people to see (figure fourteen and
fifteen).13
While the bogs and
marshlands of the Russian
countryside can make for
phenomenal natural museums to
preserve artifacts for the academic community; sometimes they pose a threat to these relic
hunters. When watching the videos of the recovery crews hauling out tanks from the bogs, the

13

Steve Merc, “Soviet KV-1 Recovered from River Bed,” War Relics Form, November 11, 2011, accessed March
2nd, 2021, https://www.globeatwar.com/blog-entry/soviet-kv-1-recovered-river-bed.

64

first matter of business once removed from the mud and grime is to drain them of watch, and
check their ordnance. Considering most vehicles crashed into bogs, the crews did not have time
to remove the munitions and oil that is still on board. While the low level of oxygen preserves
steel, it also prohibits munitions from decomposing or from being penetrated by any water. As
the vehicles are being drained of water and mud, the process of removing munitions takes place.
A single T34 is capable of carrying 76 rounds for its main 76.2mm gun, plus hundreds of
additional rounds for the DT machine guns and side arms carried by the crew. The T34 pulled
out of the Gorodenko lake still had 116 pieces of live ammunition within it. The still shining
brass and copper can be clearly seen from most vehicles recovered from the bogs, and since they
have been sitting for 60 or more years, they are extremely unstable. Requiring either a bomb
disposal squad, or some sort of military ordnance disposal team to be on sight to ensure the
munitions are handled, taken away safely, and disposed of properly. Further dangers include the
engine and general mechanics of the vehicles that have been discovered. A single T34 has a fuel
capacity of 120 US gallons, which can be catastrophic for the surrounding environment if the
fuel tank is ruptured. The same concept applies to any airplane, truck, tank, or any motor vehicle
that was ditched or crashed into a bog or marshland.
Furthermore, due to the delicate and time consuming nature of the creation of peat bogs
the overall act of removing larger objects, like a nearly functioning 29 ton T34, can be
devastating to the surrounding environment. Peat bogs form over hundreds of years, and take
decades to repair themselves when they have been tampered with. Bringing in their work crews,
machines, cameras, trucks and cars that are needed to safely recover a tank from a peatbog
causes a tremendous amount of irreversible damage that takes decades to heal. While the

65

removal of weapons, vehicles and other relics can be useful to the historic community, this must
be planned out to be completed with the least amount of manpower needed.
Novice relic hunters that find themselves in the Russian bog or marshlands have also
illustrated the dangers of discovering such intact artifacts.
Using metal detectors in bogs can reveal some incredible
artifacts, from bayonets, to helmets, tools, uniforms, vehicles,
and dog tags, it seems like a fun way to pass the time in a
relatively safe way. However, what most relic hunters do not
show are the more dangerous ordnance discovered. Hand
grenades, landmines, Molotov cocktails, machine guns,
artillery shells and numerous other dangerous artifacts can
very quickly put someone's life in danger, or even result in
their death. Videos
have appeared on
YouTube,
Instagram, and
other online platforms of relic hunters, who remained
faceless and nameless, testing out old hand grenades or
even throwing live Molotov cocktails (figure sixteen
and seventeen). One such video on Instagram, shows
someone digging massive glass bottles out of the
ground, full of strange liquids. When thrown and the
glass breaks, the concoction inside the bottles reacts with

66

oxygen and bursts into flames.14 The Soviets were innovative with their Molotov cocktails to try
and deprive tank engines of oxygen, one such example is a compound that reacts to oxygen in
order to make a volatile and flammable substance for easier detonation. If these bottles, dropped
during the Second World War fall into a bog, nothing is going to break the seals, meaning they
remain active. Resulting in these terribly dangerous weapons laying just inches under the ground,
still ready to combust when exposed to oxygen. Other videos have emerged of relic hunters
shooting machine guns and other firearms they pulled out of bogs. Since the low levels of
oxygen preserve everything, the steel and springs are often left intact, and well enough for them
to be shot. Unsurprisingly, this is extremely dangerous and illegal.
Utilizing the unique and naturally preserving landscape that Russia offers, and through
appropriate means of cultural resources management, the tireless efforts of relic hunters,
historians, history enthusiasts, and anyone interested in the matter of preserving or finding
history can be saved and preserved. The bogs and swamps located throughout Poland, Russia,
and Eastern Europe are stellar places for the world to find previously unknown artifacts in
immaculate condition. These artifacts can then be used and saved for future generations to
admire once they are restored and put on display. Furthermore, bodies that are found in these
swamps also have the chance of being identified and buried. Allowing for descendants of these
soldiers who had been killed in action to be alerted of the fate of their loved ones. Not only does
the environment in these areas preserve history, but also allows for it to be saved, restored, and
put on display.

14

www.instagram.com, Relics_ww2. Accessed: July 18th, 2020.

67

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