AN EXAMINATION OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN ASIA: COMPARING THE
UYGHUR IN CHINA WITH THE KASHMIRI IN INDIA

By
Martha Pezzino, M.A.
University of Scranton

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
to the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies
of East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

December 19, 2020

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ABSTRACT
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science to the Office of Graduate and Extended
Studies of East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania.
Student’s Name: Martha Pezzino
Title: An Examination of Separatist Movements in Asia: Comparing the Uyghur in China
with the Kashmiri in India
Date of Graduation: December 19, 2020
Thesis Chair: Ko Mishima, Ph.D.
Thesis Member: Samuel Quainoo, Ph.D.
Thesis Member: Adam McGlynn, Ph.D.

Abstract
This thesis will examine the separatist movement and ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, China
with the Uyghur population, and contrast that against the separatist movement and ethnic
conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The research will show that while the
culture and geography are vastly different between the two, there many similarities. The
significance of this research is that it will show that at the heart of both conflicts is a fight
over resources. In China the resource is oil, and in Kashmir the resource is water. In order
to come to this conclusion, much was taken into consideration, including the origins of
the conflicts, the resources in each of the regions, as well as the reasons for continued
fighting. The larger implications of this research will show that the fight for resources can
be found to be at the heart of many conflicts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is with extreme thanks and appreciation that I must acknowledge the help and
assistance I received from a multitude of people, all of whom made the completion of
both this thesis and this degree possible. To my husband, Chuck Rowles, your eternal
support and encouragement throughout this process has been valued more than you
know, especially because you have seen me through this process before. You were
selfless and encouraging to see me through this yet again. The combination of frequently
reminding me that I needed to finally finish this, coupled with leaving me in solitude so
that I actually could, is exactly the combination that I needed. Thank you, I love you. To
my best friend and colleague Richelle Smith, your unending encouragement and
inspiration have been invaluable. Driving to classes together made the long rides fun, and
helping me with the formatting and page numbers was positively invaluable, but letting
me bounce ideas off of you, and being the kind of person that gets things done was
inspirational. Thank you, I love you.
Dr. Ko Mishima, your patience and direction was instrumental, and I thank you
for it. Having faith that I would finally get this done and helping me to do so was
invaluable. Beginning with my first semester at East Stroudsburg University, your
encouragement made me feel welcome. From advising me with my classes and degree, to
helping me with my thesis and reading through it multiple times, your guidance, your
help, and your presence has not only made it possible for me to successfully finish, but to
enjoy doing it along the way. Thank you for the advice, the guidance, and for being a
brilliant professor as well.

i

Dr. Samuel Quainoo and Dr Adam McGlynn, thank you for taking the time not
only to read through this thesis and to be members of this thesis committee, but for being
wonderful professors as well. I enjoyed all of your classes and learned a tremendous
amount from both of you. Thank you for helping me not only to get through this thesis,
but to get through and enjoy my time at ESU.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………...i
Chapter1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………….1
Chapter 2: Literature Review……………………………………………………………..7
Chapter 3: Uyghur Separatism in Xinjiang………………………………………………22
Chapter 4: Hydropolitics in Kashmir…………………………………………………….47
Chapter 5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………73
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..79

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the separatist movements in two different
parts of Asia, and to compare some of the similarities between them. On the surface, the
issues facing the Uyghur population of China and the conflict between India, Pakistan,
and Kashmir may seem different, but these conflicts have major issues in common. The
separatist movements not only have comparable religious and ethnic similarities, but the
ethnic conflicts at the heart of them are fights for the land, and the resources on that land.
While the conflicts in both of these places are decades old, in recent years they have both
escalated. In both Xinjiang, China, where the Uyghur live, and in Kashmir, India, the
Chinese and Indian governments respectively have increased their suppression of the
people, using brutal and harsh techniques to silence any opposition.
The research question at hand, then, is not only whether or not these issues are
about natural resources, and what natural resources are being fought over, but also the
ways in which the people are being suppressed in these regions, and the separatist
movements that originated there.
In Xinjiang, the Uyghur are experiencing suppression at the hands of the Chinese
government. Many are being held against their will in what the Chinese call “reeducation

1

camps”, and the mass surveillance of the population means that the Uyghur have no
privacy from the government and cannot escape their oppression. The Uyghur are
historically, religiously, and culturally very different from the rest of China, and the
suppression of the Uyghur clearly has a very strong nationalist streak to it. While their
separatist movement challenges Chinese authority in the northwest part of the nation, it
also threatens some of China’s resources, as Xinjiang contains very large coal deposits,
as well as some of China’s largest oil reserves.
In Kashmir, traditional argument has it that the fight is strictly over religion, and
that the Muslims and Hindus are fighting based on religious loyalty, with Kashmir and
Pakistan having a largely Muslim population, and India being largely Hindu. The policies
and pronouncements of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would seem to bear that
out, as his anti-Muslim nationalism led to India recently removing the autonomy of
Kashmir and instituting harsh, oppressive policies against the Kashmiri people. However,
a closer look at the situation will demonstrate that while Modi’s Hindu nationalist decrees
and declarations appear to be strictly cultural and religious in nature, by taking control of
Kashmir and removing its autonomy, he also gained a great deal of control over much of
the Indus River and some of its tributaries. India has been experiencing extreme water
shortages over the last few decades and the situation becomes increasingly more dire
every day. But by taking control of Kashmir, Modi also helped to alleviate the water
scarcity in India.
This study is significant, in that it makes a noteworthy argument regarding the
causes of the separatist movements and resultant violence and fighting in two large
regions of Asia. By looking at the natural resources, and the ways in which they affect the

2

cultures, this study poses an alternative to the traditional arguments concerning religion,
ethnicity, and culture. By concentrating on our similar dependence on natural resources,
and not the differences in various cultures, this study presents another viewpoint to the
problem.
There were several different approaches taken in this study. First, an examination
of the problems in northwestern China will highlight the problems among the Uyghur,
and an examination of the problems in India and Pakistan will highlight the issues in
Kashmir. The background and the origins of the fighting needed to be examined, as well
as the reasons for their continuance. In order to counter the argument that these issues are
solely based in ethnic or religious differences, the cultures of all of the warring parties, as
well as the leadership, needed to be taken into consideration. For example, studying the
religious and cultural differences in China will show that China contains many different
ethnicities, and has Muslim populations in several provinces. However, it is the Muslim
Uyghur who have suffered more at the hands of the Chinese government. Likewise, in
order to establish that the religious differences are not solely at the heart of the issues in
Kashmir, the religions of those involved needed to be considered. While Kashmir is
largely Muslim, it is not solely Muslim, and many Muslims live in many other parts of
India.
In addition, consideration needed to be given to the types of natural resources that
are in the regions being studied. A look at the natural resources in the Xinjiang region of
China, home of the Uyghur, shows that there is coal, as well as very large deposits of oil.
The Chinese government sees these resources as necessary to not only enrich the country,
but also to position itself in a more powerful way on the world stage. Similarly, a look at

3

the flow of the Indus River, as well as its tributaries, will show that lack of water is the
source of the problems in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir, as well as Pakistan and India
all rely on the water from the Indus to sustain their economies and their lives. As India
has been experiencing extreme water scarcity, the water that flows from the Indus is
necessary to maintain Indian lives and Indian power.
Finally, an examination of the culture, biases, and methods used by the leadership
in China, as well as India, is necessary in order to demonstrate that their concern is more
about the natural resources in the land, than about the people living on the land. They are
concerned about getting the natural resources – their behavior toward the people living in
Xinjiang and Kashmir will bear this out.
The methodology used, was to examine the cultural and political atmosphere in
both China and India, as well as to look at the necessity or desperation both states had in
obtaining the natural resources. For example, in order to understand the oppression of the
Uyghur, an examination of the laws and the ways in which they are applied differently to
the Uyghur as compared to other Chinese ethnic groups had to be made. The resources in
Xinjiang also needed to be studied. Similarly, the political atmosphere in India needed to
be studied, as did the extreme water scarcity. Only by looking at both of these issues can
a connection be made between the two. The extreme Hindu nationalism of Prime
Minister Modi suitably allowed him to remove the autonomy of Kashmir, take control of
their water thus helping to alleviate their extreme water shortage, all while playing to his
base of supporters.
The literature review will examine various causes of separatist movements.
Nationalism, which necessarily runs through all separatist movements, will be looked at

4

more closely, as will the geographic reasons for separatist movements. The historic
causes of separatism will contain a brief examination of separatist movements in
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia from the 1990s that resulted from redrawing the map of
Europe after World War I. This was done in order to demonstrate that separatist
movements have long histories and do not suddenly occur without provocation. When
examining protection from oppression or genocide as a cause of separatist movements, a
closer examination will be given to the Kurdish separatist movements in several countries
throughout the Middle East.
In addition to looking at some of the major causes of separatist movements, the
literature review will also examine the three major theories of ethnic conflict. This was
necessary because separatist movements largely coincide with ethnic conflict, and an
examination of the separatist movements of the Uyghur in China and the Kashmiri of
India will certainly bear that out. Instrumentalism assumes that those in power cause
ethnic conflict so that they can gain wealth or power from it, implying that ethnic conflict
is a manipulation by those in power for personal gain. Primordialism argues that ethnicity
is fixed at birth, and that ethnic bonds are emotional and visceral. As a result, ethnic
conflict grows from that kinship one feels with others of the same ethnicity. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, Constructivism contends that ethnicity is a construct and
does not even exist biologically. It argues that what is often deemed to be ethnic, is
largely cultural, and so ethnic conflict is based in cultural differences, and not biological
differences.
This study will examine the separatist movements in two vastly different parts of
Asia but will highlight the similarities between the two of them. From the origins of

5

separatism, to the oppression of the people, and the harsh brutalities endured by the
separatists, the patterns and problems of both the Uyghur of China and the Kashmiri of
India will become apparent.

6

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Separatist movements and ethnic conflict are major parts of the study of
international politics, and very often they go together. While ethnic conflict is more
prevalent, it can sometimes result in a separatist movement. Though each movement and
conflict is very different, there are major themes that run through them.
A separatist movement is “the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal,
religious, racial, governmental, or gender separation from the larger group. Separatist
movements are often accompanied by violation of human rights and international law.”1
Very often, these groups look to establish their own independent government, though
some only look for more autonomy. Currently, there are dozens of separatist movements
going on around the world and on every continent with the exception of Antarctica.2
While most are small or marginal and may not reflect the opinions of the majority, such

Matúš Petrovský, United States General Assembly: International Intervention in
Separatist Movements, The Bratislava Model United Nations Conference, 7-9 November
2014, accessed October 29, 2020, http://www.fn-rollspel.se/dokument-tillrollspelet/seperatistrorelser.pdf.
1

Andrew Lisa, “Brexit and other active separatist movements around the world”,
22 April 2019, accessed October 29, 2020, https://stacker.com/stories/2868/brexit-andother-active-separatist-movements-around-world.
2

7

as those in Texas, Alaska, Hawaii, or California, many are much more significant. Puerto
Rico has a somewhat larger, albeit thus far unsuccessful separatist movement, as does
Quebec in Canada and the Zapatistas in Mexico. Brexit, also in the UK, represents the
separation of Great Britain from the European Union, and while the British people voted
for the separation, the world waits to determine the success or failure of their venture.
Two larger, though unsuccessful separatist movements that will be examined in greater
detail in later chapters are the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China, and the Kashmiri in Kashmir,
India.
Some political scientists have argued for what is called the “contagion theory”
regarding separatist movements. Dartmouth University Political Scientist Jason Sorens
claims that “There is some evidence that secessionism in one part of a country tends to
spread to other parts of the same country… And there is also evidence that when a central
government fails to put down one armed self-determination conflict, another one is more
likely to emerge in the same country.”3 The multiple secession movements in China, such
as those currently taking place in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and
Xinjiang would seem to provide evidence for this theory. In addition, Spain is
experiencing fairly significant secessionist movements in the Basque Country as well as
in Catalonia. While Great Britain is looking to leave the European Union, Northern
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales all have active separatist movements. In addition, France
has multiple separatist movements within its borders, as does Russia.

Brennan Weiss, “Experts can’t figure out why independence movements are
suddenly sweeping the world”, Business Insider, 10 October 2017, accessed October 29,
2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/why-catalan-kurds-voting-independencemovements-secession-2017-10.
3

8

In spite of the fact that multiple separatist movements can often be found within
the same countries, they do not seem to spread across international borders. Steve
Saideman, a Political Scientist from Carleton University in Canada, and author of
multiple books on ethnic conflict, claims that separatist movements do not cut across
borders. He claims that “there really doesn’t seem to be any hard evidence behind the
concern that allowing independence to occur in one place will encourage similar
movements elsewhere around the world.”4 When separatist movements spread, they
spread within national boundaries.
While each separatist movement will have its own character and purpose, there
tend to be specific reasons that they each begin. According to the United Nations,
“Motivations for separatism originate from the oppression which stimulates their desire
to secede.”5 The implication here is that separatist movements are begun in order to
escape domination and subjection by the ruling class. The varied causes of separatist
movements to be examined here include nationalism, geographic or historical reasons,
protection from oppression or genocide, as well as religious or ethnic identity and ethnic
conflict. Most separatist movements will be caused by a combination of these different
factors.
Nationalism is a strong motivating factor and is common in all separatist
movements. Separatist movements “are fed by the identity factor that in its turn is based
on nationalism… nationalism could be only negative and aggressive as it can be the

Weiss, “Experts can’t figure out why independence movements are suddenly
sweeping the world”.
4

5

Petrovský, United States General Assembly: International Intervention in
Separatist Movements, The Bratislava Model United Nations Conference.
9

reason for conflict between different groups of people.”6 Nationalism imposes an
identity, but also excludes those who are deemed to not belong. For example, the
Uyghurs are not considered to be Chinese by the greater Chinese population, but the
Uyghurs also largely do not identify as Chinese. They are Uyghur. Similarly, India does
not consider the Kashmiri people to be Indian, but the Kashmiri people do not consider
themselves Indian either. They are Kashmiri. They identify with their culture and
tradition, which is not the same culture and tradition of the larger Chinese or Indian
populations. As such, it is far more likely that a group who feels isolated from the larger
culture or nation will seek its independence.
Additionally, there are frequently geographic reasons for separatist movements.
The larger a country is, the more opportunities there are for separatist movements to take
place.7 Nations like Russia and China with their multitude of separatist movements can
provide perfect examples for this. Enormous geographic regions make it very difficult not
only to maintain authority over a region, but more importantly, to maintain hegemony
over the population. Various ethnic groups, with their diverse histories, languages,
religions, and cultures will find it difficult to identify with each other. This difficulty can
translate to a sense of isolation in a state and result in a separatist movement.
There are a multitude of historical reasons for separatist movements as well.
There is evidence to show that younger countries are more likely to experience separatist
movements than older ones. A new nation is unlikely to have a strong central government
Yevgeny Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”,
Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 2017, 7(1), 5–9, accessed October 29, 2020,
file:///C:/Users/Martha/Downloads/01%20ryabinin%20(1).pdf.
6

7

Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”.
10

to suppress any movements, or to have an established economic policy that might
strengthen the government.8 Additionally, a new nation is more likely to have ethnic
clashes, as the boundaries of newly formed nations are often established without
consideration for the ethnic history of its population. In many ways, World War I proved
to be a catalyst for separatist movements throughout the 20th Century.
World War I, which lasted from 1914 to 1918, was not only largely the result of
separatist movements in the now nonexistent Ottoman Empire, but would prove to be the
cause of many separatist movements in Europe at the end of the century. Immediately
following World War I, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established their
independence from Russian and created their own independent states. Additionally,
following World War I many new European states emerged as a result of boundaries that
were redrawn, including Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As a result of the creation of
these states along boundaries that ignored ethnic and cultural heritage, both Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia experienced separatist movements in the 1990s. These happened
soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, which, in itself, consisted largely of a lot of
separatist movements.
Yugoslavia was created in 1918 immediately after World War I. Ignoring the
ethnic and cultural history of the region, the allied powers created this state out of many
different ethnic groups, including several separate Slavic cultures, some Hungarians from
the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, parts of the former Ottoman Empire, the
independent states of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.9
8

Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”.

Brian Beary, “WWI Transformed the Map of Europe – Could it Change
Again?”, European Institute at the University of Maryland, 18 June 2014, accessed
9

11

Following the end of World War II, Yugoslavia came under the influence of the now
powerful Soviet Union, with Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito exerting a strong grip
on power, and keeping all of the different ethnic groups in check. When Tito died in
1980, ethnic differences began to rise. But it was not until the Soviet Union’s power was
starting to dissipate that Yugoslavian separatist movements began to emerge. With the
fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, these emerging separatist movements broke
out into full scale declarations of independence with the accompanying fighting and
violence.10
In June of 1991 Slovenia and Croatia each declared their independence from
Yugoslavia. This was followed in January of 1992 with Macedonia declaring its
independence. Three months later, in April, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit, as
well as Serbia and Montenegro.11 These declarations of independence essentially fell
along ethnic lines. Separatist movements had largely been established by groups that
were artificially thrown together to create Yugoslavia after World War 1. Also, in 1992,
ethnic tensions erupted into a war which lasted for three years, and saw the deaths of
thousands, and the displacement of more than one million people. At the end of the war,
the country was “partitioned into three areas, with each region governed by one of the
three ethnic groups. Each enclave is now made up of roughly 90% of its own ethnic

October 31, 2020, https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/233-european-affairs/eajune-2014/1909-wwi-transformed-the-map-of-europe-could-it-change-again.
Borgna Brunner and David Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia. From
WW1 to the splintering of the country”, Infoplease, 28 February 2017, accessed October
31, 2020, https://www.infoplease.com/history/world/timeline-the-former-yugoslavia.
10

11

Brunner and Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia”.
12

group.”12 From the middle to the late 1990s in Serbia, President Slobodan Milošević
engaged in the extermination of thousands of mostly ethnic Albanians in the province of
Kosovo. What began as a multitude of independent ethnic groups and states being thrown
together to start a new nation at the beginning of the century, ended with many separatist
movements declaring their independence with resultant violence and even genocide.
While Yugoslavia stands out because of the violence and genocide associated
with its separatist movements and eventual dissolution, other states were created because
of separatist movements that were largely peaceful. Czechoslovakia experienced its
Velvet Revolution in November 1989, which was a largely peaceful protest to gain
independence from the communist Soviet regime. While Czechoslovakia had seen hints
of rebellion for decades, the Velvet Revolution was marked by enormous demonstrations
sparked by playwright and future president of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel. What
ostensibly began as a celebration of the anniversary of demonstrations that took place in
1968 to protest the killing of a student by the Nazis and its subsequent repression,
evolved into protests against the communist government. While the students who
participated “were met with police tear gas and water cannons… the students nonetheless
created more protest events. Marches and mass demonstrations paralleled grassroots
organizing by actors and students around the country.”13 In a country with a population of
less than 16 million people, more than a million people took to the streets in mass
demonstrations. In just over a month, the protests “forced the resignation of the Politburo,
12

Brunner and Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia”.

Lester Kurtz, “Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (1989)”, International
Center on Nonviolent Conflict, March 2008, accessed October 31, 2020,
https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/czechoslovakias-velvet-revolution-1989/.
13

13

and the creation of a new government dominated by non-communists.”14 This would
pave the way for the subsequent division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, which also occurred peacefully and along ethnic lines in January of 1993.
Frequently referred to as the “Velvet Divorce”, the split of Czechoslovakia largely
occurred along ethnic lines. When Czechoslovakia gained its autonomy and began to
establish its own government with its own constitution, there were many issues which
divided the Czechs, who dominated the western part of the nation, from the Slovaks,
which dominated the eastern part of the nation. The two groups had difficulties coming
together over issues such as the economy and general governance, and their differences
proved to be too large to overcome. There were a greater number of Czechs in
Czechoslovakia than there were Slovaks, and therefore dividing power equally between
the two ethnic groups seemed unfair to the Czechs, as “many Czechs felt the Slovaks had
too much power for their respective numbers.”15 While there were some difficulties along
the way, with discussions on whether to separate coming from both sides, in the end the
dissolution was diplomatic and nonviolent, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia
peacefully replaced a unified Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993.16
While some separatist movements are largely the result of historical events, such
as those that took place in Yugoslavia as well as in Czechoslovakia, others occur mainly
because of a need to avoid persecution or even genocide. Several separatist movements

14

Kurtz, “Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (1989)”.

Robert Wilde, “The Velvet Divorce: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”, 21
February 2019, accessed October 31, 2020, https://www.thoughtco.com/the-velvetdivorce-1221617.
15

16

Wilde, “The Velvet Divorce: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”.
14

around the world and throughout history are evidence of this, including the Uyghur in
China. As we shall see, the separatist movement there is born from nationalism, historical
events, but also from a need to avoid persecution by the Chinese government. The Kurds
are engaging in separatist movements in several nations. Their ethnic identity, coupled
with persecution and oppression from several states, has driven the Kurds to form their
own separatist movement and to try to create their own state.
The Kurds are an ethnic group consisting of approximately 25 to 35 million
people spread across the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia. While they
constitute “the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East… they have never obtained
a permanent nation state.”17 There was consideration for the creation of a Kurdish state
called Kurdistan following World War I, but when Turkey and other Middle Eastern
states were carved out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, consideration for a
Kurdish state evaporated. The Kurds would be spread across five different nations and
find themselves a minority ethnic group in each of them.18
In Turkey, where the Kurds make up approximately 15 to 20 percent of the
population, they have been treated harshly by the government for decades. Many Kurds
were forced off their land, their traditional names and clothing were banned, the language
was forbidden, and their ethnic identity was forcibly changed from being called Kurds, to
‘Mountain Turks’. While Turkey attempts to eliminate Kurdish identity, the separatists
fight the Turkish government. Thousands of people have been killed over the last few

BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”, 15 October 2019, accessed October 31,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440.
17

18

BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.
15

decades, sowing the seeds for future violent clashes, and increasing the calls for separatist
movements. The Kurdish population in Iraq suffered chemical attacks at the hands of
Saddam Hussein in the 1980s in retaliation for the Kurds supporting Iran in the Iran-Iraq
war. In Syria, where the Kurds constitute 7 to 10 percent of the population, they have
suffered oppression there as well.19 Approximately “300,000 have been denied
citizenship since the 1960s, and Kurdish land has been confiscated and redistributed to
Arabs in an attempt to ‘Arabize’ Kurdish regions.”20 The Kurdish population, while it is
one of the largest ethnic groups in the Middle East, is spread out between five different
countries. This means that they are minority ethnic group within any national boundary
and suffer as a result. Their separatist movement crosses those boundaries, only because
the Kurds were there for millennia before the political boundaries were established in the
years after World War I. Therefore, in order to avoid oppression and extermination, they
persist with their separatist movement.
Religion is certainly a common cause of separatist movements as well.
Overlapping with other cultural differences such as food, rituals, and language, religion
can point to differences between varied groups within the same state. The Kashmiri
people of India are a Muslim minority in a largely Hindu state. They demand their
autonomy while they suffer the oppression of India. The same can be said of the Uyghur
of Xinjiang in China. They are a Muslim minority in a Chinese state without a dominant
religion. But the religion of both the Kashmiri and the Uyghur points to additional
cultural differences between them and the states from which they wish to separate.

19

BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.

20

BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.
16

Religion determines beliefs, practices, rituals, and sometimes even language, setting apart
those who practice the minority religion from the larger population.
While all of these separatist movements are driven largely by one cause or
another, nationalism and ethnic identity are more common factors. Nationalism by its
very definition must exist in order for a group to demand its independence or autonomy,
and ethnic identity is very often a common factor as well. Simply put, an ethnic conflict
is one in which two or more ethnic groups fight for power, and ethnic conflicts are
common factors in separatist movements. Ethnic conflict exists in various forms, and
there are multiple reasons for them. However, political scientists have proposed three
major theories behind the cause of ethnic conflicts. They are instrumentalism,
primordialism, and constructivism. Each of these theories proposes different ideas and
causes of ethnic conflict, and each starts with different assumptions.
Instrumentalism as a theory for the cause of ethnic conflict presumes that those
involved in the ethnic conflict “hope to derive some material benefit from the conflict,
such as jobs, wealth, or power” and that “ethnic conflict is conflict among rational agents
over scant resources”.21 With this, political, cultural, or religious leaders use their power
to manipulate ethnic groups for their own personal, economic, or political advancement.
Ethnic differences are exploited for personal gain. The assumption inherent in
Instrumentalism is that organization by ethnicity is beneficial and reasonable, but that it is
also an intentional attempt to grab power and control resources by manipulating various

Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II, “On the Theory of Ethnic
Conflict”, September 2011, accessed November 1, 2020,
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~coleman/web/ethnic.pdf.
21

17

ethnic groups and creating allegiances along ethnic lines. The efficacy of Instrumentalism
“lies also in explaining why some ethnically fragmented societies choose to fight or
chose to cooperate rather than fight. This decision, it is argued, depends on the cost and
benefit calculations that groups make and so when the cost of cooperation is more than
the perceived benefits, ethnic conflicts tend to be unavoidable.”22 According to this
theory, people participate in ethnic conflict not because they necessarily believe in the
reasons for the fight, but because the fight will benefit them materially.
While Instrumentalism may be used to explain some ethnic conflicts, this theory
does not address the violence that often accompanies such conflicts. Torture, rape, and
genocide have been associated with many ethnic conflicts, but this explanation does not
account for such brutality. While leaders may appeal to ethnic sentiment in order to
mobilize people, the atrocities that have been witnessed in ethnic conflicts that can be
found in Rwanda in the 1990s, and currently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
among the Uyghurs in China, cannot be explained simply by saying that it was
manipulation by the highest powers that made it happen.23
Primordialism is another theory of ethnic conflict. It presupposes passion and
sentimental causes, as it focuses “on the visceral dimension of conflict”.24 According to
primordialism, ethnic groups have a connection and a mutual bond which unites them.
This bond is not only emotive, but it is fixed and exists at birth. Ethnic identity in

Dodeye Uduak Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories of
Ethnic Conflict”, Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol 4 (1) March 2015,
p.148.
22

23

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.148.

24

Caselli and Coleman, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”.
18

inevitable and unchangeable, but it also comes with deep-seated rivalry or even hatred of
other ethnic groups.25
There are problems with the Primordialist theory as well. While it explains the
emotional brutality that comes with some ethnic conflicts, it also implies that there is an
inevitability to the violence. By ignoring “the structural, economic and political processes
within which these conflicts erupt”,26 it assumes there is a certainty and predictability to
ethnic conflict. However, there are many places around the world and throughout history
where different ethnic groups have lived together without conflict, which would seem to
negate this theory.27
The final theory of ethnic conflict is Constructivism. This theory offers an
alternative approach, and views ethnic identity as something that changes with cultural
association. This holds that ethnicity is an artificial construct and it is not immutable and
fixed at birth, as Primordialism would maintain. It is a product of cultural assimilation
and “can be formed through various means including conquest, colonization or
immigration”.28 Your ethnic identity is tied up in your language, customs, and religion,
none of which are absolute. Ethnicity is contrived and subjective, and its goal is to
reinforce the differences between different groups of people.
This theory also has problems. It ignores instances of ethnic conflict that cross
borders, such as the Kurds. Spanning five different countries, there are certainly cultural

25

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.147-148.

26

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.147.

27

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.148.

28

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.149.
19

differences between different Kurdish groups that live in different nations. Additionally,
some groups identify themselves on some aspect of their physicality, such as hair or skin
color, and this theory would seem to minimize or ignore that altogether.
It is clear that neither Instrumentalism, Primordialism, nor Constructivism is
applicable to all ethnic conflicts, as there are ethnic conflicts that would disprove each of
these theories. The problem lies in their definition of ethnic identity, and the fact that the
theories do not start with a firm definition on which all can agree. Where Primordialism
defines ethnicity as natural and unchanging, Constructivism does just the opposite and
defines ethnicity as a construct determined more by culture than by genes. For the
Instrumentalists, it is irrelevant if ethnicity is natural or artificial, so long as it can be used
for power or material gain. 29 Knowing the cause of ethnic conflict is integral to finding a
solution to it, as our definition and understanding frames “our response and informs the
course of action taken to prevent or resolve these conflicts. A narrow focus on a single
dimension will continue to produce ineffective intervention or post conflict peace
building strategies that are insensitive to other significant factors.”30 Unless we can
understand the cause of ethnic conflict, we cannot hope to find a solution to it.
Separatist movements are caused by a multitude of factors, many of which
overlap. There are countless geographic and historical reasons for many separatist
movements, but many others are the result of oppression and genocide, and the need to
escape the torture and death that goes along with it. Others have ethnic conflict at their
foundation, though political scientists cannot come to an agreement as to the causes of

29

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.149-150.

30

Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.150
20

ethnic conflict. Nationalism seems to run through most as well. The reality is that most
separatist movements are caused by a combination of factors. To simplify the causes of
ethnic conflict, or the causes of separatist movements into lists, is to ignore the complex
nature of politics, culture, identity, as well as human nature.

21

CHAPTER 3: UYGHUR SEPARATISM IN XINJIANG

Introduction
China, like many other nations, is one filled with religious and political turmoil.
Through thousands of years of existence, the Chinese government, whether imperial or
communist, has attempted to maintain itself in spite of multiple revolts from within. Most
recently, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China has experienced many
problems. It has been fighting for independence for much of the twentieth century, and
this fight has spilled over into the twenty first century in the form of acts of defiance,
both violent and peaceful, that are met with acts of aggression from the Chinese
government. The Uyghur are the dominant ethnic minority in Xinjiang. They are the
people that are in opposition with the Chinese government, and the ones that are being
repressed by the Chinese government. Predominantly Muslim, they are ethnically and
culturally part of the Turkic people, and not the majority Han of traditional China.
Additionally, they live in an area that is rich in oil and mineral reserves. While at first
glance it appears that the uprisings in Xinjiang and resultant reasons for the repression of
the Uyghur people are religious in nature, the cultural and economic issues should be
considered as well.

22

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, usually referred to simply as
Xinjiang, dominates the northeast part of China. An incredibly large land mass, it borders
eight nations and accounts for one-sixth of the entirety of Chinese territory. As of 2000,
its population was 19.25 million. While just over eight million of these constitute the Han
Chinese, the remaining eleven million are made up of forty seven other minority ethnic
groups, the most prevalent of which is the largely Islamic Uyghur. In large part because
of its location, its history, and its ethnic diversity, Xinjiang has been home to a variety of
religions, including Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Taoism,
among others. Islam was introduced into the region in the tenth century and became the
dominant religion in the sixteenth century.31
Over the centuries, many other religions continued to exist, albeit not always
peacefully, alongside Islam, which is now by far the dominant religion in the region.
According to the Chinese government, Xinjiang contains more than 24,000 religious
sites, 23,753 of which are mosques. In addition, there are approximately 26,800 clerics,
including 26,500 which are Muslim. The Chinese government also contends that
Xinjiang has many Islamic leaders active in the regional government, and that China has
spent a lot of money to build and fix mosques in Xinjiang. While many assert that the
atheistic Chinese government is anti-Islamic, the government claims that all are given
freedom to practice their religion, as is stated in the Chinese constitution and the law.32

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
Beijing, May 2003, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916306.htm.
31

32

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.
23

Culturally, many issues in Xinjiang should be considered. Problems began for this
region in the middle ages, when ethnic and national identities were questioned, and parts
of this region were briefly referred to as Turkistan. The fact that it bordered Russia and
Kazakhstan to the north, and had much in common with the Russian culture, led many in
Xinjiang to identify more with Russian culture than with the traditional Han Chinese
culture.33 Additionally, Xinjiang has enjoyed sporadic autonomy and independence since
coming under Chinese authority in the eighteenth century. The Turkish Islamic Republic
of Eastern Turkestan was briefly declared in 1933,34 and after the Chinese Revolution in
1949, a short lived East Turkestan state was declared, after which the region officially
and formally became part of China. As such, the Chinese government now had to
suppress any revolutionary activity in order to maintain their authority.35 However, the
methods used to relate with the Uyghur population varied through the decades. In the
1950s, the Uyghurs and their language, beliefs, and customs, were to be treated with
respect. This changed quickly in the 1960s with the Cultural Revolution, when violence
again was used against the Uyghurs.”36 With nationalist movements gaining momentum
in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, the call for an independent East Turkestan

33

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

Enze Han, “Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang,
China”, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol 4 (2) 2010, p.247.
34

BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?” 26
September 2014, accessed November 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-26414014.
35

36

Gardner Bovingdon. "The not-so-silent majority: Uyghur resistance to Han rule
in Xinjiang." Modern China (2002): p 45.
24

was revived.37 Although quickly suppressed by the Chinese government, some separatists
continue to refer to the region as East Turkestan.
Economically, there are several issues which also complicate the situation in
Xinjiang. Situated along the Great Silk Road, Its geographical position has been
important for trade between the east and the west for many centuries.38 While agriculture
has competed with trade in the region for a very long time, recent industrial and
developmental projects have brought more jobs and opportunities to the larger cities in
Xinjiang. This, in turn, has brought in more Han Chinese from the east into the region. In
addition to the cultural, linguistic, and religious differences, the native Uyghur argue that
the best jobs are given to the new Han. This is cause for additional animosity among the
Uyghurs toward the Han, and therefore toward the Chinese government.39
The issues in Xinjiang are multifaceted and complex. The Uyghur feel
discrimination and the Chinese government discriminates against them, even going so far
as creating concentration camps, or “re-education” centers to house countless numbers of
them. Their desire for an independent state emanates not from one event or a single issue,
but from many issues that work together. In turn, the Chinese government looks to
suppress any revolutionary activity, which is seen as anything that is not in line with
traditional Chinese culture. Therefore, the issues of religion, culture, and economy all
play a role in the revolutionary activity in Xinjiang.

37

BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?”.

38

Han, “Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict”, p.246.

39

BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?”.
25

Xinjiang has a rather problematic history. Situated in Central Asia, the indigenous
people have more in common with other Central Asian ethnicities than with traditional
China. As such, the Uyghur have been fighting a secessionist movement for many
decades. This movement has manifested itself in many ways, though the most apparent to
an outside observer is through violent acts against the Chinese people, and the Chinese
government. As such, the attacks by the Uyghur against the Han and others has been at
the forefront of the discussion of the Uyghur and their treatment by the Chinese. While it
may be asserted that the violence of the Uyghur toward China is the result of the violent,
unequal, and unfair treatment given to them by the Chinese government, it can also be
claimed that the Chinese government is defending itself, albeit violently, against the
aggressions of the Uyghur people.
The Uyghur people are culturally and physically different from other minority
ethnicities in China and are therefore treated differently by the Chinese government than
other minority ethnic groups. The assertion that the Chinese government treats the
Uyghur differently than other minorities, including other Muslim groups, within China, is
affirmed by Liang Zheng in his doctoral dissertation. After analyzing “four state
newspapers” and conducting thirty-eight interviews, he concludes that “Uyghurs are
represented in China’s state media in a partial and biased way.”40 This bias has come
through in several ways. For example, in the northwest part of Xinjiang, where the vast
resources have brought investment and immigrant Han, the local government imposed a

Liang Zheng, “Media and Minkaohan Uyghurs: Representation, reaction and
resistance”, (Doctoral Dissertation Abstract, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2011),
accessed November 27, 2015, http://search.proquest.com/docview/915643879.
40

26

ban on people sporting Islamic dress or long beards from using public transportation.
While the government claims that this was done to prevent terrorist attacks, the Uyghur
population claim that they are being unfairly targeted.41
In April 2017, the Chinese government began to implement an even more
repressive policy, when they instituted a program of mass surveillance, and built and
established a system of camps and prisons across Xinjiang to house the Uyghur
population extrajudicially. While the Chinese government refers to them as “political
education” camps or “boarding schools”, it is estimated that there are more than 1,000 of
these prisons in Xinjiang, and that approximately 1.5 million people have been held there
against their will. That is roughly one out of six adult Muslims in Xinjiang.42
Additionally, since 2018, the Chinese government has begun to move from internment to
forced labor. Uyghurs and other Muslims are kept in the prisons and “forced to work in
the production of textiles, food, and light manufacturing.”43
According to Human Rights Watch, the Uyghur population, with their differing
language, religion, and heritage “are deemed evidence of disloyalty to the Chinese

Joshua Lipes, “Xinjiang City Bans Beards, Islamic Dress from Public Buses”
Radio Free Asia, 6 August 2014, accessed November 29, 2015,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/karamay-08062014182306.html.
41

Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment
Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs” 12 November 2019, accessed October 4, 2020,
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/zenz-11122019161147.html.
42

Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment
Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs”.
43

27

Communist Party.”44 Therefore, the Chinese government is attempting to create a more
homogenous society, one where the Uyghurs will not attempt to separate from the
Chinese government, because they see themselves as Chinese, not as Muslims, or Turks,
or even as Uyghurs. Referred to as “cultural genocide”, the purpose is to forcibly
assimilate them, and eradicate their heritage. Those detained in the camps are “subjected
to political indoctrination, routinely face rough treatment at the hands of their overseers,
and endure poor diets and unhygienic conditions”.45
Additionally, even those Uyghur not detained in the camps are under constant
scrutiny by the Chinese government. China is spending billions of dollars to create a
surveillance system in Xinjiang to monitor and control the Uyghurs, while ignoring the
Han Chinese that live in Xinjiang. They have created a computerized system which “taps
into networks of neighborhood informants; tracks individuals and analyzes their
behavior; tries to anticipate potential crime, protest or violence” and deploys what they
see as the appropriate security forces.46
However, Chinese government contends that the problems in Xinjiang stem from
external, foreign interference. The issues initially began in the first part of the twentieth
century, when, according to the Chinese government, “a small number of separatists and

Maya Wang, “More Evidence of China’s Abuses in Xinjiang” Human Rights
Watch, 20 February 2020, accessed October 4, 2020,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/20/more-evidence-chinas-horrific-abuses-xinjiang#.
44

Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment
Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs”.
45

Chris Buckley and Paul Moser, “How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to
Subdue Minorities”, The New York Times, May 22, 2019, accessed October 4, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html.
46

28

religious extremists in Xinjiang, influenced by the international trend of religious
extremism and national chauvinism, politicized the unstandardized geographic term ‘East
Turkistan’ and fabricated an ‘ideological and theoretical system’”47 Furthermore, the
Chinese government argues that these foreigners interfered with a previously peaceful
state when they encouraged and provoked Islamic ethnic groups which spoke Turkic, to
form a theocracy together. According to the Chinese government, these groups, including
the foreigners who interfered as well as the native Uyghurs, “denied the history of the
great motherland jointly built by all the ethnic groups of China” and that “separatists of
all shades raised the banner of ‘East Turkestan’ to carry out activities aimed at
materializing their vain wish of establishing an ‘East Turkestan State.”48 These groups
“created many disturbances with the connivance and support of hostile foreign forces.”49
China further argues that there was a disturbance in 1933 with the founding of the
“East Turkestan Republic”, but these forces were put down “thanks to the opposition of
all the people of all ethnic groups of Xinjiang.”50 “Since the peaceful liberation of
Xinjiang, the ‘East Turkestan’ forces have never resigned themselves to their defeat.”51
Interestingly, the Chinese government perceives this to be a danger and menace from
outside forces, threatening the peace of China and the people of Xinjiang, as opposed to a

47

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

48

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

49

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

50

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

51

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.
29

revolution from within, by the people of Xinjiang. They clearly wish to convey the notion
that had it not been for foreign interference, the Uyghur people would not have any
difficulty with the Chinese government, and certainly would not be advocating for any
form of secession.
The secessionist movement takes its official form with the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), presumably formed sometime around 2000. Founded, organized, and
joined by the most militant of Uyghurs, the United States Treasury Department, in 2002,
listed the ETIM as a terrorist organization. This happened at a time of increased
cooperation between the United States and China in fighting terrorism following the
September 11 attacks. A nationalist, Islamist organization, they have taken credit for
much of the violence done in the name of the Uyghur separatist movement. It should be
noted however, that most Uyghur do not belong to the ETIM, and that the ETIM, while
based in Xinjiang, has support in several other nations.52
The Chinese government, then, argues that the war on terror which resulted from
the September 11 attacks, have given the East Turkestan forces an argument against the
Chinese government, in that they now “have raised the banner of ‘human rights,’ freedom
of religion’ and ‘interests of ethnic minorities,’ and fabricated claims that ‘the Chinese
government is using every opportunity to oppress ethnic minorities,’ to mislead the
public and deceive world opinion in order to escape blows dealt by the international

Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria, “The East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations, updated 4 September 2014, accessed
November 27, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movementetim/p9179.
52

30

struggle against terrorism.”53 The Chinese government is arguing that since the
September 11 attacks, the Islamic separatists are hiding behind the banner of government
repression to justify their separatist ideology. Interestingly, Liang Zheng contends that
the overt bias against the Uyghurs began after the September 11 attacks and the War on
Terror, which led to “an increase in negative depictions of Uyghurs as more related to
terrorism and a greater threat to China.”54 Gardner Bovingdon argues that since the
September 11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror declared by the United States,
the Chinese government has used this opportunity to increase its control and impose more
restrictions on the people of Xinjiang under the guise of fighting terrorists. As a result,
many others in Xinjiang besides the Muslims and separatist Uyghurs are increasingly
angry at the Chinese government.55
The animosity that the Uyghur have toward China, and the desire for secession,
might be the fault of China itself. Gardner Bovingdon contends that inconsistent policies
in that region have exacerbated the problems. The frequent shift back and forth between
tolerant and repressive policies from the 1950s through the 1980s, as China went through
many changes, meant that policies toward the Uyghur fluctuated between acceptance and
forced assimilation. By the end of the Cultural Revolution with the death of Mao Zedong
in 1976, “pressures to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the persecution of religious
practices and personnel, and attacks on respected authorities had profoundly alienated

53

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

54

Zheng, “Media and Minkaohan Uyghurs”.

55

Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang”, page 9.
31

most Uyghurs.” Bovingdon further asserts that “this was soon followed by somewhat
more tolerant cultural and economic policies in Xinjiang, though signally without
relaxation of political controls” which further resulted in violent rebellions. The result of
these rebellions was that “Xinjiang was accompanied by new restrictions on culture and
religion that have remained in place up to the present.”56 The repressive stance taken by
China toward Xinjiang has increased the animosity of the Uyghur, and their desire for
secession. Bovingdon argues that it is the repression of Islam in Xinjiang by the Chinese
government, which has caused the Uyghur to dig in their heels to revolt. He contends that
if China had taken a step back and allowed for more autonomy and less control,
“Xinjiang would have seen less conflict” and that “rigid policies and crackdowns on
dissent have precipitated the protests and violent episodes of recent years.”57 In other
words, as the Chinese government became harsher in their treatment of the Uyghur, the
Uyghur increased their revolutionary behavior.

Are the Difficulties Based in Religious Issues?
The Islamic Uyghur are very different from the largely Confucian Chinese
society. Confucianism is the dominant Chinese philosophy which teaches respect for
authority, and the established social and political order.58 It can therefore be argued that it

56

Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 8.

57

Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 9.

Judith A Berling, “Confucianism”, Focus on Asian Studies, Vol 2, No 1, Asian
Religions, pp 5-7, Fall 1982, copyright 1996, accessed November 30, 2015,
http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Fac/Adler/Reln270/Berling-Confucianism.htm.
58

32

is the religious differences that have been triggering the revolutionary movement, as well
as the harsh reaction from the Chinese government. The politicization of religion has
become a regular occurrence in Xinjiang. The Chinese government can close mosques,
dismiss clerics, and many people are otherwise prevented from practicing their religion.59
They also determine who can be a religious leader, which form of the Koran is to be
used, what can and cannot be said in religious gatherings, and where these gatherings
may or may not be held.60 This has necessarily made religion a political issue, and
therefore the possible source of the separatist movement.
Human Rights Watch, an NGO which advocates on behalf of human rights
internationally, asserts in a 2005 report that the repression of the Uyghurs is religious in
nature, and that they are being discriminated against because of their Islamic faith and
practice, “in the name of anti-separatism and counter-terrorism”.61 The report argues that
the subjugation of the Uyghurs is based in their Islamic religion, and that the Chinese
government uses the separatism and dissent of the people as an excuse for religious
persecution. It further states that Chinese policy toward them disallows the Uyghurs
“religious freedom, and by extension freedom of association, assembly, and

59

Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang”, page 8.

Joshua Philipp, “China Security: How China is using the Paris Attacks to
Promote the Persecution of Uyghurs”, Uyghur Human Rights Project, published 25
November 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, http://uhrp.org/news/china-security-howchina-using-paris-attacks-promote-persecution-uyghurs.
60

Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims” 12
April 2005, accessed November 28, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/04/12/chinareligious-repression-uighur-muslims.
61

33

expression.”62 Another, more recent report from Human Rights Watch upholds the
assertion that “the government maintains a pervasive system of ethnic discrimination
against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities…and sharply curbs religious and cultural
expression.”63 While Human Rights Watch maintains that the religion is the source of the
discontent, others argue that when the Chinese government goes after the religion, it is
being used as a tool to curb the activities, religious or otherwise, of a population that
China is looking to silence. Interestingly, neither of these reports makes mention of the
Hui.
According to the 2000 Chinese census report, there are roughly 20.3 million
Muslims in China. The two largest groups are the Uyghurs, which constitute 8,399,393
people, and the Hui, which is the largest at 9,816,805.64 As established, the largely
separatist Uyghur can be found predominantly in Xinjiang. The Hui can be found
throughout China, but predominantly in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Usually
referred to simply as Ningxia, it is located in the north-central part of China. The Hui
have more in common with the Han Chinese than either the Uyghur, or other Muslim
groups “in terms of demographic proximity and cultural assimilation.”65

62

Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims”.

Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2013: China”, accessed November 27,
2015, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/china-and-tibet?page=3.
63

Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”, Global
Dialogue, volume 9, Number 12, 2007, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=403.
64

65

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.
34

While their religion is the same, it is only the Uyghur that have formed a
separatist movement, and it is only the Uyghur that are feeling the wrath of the Chinese
government. The Uyghur and the Hui have different experiences when it comes to their
treatment by the Chinese government. For example, Yining, which is one of the larger
cities in northwest Xinjiang, was the first in that region to prohibit wearing veils which
cover the face in public.66 The Hui experience no such restriction.
The Hui are an ethnic minority that is in large part defined by their Islamic
religion but does not attract the same amount of ire from the government as does the
Uyghur. According to Brent Crane, the explanations for this are multifaceted. First,
territoriality is a reason for the disparate treatment of the Hui and the Uyghur. While the
Hui are not arguing for a separate state, the Uyghur declared independence from China
twice in the twentieth century, and many continue to refer to Xinjiang as East
Turkestan.67 This is perhaps the most important reason, as the Hui are not looking to
separate from China. It should also be noted that the Hui, in general, do not support the
separatist movement of the Uyghurs, or an independent Xinjiang, and neither do China’s
other Muslim minorities.68

The Economist, “Remote Control: The Government in Xinjiang is trying to
limit Muslim births”, 7 November 2015, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21678007-government-xinjiang-trying-limitmuslim-births-remote-control.
66

Brent Crane, “A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities”, The Diplomat, published 22
August 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/a-tale-oftwo-chinese-muslim-minorities/.
67

68

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.
35

The second reason for the unequal treatment, according to Crane, is cultural, and
includes their language and their race. Unlike the Hui, the Uyghurs “have a strong
attachment to their cultural practices and are deeply prideful of their culture’s long
history” with “little desire to assimilate into Han society.” The Hui, on the other hand,
have converged Islam with traditional Chinese culture. Hui mosques, argues Crane, are
“a harmonious blend of traditional Chinese dynastic architecture with Islamic motifs” and
“are the perfect manifestation of the Hui’s fluid assimilation.”69
In addition, the physical characteristics of the Uyghur force them to stand apart
from the Han and the Hui. While the Hui “mingle freely” as they speak Mandarin, and
look like the Han, the Uyghur’s physical characteristics are quite different. Appearing
more like “Turkic minority groups”, Crane argues that when a crime is committed by any
Turkic minority, including “Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks or Tatars, Han will likely
describe the wrongdoers to authorities as Uyghurs; suddenly nearly every non-Han crime
taking place in China is committed by Uyghurs.” Because of this animosity toward the
Uyghur, the Chinese state-run media portrays all acts of violence or crime committed by
the Uyghur as an Act of Terrorism.70
Bill Savadove agrees that the hostility toward the Uyghur is political in nature, not
because of their religion, when he states that the “Muslim sect in Ningxia accepts
Beijing’s authority and is allowed to build a virtual religious state.”71 This article tells the

69

Crane, “A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities”.

70

Crane, “A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities”.

Bill Savadove, “Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland” South China Morning
Post, 17 August 2005, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://www.scmp.com/article/512501/faith-flourishes-arid-wasteland.
71

36

story of Hong Yan, an Islamic Hui leader in the Ningxia region, who “has created a
virtual religious state by building mosques, schools and libraries throughout the region.”
In return for state-sanctioned approval and the ability to practice his religion that comes
with it, he “toes the government line” and “praises state policies.” Different from the
Uyghurs, this group “preaches co-operation with the government” and “has sought
compromise with the government.”72 Where the Hui are working with the Chinese
government, the Uyghur are looking to break from the Chinese government. As a result,
the Hui are permitted to practice their religion, the Uyghur are not. It is therefore difficult
to argue that it is strictly a religious issue.

Are the Difficulties Based in Cultural Issues?
The Uyghur are culturally very different from other ethnic groups in China, and it
can therefore be argued that it is the cultural differences that have been triggering the
revolutionary movement, as well as the reaction from the Chinese government. While
China has more than 50 ethnicities, the largest and dominant are the Han, which
constitute more than ninety percent of the Chinese population.73 The Uyghur are Turkic.
With the creation of the Soviet Union in the early part of the twentieth century, and the
subsequent emphasis on regional nationality, the Soviets influenced Chinese policy with
a creation of a divide-and-rule strategy. The result of that was Chinese acceptance and

72

Savadove, “Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland”.

Frank Dikotter, “Nationalist Myth-Making: The Construction of the Chinese
Race” Human Rights in China, posted 27 April 27 2001, accessed November 20, 2015,
http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/4573.
73

37

recognition of different ethnic groups in different regions, including the Uyghur. This led
to the “widespread acceptance today of the idea of a continuity with the ancient Uighur
kingdom and that they constitute a bona fide nationality.”74 This acceptance of their
group as a nationality, in spite of concealing the vast differences among the Uyghur
themselves, has given rise to the notion among the Uyghur that because they constitute
their own nationality, they should rule their own nation.75 Thus, the creation of a
separatist movement.
Sporadic violent insurgences occur among the Uyghur, directed toward the
Chinese government, and the majority Han. These insurgences are met with violence by
the Chinese government, and according to Gardner Bovingdon, the violence, met with
violence, produces more violence.76 Some of the violent episodes in the past year include
the deaths of seven Uyghurs after they were accused of hacking at least three people in
March 2015; the deaths of four Uyghurs as they tried to knife and kill Han outside a
casino in March 2015; the deaths of six people as a result of two consecutive suicide
bombs at a checkpoint in Hotan in May 2015; the deaths of eighteen people after a knife
and bomb attack by Uyghurs after strict limits were placed on them concerning their
observance of Ramadan in June 2015; and the deaths of eight Uyghurs after someone
claimed to see suspicious strangers by a river.77

74

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

75

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

76

Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang”, page 9.

Radio Free Asia, “Xinjiang Unrest Timeline”, accessed November 29, 2015,
http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/timeline/UyghurUnrest.html.
77

38

However, Gardner Bovingdon asserts that as the Uyghurs might sometimes use
violence to make their voices heard, the biggest threat to China does not come from the
violence, but rather the “quiet resistance of ordinary Uyghurs all over the province”.78
The Uyghur are culturally very different from the rest of China, especially the majority
Han. The fact that the Uyghur defiantly maintain cultural differences, represented by their
religion, their language, their literature and poetry, as well as their lifestyles, is evidence
that the Chinese government has not been successful in winning over the Uyghur. China
has been unable to create a homogenous culture, and the Uyghur have been intentional
participants in this cultural resistance. According to Bovingdon, “this resistance exposes
the gap between the state’s vision of Uyghurs as PRC citizens and the Uyghurs’
understanding of themselves as first and foremost Uyghur.”79 Because actual secession,
in all likelihood, is impossible to attain, and because violence is not the legitimate and
useful method of obtaining political goals, cultural differences are all the Uyghur have,
and so that is what they use. According to Bovingdon, “Uyghurs challenge their political
representation through defiant cultural representation.”80 Further, he states that “Where
collective action is too risky and open expression of criticism or dissent is not allowed,
grumbling, songs, jokes, satire, and political fantasy do not just substitute for politics –
they are politics. Through these various modes of self-expression and resistance, Uyghurs
claim a different reality.”81

78

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, page 42.

79

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, page 44.

80

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, page 46.

81

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, page 47.
39

The Uyghurs have created their own distinct culture in order to prove that they are
not Chinese, and this has apparently been effective, as the Han view themselves as
different from the Uyghur. Bovingdon’s research indicates that the Han, as a group, tend
to believe the official stories put forth by the Chinese government, which means they
believe the Uyghurs are receiving preferential treatment, and that the Uyghurs do not
have a claim to Xinjiang or secession from China.82 However, this lack of cultural
assimilation is something the Chinese government is fighting. Hoten, in the northwestern
region of Xinjiang, has recently instituted a ban on twenty two Muslim names, “in an
apparent bid to discourage extremism among the region’s Uyghur residents” and
threatened to prevent students with Muslim names “from attending school unless their
parents change them.”83
There are vast cultural differences between the Han and the Uyghur, with religion
certainly being one of them. And while the Uyghur have cultural differences among
themselves, including but not limited to issues of class, language, politics, and location,
these differences do not seem to be insurmountable to the Uyghur themselves. The
overarching Uyghur culture, the one defined by their place as a minority ethnicity,
appears to be able to counteract the differences between them.

82

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, pages 44 and 45.

Radio Free Asia, “Chinese Authorities Ban Muslim Names Among Uyghurs in
Hoten” 24 September 2015, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/chinese-authorities-ban-muslim-names-amonguyghurs-in-hotan-09242015120656.html.
83

40

Are the Difficulties Based in Economic Issues?
The Chinese government has an economic stake in the retention of Xinjiang for
various reasons. The northwestern part of Xinjiang contains a vast amount of oil, coal,
and gas, and is also a transport center to ship the resources not only to other parts of
China, but also to other nations looking to purchase the resources. As such, China has
built several pipelines to move the resources not only throughout China, but to bordering
nations as well. In addition, Xinjiang distributes any resources China imports from
Central Asia through the rest of the country.84 China’s increasing industrialization, as
well as its role on the world stage, means that these resources are integral not only to
China’s economy, but to its international political power as well. The Chinese
government has an economic stake in maintaining control over Xinjiang and quelling the
secessionist movement and related uprisings. However, the increased attention given to
Xinjiang has had a detrimental effect on the native Uyghur, giving impetus to the
secessionist movement there.
It is estimated that when it comes to oil reserves, Xinjiang itself contains
approximately twenty one billion tons, which is roughly one fifth of the nation’s total,
and new large deposits are being discovered. Additionally, Xinjiang contains China’s
largest natural gas and coal reserves, with the coal reserves totaling approximately forty
percent of China’s total. The result is increased interest and investment in the area.85

Edward Wong, “China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife”, The
New York Times, 20 December 2014, accessed November 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/china-invests-in-xinjiang-region-rich-inoil-coal-and-also-strife.html?_r=0.
84

85

Wong, “China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife”.
41

This also means that China has a major economic stake not only in making certain that
Xinjiang remains part of China, but also in suppressing any rebellious activity there.
In spite of the production of natural resources, and the increased capital being
made by the Chinese government, the indigenous Uyghur are worse for it. As a result of
this boom in natural resources, there have been consequences to both the land and the
Uyghurs. The increased water usage has led to drought conditions, and the processes by
which the resources are produced has resulted in the production of heavy smog
conditions. In addition, the Uyghurs have not benefitted economically either. Immigrant
Han are given most of the jobs, resulting in ethnic strife between the immigrant Han and
the native Uyghur, many of whom claim that “they resent Han rule and the reaping of
their homeland’s resources.”86
While the Chinese government may contend that they are attempting to suppress
the influence of outside forces on an otherwise peaceful people, and that the Uyghurs are
treated equally as all others in China, the evidence seems to counteract that assertion. The
one-child policy has never been prescribed equally for all in China, and now that the
requirements have been relaxed, they are disbursed unequally again, with the Uyghur
being treated differently than others.
The one-child policy that was imposed in 1983 was largely focused on the Han
Chinese, which is the dominant ethnic group throughout China. Ethnic minorities,
especially those in the rural areas, were permitted to have sometimes up to three or four
children. While the Chinese government have begun to relax the rules concerning family-

86

Wong, “China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife”.
42

planning in much of the country, the regulations are being tightened in Xinjiang. Since
2012, the Han living in the southern part of Xinjiang, where the separatist movement is
the strongest, have had permission to have two children. At the same time, the Chinese
government is attempting to restrict Uyghur births. The government has doubled
payments to 6,000 yuan ($950) to Uyghur couples with fewer children than their
government would normally allow. In addition, both parents receive an annual payment
of 1,800 yuan for life. The Chinese government has created an economic incentive for the
Uyghur to have fewer children.87
This was done, according Xinjiang’s communist party chief, in order to combat
terrorism. If the government can lower birth rates among the Uyghur, then eventually the
Uyghur will be outnumbered, thus ending, or at least minimizing, the separatist
movement. Thus far, it is somewhat successful in that among the Uyghur in Yining, one
of the larger cities in northwest Xinjiang, birth rates have been declining over the course
of the last three years that the policy has been in place. The government sees this as its
attempt to “battle against ‘extremism’.”88
The Han living in Xinjiang are growing concerned that they are becoming
outnumbered by the Uyghur, and the “rising separatist militancy”.89 As a result, the
Chinese government is attempting to ensure that the Uyghur are, and will continue to
remain, a minority group in Xinjiang by both attempting to decrease the birthrate of the
Uyghur, as well as encouraging more Han to settle in the region. The Chinese

87

The Economist, “Remote Control”.

88

The Economist, “Remote Control”.

89

The Economist, “Remote Control”.
43

government has reduced restrictions on residency requirements in hopes of bringing in
new Han immigrants. Han have been encouraged to move into Xinjiang for the last few
decades, and that encouragement has shown results. Since the 1940s, the Han population
has gone from approximately two hundred thousand, to roughly six and a half million,
which indicates a growth from five percent of the population, to thirty eight percent of the
population.90
There are many economic issues at stake in Xinjiang. The discovery and
excavation of so many natural resources, as well as the distribution of resources and
goods into and out of China, have made Xinjiang an especially important region for the
Chinese government. At the same time, the Uyghur have not benefitted economically
from the developments. They have been witness to the destruction and pollution of their
land, and the Chinese government has instituted restrictive family planning policies to
ensure that the Uyghur population is reduced in size, while encouraging Han to move to
the region. There are many economic incentives for the dissatisfaction of both the Uyghur
and the Chinese government.
There are many complicated and varied issues affecting Xinjiang, and the people
living there, especially the Uyghur. The violence being imposed on the Uyghur by the
Chinese government, and the violence being imposed by the Uyghur on the people of
China as well as the government, has led to many problems. Branded terrorists by both
the Chinese government as well as by the United States government, the separatist
movement has gained international notoriety since the September 11 attacks. The Uyghur
claim that the Chinese government has used the September 11 attacks to brand them

90

Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority”, page 45.
44

terrorists, and therefore to exact harsher punishments and more restrictions against their
behavior. The Chinese government claim that the separatist movements, and the Uyghur
have used the September 11 attacks to become more violent and revolutionary.
In December 2003, the Chinese government named four groups as terrorist
organizations within China. They are the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, the
Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization, the World Youth Uyghur Congress, and the
Eastern Turkestan Information Center,91 all centered in Xinjiang, and all Islamic Uyghur.
In addition, the Chinese government used the recent November 13 attacks in Paris to
bring attention to what they deem to be their own domestic terrorists. They “called on the
world to support its own brand of ‘counterterrorism’” in fighting the terrorist forces in
Xinjiang.92 In turn, however, the Uyghur have suffered at the hands of the Chinese.
Discriminatory practices by the Chinese government have resulted in limits on their
behavior, restrictions in their movement and religious practices, as well as
impoverishment. The fight is on both sides.
There are many underlying causes to the problems in Xinjiang and the Uyghur
people. At first glance, it appears that the primary, fundamental problem is the difference
in religion, and it is easy to say that the Uyghurs are persecuted simply for their religious
beliefs and practices. However, the Hui, which are the largest Muslim group, encounter
no such hostility from the Chinese government. Blending in virtually seamlessly, they
acquiesce to the larger Chinese culture, and appear no different from the majority Han.
They have blended Islam with traditional Chinese culture, and are certainly not

91

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

92

Philipp, “China Security”.
45

advocating secession, ensuring that they are not a threat to the government, or the culture.
In turn, the Chinese government permits them to practice without persecution or
discrimination. Culturally, there are many differences between the Uyghur and the Han,
and the Uyghur have made no attempt at assimilation. Taking pride in their religious,
linguistic, cultural, and physical differences, they flaunt the notion that sub-cultures that
refuse to assimilate into the broader culture are a threat to the powers that be.
Economically, the Uyghur have seen their land taken over, and the Chinese government
is essentially trying to weed them out with a discriminatory family planning policy.
While it by no means can be claimed that secession is the predominant preference
of the Uyghur people, this vocal minority is certainly making its voice heard. However,
the people of Xinjiang, Uyghur or not, are becoming increasingly disgruntled at their
treatment by the Chinese government. The restrictions on religious freedom, the
environmental destruction, and the prejudicial and discriminatory branding of all Uyghur
Muslims as terrorists, has angered and concerned many people who are not advocating
separatism.93 Clearly, the actions taken by the Chinese government have proven counterproductive, assuming their goal is peace and security in the region, as their policies are
ensuring them more adversaries instead.
There is clearly no single cause of the problems in Xinjiang, but it is the
culmination of issues that are hundreds of years in the making. Problems so old, however,
are being exacerbated by an increase in violence and discrimination on both sides. The
differences in religion, culture, and ethnicity are difficult to overcome in a nation where
cultural assimilation is mandatory.
93

Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.
46

CHAPTER 4: HYDROPOLITICS IN KASHMIR

Kashmir is a region of the Indian subcontinent that lies to the north of India and
the northeast of Pakistan, bordering both nations. Both India and Pakistan have been
fighting over this region for many decades. Considered one of the more volatile regions
in the world, and exacerbated by the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear states,
many of the difficulties between these two nations originate in a fight for the water that
comes from the Indus River, on which both states rely for their existence. The issues stem
from Britain’s partition of India in the middle of the 20th century, and they continue to
persist to this day.
Britain took control of the Indian subcontinent in the middle of the 19th century
and lost it in the middle of the 20th century. When Britain partitioned its holdings on the
Indian sub-continent into India and Pakistan in 1947, it was intended to divide the region
into Hindu and Muslim states, with the stated purpose of maintaining peace by giving
each religion its own home. However, India and Pakistan have been in conflict with each
other since the partition. They have fought several wars and continue to have fights and
skirmishes along the border in the Kashmir region. The historical roots of this conflict
began when the British government intentionally and deliberately alienated both groups
from each other after the 1857 War of Independence. However, the issue was made more
47

difficult because the partition itself was rather vague when it came to the control of
Kashmir. As with so many conflicts around the globe, the fight over Kashmir comes
down to a fight over resources, and in this case, that resource is the water that flows from
the Indus River and its tributaries. No nation can survive without access to clean,
adequate sources of water. It affects everything from a nation’s economy, its ability to
feed itself, and its citizens’ health. A multitude of problems arise when there is a scarcity
of water.
Pakistan became its own state on 14 August 1947, as a result of the conflict
between Muslims and Hindus on the sub-continent of India.94 While Islam traces its
origins to the 7th century, and started to foment and grow into the region that is now
Pakistan in the 8th century and beyond, by the 18th century, Sharia law had come to
dominate the region, and Islamic culture and tradition were well established.95 This is in
large part due to the influence and power of the Mughal Empire, which controlled the
land which is now India and Pakistan, and actively sought to consolidate Islam within its
borders during the 16th and 17th centuries. However, by the 19th century, Britain was
increasing and expanding its control in the region. It was in 1837, when the British
government made Urdu the official language in the Muslim dominated regions of
northern India, that Muslim nationalism started to gain more of a foothold there. Urdu, a
combination of six different languages from the region, including Persian and Hindi, had

94

Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National
Heritage, “History in Chronological Order,” accessed March 20, 2015,
http://infopak.gov.pk/History.aspx.
95

Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.
48

become the preferred language of administration, where it previously had only been used
among the urban elite. The new, ennobled position given to Urdu made this language a
status symbol, and seemingly elevated those who used it. Now that it was the official
language, it started to be used in the courts, among the elite, and it became the vernacular
among the Islamic population, creating a sense of nationalism among the Muslims.96
It was, however, the 1857 War of Independence that cemented the division
between the Muslims and the Hindus in the region, as the beginning of Indian
Nationalism and the growth of Muslim separatism began with the War of
Independence.97 During the war, Muslims and Hindus worked together against the
British. However, after the war, the British blamed the war on the Muslims, and
deliberately began not only a tyrannical rule over the Muslims,98 but also intentionally
tried to pit the Muslims against the Hindus, thus hoping to prevent any collusion against
the British in the future. British rulers came up with a two-nation theory, and proposed to
the people of the region that they cannot peacefully live together because of their
different religions. Muslims and Hindus, suggested the British, are far too different to be
able to work together.
There is much evidence to support this assertion. In a letter from British Secretary
of State Sir Charles Wood to Lord Elgin, the Governor General of Canada from 1847 to

R. Upadhyay, “Urdu Controverys – Is Dividing the Nation Further,” South Asia
Analysis Group, last modified January 5, 2003, accessed March 29, 2015,
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper675.
96

R.A. Geaves, “India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim
Perspective,” Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 25.
97

98

Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.
49

1854, and Governor General of India from 1862 to 1863, Elgin states “We have
maintained our power in India by playing off one part against the other and we must
continue to do so. Do all you can, therefore to prevent all having a common feeling.”99 In
addition, in a letter dated 26 March 1886 from George Francis Hamilton, Secretary of
State of India, to Lord George Curzon, Viceroy of India, Hamilton states:
I think the real danger to our rule in India not now, but say 50 years hence is the
gradual adoption and extension of Western ideas of agitation organisation [sic]
and if we could break educated Indians into two sections holding widely different
views, we should, by such a division, strengthen our position against the subtle
and continuous attack which the spread of education must make upon our system
of government. We should so plan educational text-books that the differences
between community and community are further strengthened.100
The British government planned to foment hostility and bitterness between the Muslims
and the Hindus who once worked together, and they were successful.
This premeditated and deliberately instigated animosity continued to grow
through the 19th century and into the 20th century. When various nationalist movements
were growing around the world in the 1920s and 1930s, the sub-continent would not be
immune. Several decades of intentionally fostered hostility, coupled with an increasing
sense of nationalism, resulted in the movement for the creation of a separate Muslim
state. The preeminent spokesperson for this separation was the philosopher, writer, and
politician, Allam Muhammad Iqbal. He claimed that “for the healthy development of
Islam in South-Asia, it was essential to have a separate Muslim state.”101 This movement

B.N. Pande, “History in the Service of Imperialism,” accessed March 29, 2015,
http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/pande.htm.
99

100

Pande, “History in the Service of Imperialism”.

101

Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.
50

would gain momentum over the course of the next ten years, so that in 1940, the AllIndia Muslim League, an Indian political party devoted to the creation of a Muslim state,
demanded an independent homeland for Muslims living in the Muslim dominated,
northern regions of India. This Pakistan Resolution, as it would come to be known,
became popular among the Muslims living in the region immediately, and the movement
continued to grow during World War II.102 Those who supported the creation of Pakistan,
cut away from the northern part of India, and became the vocal majority over those who
opposed it.
Following World War II, the movement to separate Pakistan and thus to create a
Muslim homeland continued to gain support. With the aid of Britain, an interim
government was formed in October 1946, under the direction of the Muslim League.103
Because Britain was about to lose control over all of India, it was in Britain’s best interest
to assist with the division of the state, which it did. India gained its independence in
1947. As a result of the British subjugation of India, and the intentional and calculated
effort at causing a conflict between the Muslims and the Hindus in the region, Pakistan
was created on 14 August 1947. It was geographically divided into West Pakistan, which
bordered India on the northwest, and East Pakistan, which bordered India on the
northeast. The Eastern and Western halves were divided not only by India, but by
political and economic differences which made political agreement difficult. The Muslim
League, therefore, was unprepared to establish and create a workable governing system.

102

Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.

103

Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.
51

They argued over political power, and who should have it. As a result, the first
constitution was not drafted until 1954, and it would be two additional years before it was
adopted.104 Even though it now had a constitution, Pakistan would continue to experience
political upheavals over the next few decades in the form of military coups, as well as a
civil war in 1971, which would result in the secession of Eastern Pakistan, and the
creation of Bangladesh from this region.
The partition itself caused a multitude of problems in both India and Pakistan.
While the goal behind the division was to create separate Muslim and Hindu states,
nearly half of the Muslims remained in India, while many Hindus remained in what
would become Pakistan.105 The partition also resulted in many riots and fights, most of
them taking place in Punjab, which was now physically divided. These riots caused the
deaths of nearly one million people. In addition, the partition resulted in the “largest mass
migration in human history of some 10 million.”106 Muslims along the border had to head
west to the freshly created Pakistan, and as the new residents, they had to compete with
established residents for land, resources, and jobs. This caused additional conflict.107

104

Sumit Ganguly, "Pakistan's never-ending story: Why the October coup was no
surprise," Foreign Affairs (March 2000): 3.
105

Robert L. Hardgrave, "India: The dilemmas of diversity." Journal of
Democracy 4, no. 4 (1993): 54.
Crispin Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies,” last modified
March 3, 2011, accessed April 1, 2015,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml.
106

107

Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies”.
52

To further complicate matters, the boundary between India and Pakistan was
drawn up and announced on 17 August 1947, two days after India’s independence, and
three days after Pakistan’s independence. Furthermore, the border itself was fashioned by
British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, who was inexperienced in Indian affairs, and utilized
outdated maps and census information. As a result of the haphazard method of
partitioning , the Kashmir region was left in an ambiguous position. It was not fully given
to either state, but it was claimed by both. This is the region that India and Pakistan have
been fighting over ever since. The conflict over Kashmir began almost immediately after
the partition.108
Only months after the division in 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over
Kashmir, which is something they would do several times again over the course of the
next few decades. Kashmir is a region which borders both India and Pakistan to their
north, and China to its south. While it was believed that the partition would result in the
Muslim population of Kashmir being controlled by Pakistan, and the Hindu population
being controlled by India, the end result was conflict over the entire region, as both India
and Pakistan claimed jurisdiction. The Kashmiri people, however, have historically
viewed things quite differently. As a population consisting of Muslims, Hindus, as well
as Buddhists, traditionally, they have lived peacefully with each other. And since the
decades long fight over the region, there have been a small but growing minority of

108

Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies”.
53

Kashmiris that have been advocating autonomy, and freedom from India as well as
Pakistan.109
The separatist movement among Muslims in the Indian-administered part of
Kashmir largely began in the 1980s, spurred on by the massive demonstration held by
orthodox Muslim students in Kashmir in June of 1976. This was followed in the 1980s by
bomb and arson attacks by Muslim separatist organizations against the Indian
government, who responded with increased military action, which lead to increased
protests and violence against Indian rule. India responded in July 1990 by suspending the
Kashmiri state assembly and imposing “direct federal rule over Kashmir”. 110 The next
decades saw increasing clashes between Kashmiri Muslim separatists and the Indian
military. According to the US State Department, Pakistan showed support for the Islamic
separatists.111
For India and Pakistan, however, it is not about what the people of Kashmir want.
There are many reasons why these two states fight over this region, including nationalism
and religion, but one of the main causes of the fighting is over one of the most important
of resources, water. The Indus River begins in the Tibetan Plateau, which sits on the far
northeast border of India, but the basin is split between India and Pakistan. It then runs
through the length of Pakistan and empties into the Arabian Sea. India and Pakistan,
being the two major beneficiaries of this waterway, have both created dams along the
109

Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Crisis in Kashmir." Asian
Survey (1994): 402.
Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kashmiris in India”, accessed
October 12, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38961e.html.
110

111

Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kashmiris in India”.
54

river’s pathway to use for irrigation as well as hydro-electricity. Of the five main
tributaries, the largest begins in Kashmir. Therefore, if the line of control that they are
fighting over becomes a permanent border, India would control the upper part of the
Indus River, and Pakistan would control the lower part as well as all of its tributaries.112
This would be detrimental for Pakistan to lose control of the upper part. Pakistan
relies on the Indus River, as it is the sole river system supplying this state “where more
than 92 percent of the land is arid or semi-arid.”113 If India retained control of the upper
part of the river, they could cut the supply whenever they wanted or needed to, paralyzing
Pakistan. To make matters worse for Pakistan, “90% of the subcontinent’s industry, and
taxable income base remained in India, including the largest cities of Delhi, Bombay and
Calcutta. The economy of Pakistan was chiefly agricultural and controlled by feudal
elites.”114 For India, control of the Indus River is essential as well. The Indus, in the
northwest of the country, is only one of two river systems which support this region,
which includes Punjab. Punjab, known as the ‘bread basket’ of India, “produces more
than 20 percent of India’s wheat.” 115 The Indus River is extremely important to both
states, and the loss of Kashmir, and control of the Indus River, would be detrimental to
both.

112

Ayesha Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water,” accessed March 30,

2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/201178
12154478992.html
113

Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water,”

114

Bates, “The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies”.

115

Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water”.
55

When the partition was made official in 1947, the British government understood
the importance of the Indus River to both states, but when the British had control of the
entire region, they established an irrigation system in Punjab, the region in India where
the Indus flows. In 1947, it was agreed that both India and Pakistan would share the
system until 1948, putting off making the final decision in the region for a year. The first
day that they were no longer legally obligated to share the system, on 1 April 1948, India
cut off the flow of water to Pakistan. While India could never completely stop the flow of
the Indus, it reduced the amount of water that flowed into Pakistan. This was enough to
cause major problems for Pakistan’s crops, and it also highlighted the problems the
partition was to bring. Pakistan, therefore, cannot give up rights to Kashmir, because if
they did, India would be able to virtually destroy Pakistan. India clearly is in the more
advantageous situation, and Pakistani political leaders know this. For this reason, they
have not given up their claims to the region. They know they would always have to rely
on the magnanimity of India for their water, and thus their survival.116
It should be noted that India has always categorically denied that it has ever
interfered with Pakistan’s water supply. India maintains that any cutting off of the water
supply was either accidental, short term, or both, and there is no way to either prove or
disprove Pakistan’s allegations.117 What is known, however, is that whether or not India
has ever actually tampered with the water supply, they have the strategic advantage. They
therefore can, if they choose, tamper with, and manipulate the water supply flowing into

116

Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water”.

117

Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water”.
56

Pakistan. This is a dangerous enough situation for Pakistan. With partition, India now
controls their water supply.118
Since control of the water supply had been a difficult problem in the region for a
very long time, negotiations were started in order to attempt to alleviate the crisis. In
September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed by both India and Pakistan.
Following more than eight years of negotiations through the World Bank,119 the treaty
was intended to ease the tensions in the region. Initially, India wanted control over all of
the eastern tributaries, as well as part of the western tributaries. Pakistan wanted all of the
western tributaries, as well as part of the eastern tributaries. Part of the problem involved
the system of canals and engineering structures which were intended to regulate the flow
of water from the Indus. These were built by the British when they controlled the entire
region, and now that two separate states wanted to divide the water, they needed to
restructure the canals and engineering structures so that both states would have an ample
supply of water, unimpeded by the other. Because of the impasse between India and
Pakistan, it took several years for the World Bank’s solution to be accepted. In 1954, the
World Bank proposed a complete separation of the tributaries, with Pakistan being given
all of the western tributaries, and India being given all of the eastern tributaries except for
a small portion of one river, which would be given to Pakistan. The proposal allowed for

118

Neda A. Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River
system." Water Policy 11, no. 1 (2009): page 4.
119

Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system.".
57

a period of transition, so that the canals and dams could be adjusted according to the
plan.120
India accepted the proposal, but Pakistan was hesitant, as they believed that the
plan would not provide them with a sufficient supply of water. In an attempt to appease
Pakistan and come to an agreement, an additional proposal was made which called for
increased storage facilities and greater canals along the western rivers. While India
agreed to the concessions, a new controversy arose over who would pay for these new
amenities, and exactly where they would be placed. The new projects would cost
approximately $1.12 billion, and neither state was willing or able to pay this, especially
because both saw themselves as being the rightful heir to the Indus River in the first
place. To settle the dispute, the World Bank suggested that the cost be divided. India
would pay $174 million, Pakistan would pay $46 million, and the remaining $900 million
would be raised in the international community through a consortium of donors. Both
sides agreed to the new terms and were put on a payment plan so that construction would
begin. On 19 September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed in Karachi, Pakistan.121
With the Indus River system divided, the crisis was temporarily alleviated.
However, over the course of the next few decades, both India and Pakistan saw
population increases, which accentuated and revived the old problem.122 While the treaty

120

Aaron T. Wolf and Joshua T. Newton. "Case study of transboundary dispute
resolution: The Indus water treaty," accessed April 17, 2015,
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documents/indus . Ddf.
121

Wolf and Newton. "Case study of transboundary dispute resolution: The Indus
water treaty". The authors do not state why it was that India was asked to shoulder a
larger share of the financial burden.
122

Siddiqi, “Kashmir and the Politics of Water”.
58

allows for cooperation in the building of industrial works affecting the river that both
sides agree to, it also permits India to construct anything it needs in its area, in terms of
hydrological features such as dams or methods of irrigation. The run-off would be
Pakistan’s problem. Additionally, anything India does to the water flow can change the
quality and condition of the water, as well as the amount of water that flows into
Pakistan. And the quality of water has certainly been affected. Polluted water has made
its way into Pakistan’s aquifers, corrupting their fresh water supply. Because all of
Pakistan’s water comes from the Indus and its tributaries, and because they are dependent
on the water flowing down from India, farmers in Pakistan have used this polluted water
to irrigate their farms, resulting in increased disease and decreased soil fertility. Children
in these regions have developed previously unexperienced health problems, and people
living close to the drainage point show high levels of lead in their blood. While India
modified the construction of its structures as necessary to reduce the pollution,123 it again
shows how dependent Pakistan is on India.
In addition, while the Indus Water Treaty has settled some issues, dispute over
water continues to plague the region. This has become especially heated since the 1980s.
Since then, Pakistan has challenged several Indian hydroelectric water projects. More
recently it has taken umbrage with the Baghilar Hydropower Project (BHP), which began
construction in 1999. India proposed to create a dam for power generation on the Chenab
River in the disputed region of Kashmir. Pakistan argued that this project ran contrary to
the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan asserted that this might inhibit the

123

Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system" page

6.
59

flow of water in the region, which could be especially detrimental during the low season,
and insisted that India stop production immediately. Since it was the World Bank which
brokered the original Indus Water Treaty, the World Bank was again called upon for a
solution. They, in turn, assigned a neutral party to come to an unbiased resolution.124
While it was determined that the project could continue, and has in fact since been
completed, this matter points to the continuing problem that exists between India and
Pakistan over control of the Kashmir region, and the water that stems from it.
The problems do not look to be ending any time soon. Due to climate change,
water scarcity is fast becoming an issue in many areas around the world, including the
Indian subcontinent. It is believed that climate change is causing the glaciers in the
Himalayans, which feed the Indus River, to melt at an alarming rate. Over the last two
decades, these glaciers have melted two times as quickly as they did in the two decades
prior, and additionally, it is predicted that over the course of the next eighty years, “up to
two-thirds of the Himalayan glaciers are projected to melt because of climate change.”125
The glaciers play in important role in regulating the flow of the Indus River, as it freezes
the snow in the winter and releases it as water in the summer. As a result, the Indus River
depends on regular, seasonal melting to regulate its flow. In the short term, this means

124

Rajesh Sinha, "Two Neighbours and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,"
Economic and Political Weekly (2006): 606-607.
Pien Huang, “I Spy, Via Spy Satellite: Melting Himalayan Glaciers,” NPR,
accessed October 10, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/733739909/i-spy-via-spysatellite-melting-himalayan-glaciers.
125

60

there will be more flooding, but in the long term, as the glaciers disappear, there will be
less water in the Indus River.126
Couple the melting glaciers and resultant decrease in water with the increasing
population of both India and Pakistan, and this problem will become much worse. It is
predicted that by 2025, the population of India will be three times what it was when the
Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960, and the population of Pakistan will grow to be
six times what it was. More people means there will be more crops requiring irrigation,
more water necessary for industry, and larger cities that will need to be supplied.127 This
means that very soon, a dwindling water supply will need to be shared by millions more
people in an already contentious region.
This will have not only enormous humanitarian consequences, but political and
economic ones as well for both India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy is driven partly
by the sugar and wheat industries, but largely by the textile industry, which forms a large
part of India’s economy as well. It is estimated that almost India and Pakistan provide
approximately “thirty percent of the world’s cotton supply … much of that from the
Indus River Valley. On average, about 737 billion gallons are withdrawn from the Indus
River annually to grow cotton – enough to provide Delhi residents with household water
for more than two years.” 128

William Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River,”
National Geographic, accessed October 10, 2020,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/10/111012-india-pakistan-indus-riverwater/#close.
126

127

Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.

128

Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.
61

The dwindling water supply is already having an effect not only on the Pakistani
farming industry but on their fishing industry as well. Fishermen are abandoning regions
that at one point had sufficient water supplies, but now rivers have turned to streams,
leaving them unable to make a living. Farmers and fishermen are leaving rural regions
that once had adequate water and moving to the cities, where the water supply is still a
problem. 129
The loss of water results in corruption as well. In Karachi, the largest city in
Pakistan, water theft is common, and is a $500 million annual industry. People take
public water from the pipes and sell it from tankers throughout the city and the slums,
where water is difficult to get. In other cities, the water crisis has resulted in food and
energy shortages that have sparked riots and protests. 130
In India, the situation is just as dire. With a population of approximately 1.3
billion, about half of them are currently facing severe water shortages, and roughly
“200,000 die every year from inadequate or unsafe water supplies”. 131 This will continue
to result in food shortages, sanitation problems and increased susceptibility to disease, as
well as conflict over the supplies of water. Infrastructure is struggling, with hospitals and
schools short of water. Hundreds of thousands of people “wait in line each day to fill

129

Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.

130

Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.

Jessie Yeung, Swati Gupta, and Michael Guy, “India Has Just Five Years to
Solve its Water Crisis, Experts Fear. Otherwise Hundreds of Millions of Lives Will Be in
Danger”, CNN, accessed October 11, 2020,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/india/india-water-crisis-intl-hnk/index.html.
131

62

their pots at government water tankers … People are forced to wash utensils in the same
dirty water, saving a few bottles of clean water to cook food.” 132
Several sectors of the economy are suffering as a result. Chennai is one of the
largest cities of southern India and is often referred to as the banking capital of India.
With a growing population that has tripled in the last thirty years to approximately 10
million, it has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. However, water
scarcity will likely slow that growth. Its recent rapid development has largely contributed
to the problem of dwindling water supplies, not just because of the increase in population,
but also because of way the city grew. To accommodate the physical growth of this city,
the municipal government changed zoning regulations to allow builders to fill in water
supplies such as ponds, canals, and flood plains, and then build on top of them. As a
result, water that is normally supplied during the monsoon season is not absorbed by the
land and therefore cannot refill groundwater supplies. 133
With its recent rapid development, coupled with its high population and high
tourism rate, its water supply is being overtaxed. Consequently, the government has had
to spend a lot of money to desalinate sea water, and to import water by using both trains
and water trucks, which is not a long term solution. In a city that is the business center of
southern India, this water shortage is disrupting the flow of business. Most industries in
Chennai have been affected by the dwindling water supply, as it has “caused disruptions
in production schedules, higher operation costs and a reluctance to invest in expansion
132

Yeung, Gupta, and Guy, “India Has Just Five Years to Solve its Water Crisis”.

“Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC,
accessed October 11, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/06/rapid-growth-of-indiaschennai-threatened-by-water-shortages.html.
133

63

because of the uncertainly about future water supplies.” 134 Additionally, many
businesses have had to hire people whose sole job is to manage the importation of water
tankers to their companies, and they pay upwards of 30% more for the water supplied this
way. 135 Water scarcity is having a detrimental effect on the development and growth of
Chennai and its economy, and as one of the largest cities in India, and as the financial
center of southern India, it will have a detrimental effect on India as a whole.
The farming industry is suffering as well, as it uses a tremendous amount of
water. These water problems have and will continue to have, detrimental effects on
India’s economy. The World Bank predicts that unless India can manage its water supply,
it will be unable to achieve its next level of economic growth because it will be unable to
protect its farmers, as well as the agricultural sector as a whole. 136
Because water is often difficult to get in the quantities needed, many farmers in
India have resorted to using untreated sewage wastewater to irrigate their crops. But
while it can reduce costs to the farmers, it also puts them at risk of disease from exposure
to harmful microorganisms found in the wastewater. The wastewater also contains heavy
metals, which, when it builds up in the soil, “results in toxicity to plants and food
contamination.”137 As a result, scientists have discovered dangerous levels of toxic

134

“Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC.

135

“Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC.

“Without Water Management, India’s 8% GDP growth is a distant dream:
World Bank”, Financial Express, accessed October 11, 2020,
https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/world-water-day-2018-without-watermanagement-indian-economy-cant-growth-at-8-world-bank/1107717/.
136

Jennifer Moller-Gulland, J. Carl Ganter, and Cody T. Pope, “Toxic Water,
Toxic Crops: India’s Public Health Time Bomb”, Circle of Blue, accessed October 11,
137

64

substances in the crops themselves, which can cause cancer, malnutrition, as well as
genetic mutation, posing a threat to public health when the crops are consumed. 138
The toxic levels of microorganisms and heavy metals in their agricultural
products is making it more difficult for India to trade those products internationally, as
their agricultural exports are no longer deemed safe by many countries. While “the
United States is India’s top export market”, India is listed by the United States as one of
three countries that “most consistently violate America’s import safety limits. Food
grown in India accounts for 60 percent of the items that United States Customs inspectors
refuse to allow into U.S. markets.” 139 And the United States is not alone in restricting the
importation of food grown in India. The United Arab Emirates has banned many Indian
agricultural products unless they also contained official residue analysis reports. As
nations around the world restrict Indian imports for not meeting international quality
standards, Indian farmers are still left with little choice. They do not have the water
supply to irrigate their farms without the use of wastewater, and they cannot afford to
give up farming. 140
A few farmers have changed the crops that they grow in an attempt to decrease
their water usage. Farming is a huge industry, and farmers use upwards of 90% of the
available groundwater, with rice being not only one of India’s most important staple

2020, https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/india/toxic-water-toxic-crops-indias-publichealth-time-bomb/.
138

Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.

139

Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.

140

Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.
65

crops, but also one that uses a tremendous amount of water. In India’s rice growing
district, “the water table has been declining by 0.7 meters every year”.141 Crops such as
wheat and sugar cane also use a lot of water, but many farmers are hesitant to switch
crops. The government purchases rice at a set price, so they know they will always have a
market, and they are guaranteed an income. While crops such as millet, legumes, and
corn use up to 80% less water than rice, there is no guaranteed market for them, and
therefore no incentive for the farmers to change. Additionally, since the government
subsidizes the cost of water, power, and fertilizer, it can be difficult to convince the
farmers to make the switch to a different crop especially where there is no guaranteed
income.142
As a result, the government has started to enact change, albeit slowly. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi is facing the difficult problem of trying to convince farmers to
switch to a crop that does not have a guaranteed income, such as corn or legumes. But
farmers are the largest voting bloc in India. If he ends the policies of subsidized farming
and guaranteed income for rice, Modi will lose a lot of support. Politically, forcing
farmers to switch their crops is risky. At the beginning of 2020, the north Indian state of
Haryana attempted to limit rice cultivation to half of its farming region. But the farmers
argued that the government cannot prohibit them from growing something which gave
them a guaranteed income.143 In other places, attempts are being made as well. In
Bibhudatta Pradhan and Pratik Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a
Problem for Modi”, Bloomberg, accessed October 12, 2020,
https://www.bloombergquint.com/economy-finance/india-water-crisis-forces-farmers-torethink-their-crops.
141

142

Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.

143

Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.
66

Northern Punjab, cash incentives are being offered “to farmers who use less electricity to
extract ground water. In Maharashtra… farmers are encouraged to use drip irrigation for
sugarcane cultivation.”144 If the farmers do not change, and if Modi does nothing, then
the water situation will continue to get more dire.
Varied other solutions are being offered to the problem as well. Niti Aayog is an
Indian government policy think tank, and Prime Minister Modi is the Chair. Its CEO
Amitabh Kant recently argued that “Water needs to be priced well. If not, then people
won’t understand the value of water.” 145 Parameswaran Iyer, the Secretary of the
Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation agrees with Kant. He maintains that “India
should learn water management from Singapore and Israel” and that “Water is almost
free in India. People are willing to pay for good services including water, but there is
unwillingness on part of state to charge for water usage”. 146 But these views do not take
into consideration the plight of the farmer. Rajinder Singh is a farmer and an activist who
would like to see the government guarantee the purchase of not just rice, but other crops
such as corn, millet, and legumes, which would use much less water to produce. This
would change the attitude of farmers and make the transition to less wasteful crops much

144

Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.

“Water management to play key role in India’s economic growth: Amitabh
Kant”, The Economic Times, accessed October 12, 2020,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/water-management-to-playkey-role-in-indias-economic-growth-amitabh-kant/articleshow/66808688.cms?from=mdr.
145

146

“Water management to play key role in India’s economic growth”.
67

easier. He contends that the “government should give assurance to procure these crops,
more access to market and set up infrastructural facilities like cold storage.”147
India’s water problems are exacerbated by its political problems. Politicians
disagree on solutions and at the same time they try to please their voting constituents.
Additionally, competition between different factions within the government makes
communication among government agencies difficult, which inhibits finding and working
together on a solution. “Policies of data secrecy inhibit the effectiveness of agencies
responsible for planning, resource allocation and disaster preparedness and add to the
atmosphere of mistrust.” 148 It is very difficult to find solutions to these problems in such
an environment.
Finding a solution to the water problems experienced by both India and Pakistan
has become increasingly difficult in recent years. The growth of Hindu nationalism
signified by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party initially in 2014 and again in 2019, has further complicated the issues. By
adding Hindu nationalism into the already complex relationship between the Kashmiri
people and the Indian people, and with the revocation of Article 370 of India’s
Constitution, the region has become more volatile.
Article 370 gave the India-controlled part of Kashmir a certain degree of
autonomy. While foreign affairs and defense remained the purview of the central Indian
government, Kashmir was able to make its own laws and maintain its own constitution.

147

Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.

The World Bank, “Water Sector in India”, accessed October 11, 2020,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/09/29/india-water.
148

68

They could govern themselves in such areas as property ownership and they oversaw
their own basic, fundamental rights. This is the way it had been for approximately
seventy years.149 But Modi made it a central theme of his reelection campaign, arguing
that Kashmir needed to be put “on the same footing as the rest of India”. 150 The reality,
however, is that since the revocation of Article 370, the Kashmiri people have been
suppressed, not made equal.
While many debate whether or not the cancellation of Article 370 on 5 August
2019 by presidential decree was legal, the Indian government has moved forward with
the changes that come from its revocation. This removes Kashmir’s ability to rule itself,
but it also allows other people from India to move to Kashmir and to purchase property,
something Article 370 expressly prohibited. It also suddenly puts the people of Kashmir
under India’s laws. Many Kashmiris feel that the end result is not only the end to political
autonomy, but also the integration of Hindu Indians into the Muslim-dominated region,
which may eventually reduce their majority. 151
As India-controlled Kashmir is largely Muslim, the Hindu nationalism of Modi
and his Bharatiya Janata Party are central to the treatment of the Kashmiri people. Modi’s
animosity toward the Muslim population within India have been well known for many
years, as has his vision of a homogenous Hindu population throughout India. When he
was the chief minister of the state of Gujarat, “he presided over the worst communal

Geeta Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it
matters”, BBC News, accessed October 13, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiaindia-49234708.
149

150

Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”.

151

Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”.
69

bloodletting in India’s recent history in 2002, when 1,000 Muslims, by a conservative
estimate, were slaughtered by sword-wielding Hindus in his state over several weeks.
Some accused Modi of abetting the mobs; other said he turned a blind eye to them.”152
He frequently portrayed himself and other Hindus as the victims of Muslims, erroneously
claiming “that there were forces out to kill him”, and mocked the sufferings of Muslims
at his many rallies attended by his base, as the “crowd roared back: ‘Kill them! Kill
them!’”153
When Kashmir lost its autonomy and was under the full authority of Modi and the
Indian government, steps were immediately taken to cut off the Kashmiri people not only
from the rest of the world, but from each other as well. India sent in 10,000 troops and
arrested many Kashmiri political leaders.154 The internet was immediately shut down and
all cellular networks and landlines were disabled. A curfew was instituted, and all public
assembly was prohibited. In some villages, a soldier from the Indian army was stationed
outside of every home. Stores and homes ran out of food, and pharmacies ran out of
medicine.155 Protests by the Kashmiri people continue, resulting in frequent clashes with
the Indian soldiers.

Kapil Komireddi, “The Kashmir crisis isn’t about territory. It’s about a Hindu
victory over Islam”, The Washington Post, accessed October 13, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-kashmir-crisis-isnt-about-territory-itsabout-a-hindu-victory-over-islam/2019/08/16/ab84ffe2-bf79-11e9-a5c61e74f7ec4a93_story.html.
152

153

Komireddi, “The Kashmir crisis isn’t about territory”.

Harjot Kaur, “Weaponizing Water in Kashmir”, Legal Planet, accessed
October 13, 2020, https://legal-planet.org/2019/09/10/weaponizing-water-in-kashmir/.
154

155

Komireddi, “The Kashmir crisis isn’t about territory”.
70

By formally taking all political control over Kashmir, the Indian government also
took control of Kashmir’s waterways, allowing Modi not only to dominate the Muslim
population there, but also to potentially solve India’s water crisis. India now had power
over the rivers that flow through Kashmir, and there is evidence that they intend to use
that power. In August of 2019, the same month that India revoked Article 370, India
announced that they would not renew an agreement with Pakistan from 1989 in which
both India and Pakistan agreed to share hydrological information of the shared rivers with
each other. This agreement has been renewed every year by both parties up until last
year. That India has backed out of a thirty year agreement, coupled with the fact that
India now physically and legally controls most of the tributaries’ headwaters, has made
many in Pakistan wonder if India plans on meeting its obligations under the Indus Water
Treat of 1960.156
However, India could technically reduce the water flowing into Pakistan and
increase their own supply of water, and still hold to the terms of the IWT. Currently,
India allows some water to flow into Pakistan from the Sutlej and Beas Rivers. Now that
India no longer agrees to share hydrological information of the shared rivers with
Pakistan, India could reduce the water flow, and Pakistan would have little to no notice
that they were about to have a severe water shortage. Therefore, by taking full control of
Kashmir, India now has the upper hand not only in Kashmir, but also in Muslim Pakistan,
and may also have at least a partial solution to their water problem.157

156

Kaur, “Weaponizing Water in Kashmir”.

157

Kaur, “Weaponizing Water in Kashmir”.
71

The problems in Kashmir, as in so many places around the world, comes down to
resources, complicated by ethnic strife. Without the water that flows from the Indus River
and its tributaries, neither India nor Pakistan can adequately sustain its people. Whether
India can provide enough wheat for a swelling population, or whether Pakistan can
provide clean water for its farmers in a dry, dusty climate, determines the future of both
of these states. Furthermore, Pakistan’s dependence upon India for its water supply, as an
unfortunate issue of geography, is crucial to Pakistan’s development and sustainability.
No country can survive without an adequate supply of water. The interdependence on the
Indus River and its tributaries, and the fight for the resources might be the point of
contention, but the inability to adequately cooperate to share the resources points to other
problems between India and Pakistan.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Separatist movements are complicated. They occur frequently throughout the
world and throughout history, though their success, comparatively speaking, is something
that is not often seen. This study examined two separate movements in two distinct parts
of Asia. While there were some shared factors between them, the most glaring
commonality between the plight of the Uyghurs and that of the Kashmiri, is that thus far
they have both failed. But it is not their failure that defines these movements; in many
ways it is their struggles. By looking at their struggles, and the reasons for their separatist
movements, we can understand their history and their culture. We can also understand
how separatist movements originate, and why and when they will occur again throughout
the world.
Separatist movements have a multitude of causes. Among them are nationalism,
geographic or historic reasons, protection from oppression or genocide, religious identity
and ethnic conflict, as well as control of natural resources. We see all these issues in the
separatist movements both in Xinjiang and in Kashmir.
The Uyghur have their own identity outside of being Chinese. With a strong
nationalist sentiment, they resist assimilation into the larger Chinese culture, and retain

73

their own language and customs. Similarly, the Kashmiri have their own sense of
nationalism that excludes incorporation into Indian culture. However, the nationalist
sentiments are never one sided. While the Uyghur and the Kashmiri struggle to create
their autonomy and retain their cultural independence, the nationalism comes through
equally powerfully on the part of the Chinese and Indian governments. As both China
and India look to become global powers, there is an increased need to create strong state
structures and unified, homogenous national identities.158
In China, President Xi Jinping is looking to develop not only a unified society, but
a prosperous and powerful nation, and these two cannot be mutually exclusive. China
feels a need to end its inconsistent policies in Macao and Hong Kong, as well as to
restore sovereignty over Taiwan. This would create one unified, politically and culturally
homogenous China. In order to successfully create this consistent culture and build a
national identity, the Uyghurs must be brought into line. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi has used strong Hindu nationalism to suppress the largely Muslim
Kashmiri people. Creating a strong, nationalist Hindu identity is seen by Modi as being
integral to the creation of a homogenous society in India. While it is difficult to conceive
the brutality that results from such nationalism, it should be pointed out that history is on
their side, as many western nations did very similar things when they were developing
politically and economically, and preparing to become world powers. In the United

James Crabtree, “India and China push a new age of Asian nationalism”,
Nikkei Asia, 23 October 2019, accessed November 3, 2020,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-and-China-push-a-new-age-of-Asian-nationalism.
158

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States, the Native American population was treated in much the same way as the Uyghur
in China and the Kashmiri in India. 159
Separatist movements frequently have historic roots as well. In China, the
Xinjiang region and the Uyghur were traditionally Turkic, and their geographic location
led them to more closely identify with Russian culture than with Chinese culture.
Additionally, they enjoyed sporadic periods of independence throughout the centuries,
and only became absorbed into China in the last century. This makes it difficult for both
the Uyghurs as well as the larger Chinese population to see the Uyghurs as one of them.
Historically, they did not belong to China, so accepting Chinese sovereignty would
understandably be difficult for the Uyghurs. Similarly, the conflict in Kashmir started
with the partition of India in 1947. This move by Great Britain not only created the state
of Pakistan, but also created the conflict over Kashmir. In 2019, India revoked Article
370 of its constitution and with it they also removed all autonomy that the Indian
controlled part of Kashmir had previously enjoyed. Just as the Uyghurs were not
traditionally part of China until relatively recently, the Kashmiri were not part of India
until relatively recently. Because they did not choose to become part of their respective
nations, separatist movements grew in both places.
Protection from oppression or genocide is another common cause of separatist
movements, and it is apparent in both China and India. The Uyghur have frequently felt
the oppressive hand of the Chinese government, and it became much worse following the
Cultural Revolution. The political, legal, and economic policies of the Chinese
government have frequently shown animosity and disfavor to the Uyghur people. For

159

James Crabtree, “India and China push a new age of Asian nationalism”.
75

example, China’s one child policy, as it was enforced among the Uyghur, was intended to
drastically shrink their population much more than the Han Chinese. In recent years, the
use of surveillance in Xinjiang in order to keep track of everyone’s movements, as well
as the creation of concentration camps in order to ‘re-educate’ them are examples of the
severe oppression and tyranny being suffered by the Uyghur at the hands of the Chinese
government.
Likewise, the people of Kashmir have also felt the oppressive hand of the Indian
government. While persecution and repression have existed since the establishment of the
Indian constitution in 1950, it saw an increase in the 1980s with the increasingly vocal
and powerful separatist movement. But with the revocation of Article 370 came not only
the loss of political autonomy by the Kashmiri people, but also the harsh policies of the
Indian government. The Indian military moved in, a curfew was instituted, and all
communication both in Kashmir, and to the outside world, was cut off. These repressive
acts have increased the calls for independence.
Religious identity and ethnic conflict are also relevant to both separatist
movements, as religion is an aspect of the Uyghur and Kashmiri people that differentiates
them from the rest of China and India. Both the Uyghur and the Kashmiri are Muslim and
are frequently referred to as ‘Muslim terrorists’ by their respective governments, with
little to no actual evidence to support their claims. As such, both groups suffer because
not only are they religiously and culturally different, but also because both the Chinese
and Indian governments use that difference to intentionally set apart the Uyghur and the
Kashmiri from the rest of China and India. Modi has made it a central part of his political

76

strategy to culturally isolate Muslims. His Hindu nationalism has given him the pretext
necessary to revoke Article 370 and remove the autonomy of the Kashmiri people.
In addition to nationalism, history, protection from oppression, and religious
identity, the separatist movements in China and India are complicated by the natural
resources that lie in the disputed areas. Xinjiang contains large coal deposits, as well as
some of the largest oil reserves in China. Because China is working to become a global
power, they need the energy reserves. If the Uyghur are successful in their separatist
movement, then they take the land with them and China loses a great deal of coal and oil,
and therefore the wealth and power that goes with it. China cannot let the Uyghur go
because they cannot let the land go. Likewise, Kashmir is the source of much of the water
that comes from the Indus River and its tributaries. India is experiencing extreme water
scarcity, and this problem will only get worse as the months and years wear on. When
Modi revoked Article 370, India gained control of the water in Kashmir, and can now
redirect it to India if and when he chooses. If India were to let the Kashmiri separatist
movement succeed, they lose a significant source of water as well. India’s water scarcity
problems could potentially slow their economy and end their ability to become a global
power.
Separatist movements, whether in China, India, or elsewhere in the world, are not
likely to end any time soon, as the issues which spark these movements continue to exist
in many places around the globe. And it certainly looks as though China and India will be
having problems for many years to come. The Uyghur surveillance and concentration
camps have only just begun, but they are only part of the issues in China, as the Chinese
government has been experiencing civil and political unrest in Hong Kong, and issues

77

with Taiwan and Tibet loom large as well. In India, Modi’s reelection might signify a
growing consensus regarding Hindu nationalism, as well as the role Kashmir should be
playing in Indian politics. As the world watches both China and India, and as China and
India both look to become global powers, the separatist movements, and how they handle
them, will become increasingly relevant not only to those immediately involved, but to
the rest of the world as well.

78

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